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EDITORIAL 
 
 
Dear readers! 
 
The recent issue of the journal Corporate Ownership and Control pays attention to issues of executive 
compensation, investments risks management, corporate audit issues, corporate codes etc. Board of 
drectors issues and peculiarities of corporate governance in developing countries are also under the 
scope of researches. More detailed issues are given below. 
Antony Jackson shows that the presence of asymmetric information can also provide a positive 
externality to those market participants who operate in multiple markets-portfolio managers. Udo C. 
Braendle and John E. Katsos studying intrinsic and extrinsic incentives argue that shareholders’ 
failure to provide the right balance to motivate senior managers to perform at their best is not the result 
of compensation packages as such, but on the focus of compensation packages on extrinsic motivators 
such as pay-for-performance bonuses and stock options. N.J. Godi and J. Young aim to identify risks 
which investors are exposed to when investing offshore and ranking these risks in order of importance, 
based on a literature review as well as views and experiences of South African investment brokers 
registered with the Financial Services Board. Silvia Testarmata, Alessia Montecchia and Emiliano Di 
Carlo focuse on the disclosure of environmental sustainability in codes of ethics, investigating the 
case of Italian listed companies. Michalis Bekiaris, Thanasis Efthymiou and Andreas G. Koutoupis 
record the current situation regarding the mode of interaction of the economic crisis in corporate 
governance and risk management.  
Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, Gerald J. Lobo and Dennis J. Whalen examine the relationship between 
board independence and firm performance over multiple years, post-Sarbanes Oxley. Tsun-Jui Hsieh 
and Yu-Ju Chen investigate the impact of outside directors on firm performance during legal 
transitions and examine how the roles of family business and director compensation influence board 
efficacy. 
Andre Carvalhal, Cesar Martins and Otavio Figueiredo analyze the relation between stock price 
changes and high volume trades in Brazil. Using a unique intra-day database, authors evaluate 10 of 
the most liquid shares from 2001 to 2006. F Cronje, J.H. van Rooyen single out and demonstrate the 
effect of the minimum capital requirements on the profitability, composition and size of a bank 
balance sheet. Research is base on South African data. 
We hope that you will enjoy reading the journal and in future we will receive new papers, outlining 
the most important issues and best practices of corporate governance! 
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Abstract 
 
In dealership markets, asymmetric information feeds through to higher transaction costs as dealers 
adjust their bid-ask spreads to compensate for anticipated losses. In this paper, we show that the 
presence of asymmetric information can also provide a positive externality to those market 
participants who operate in multiple markets-portfolio managers. Specifically, insiders lower the 
estimation errors of portfolio selection methods, thus improving asset allocation. We develop multiple 
artificial markets, in which portfolio managers trade alongside informed and uniformed speculators, 
and we contrast the performance of ‘volatility timing’—a method that relies on efficient price 
discovery - with that of ‘naive diversification’. Volatility timing is shown to consistently outperform 
naive diversification on a risk-adjusted basis.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In market microstructure models, transaction costs 
arise endogenously - either through the inventory 
management process of the monopolist (Ho and 
Stoll, 1981), or through the asymmetric information 
advantage of insiders (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). 
Repeated iteration of the Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) model generates intra-day price dynamics 
via the price setting behavior of a market maker 
responding to the flow of orders arriving from a 
large pool of informed and uninformed traders.  
The degree to which intra-day prices ‘discover’ true 
fundamental value depends on how sensitive the 
dealer’s priors are to the flow of new orders.  The 
dealer adjusts prices most rapidly when the 
proportion of informed trade and the volume of 
orders are high. 
In this paper, we study the effects of 
asymmetric information in the wider context of 
multiple asset markets. In an individual market, a 
higher probability of informed trade unambiguously 
leads to higher transaction costs. We suggest, 
however, that there are subtle benefits of 
asymmetric information that accrue to those who 
operate across many markets: portfolio managers. 
The reason is that portfolio selection methods rely 
to various degrees on efficient price discovery - the 
ability of the market mechanism to accurately 
reflect underlying fundamentals. We argue that 
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private information counteracts the impediment to 
price discovery inherent in low trading volume, and 
that there appears to be an optimal level of private 
information, given the other characteristics of a 
particular market. 
Our approach is to simulate multiple assets 
with correlated fundamentals. In our dealership 
markets, insiders act as the conduit between 
fundamentals and prices. To assess the costs and 
benefits of asymmetric information to portfolio 
managers, we contrast the performance of a strategy 
that relies on efficient price discovery - the 
volatility timing strategy - with naive 
diversification. This choice partly reflects recent 
developments in the portfolio choice literature, but 
also reflects our preference for methods that offer 
the practical advantage of rapid computation. 
Attention has recently focused on portfolio 
management strategies that avoid the problems 
associated with full mean-variance optimization: 
singularity in the covariance matrix of returns, and 
excessive volatility in asset allocations. Restrictions 
are placed on elements of the covariance matrix, or 
‘shrinkage’ estimators are formed as weighted sums 
of the sample covariance matrix and a simple 
‘target’ matrix; see, for example, Jagannathan and 
Ma (2003) and Tu and Zhou (2011). The naive 
diversification strategy (DeMiguel et al., 2009) 
entirely removes the need for an estimated 
covariance matrix, instead allocating an equal share 
of capital to all portfolio constituents. The volatility 
timing strategy (Kirby and Ostdiek, 2012) is more 
involved - basing its allocation on relative 
volatilities calculated using moving windows of 
asset prices. Both strategies share the characteristics 
of full capital allocation and no-short-sales. 
The approach of this paper is to take 
advantage of the simple Bayesian updating 
mechanism offered by the binomial branching 
structure of the sequential trade model (Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985), while retaining the original 
statistical properties of the full multivariate 
simulation of underlying fundamental values. This 
is achieved by mapping multivariate normal returns 
into their Bernoulli equivalents, a process that 
requires boosting the elements of the original 
covariance matrix (Einrich and Piedmonte, 1991). 
Our simulation methodology does not place any 
restrictions on the number of portfolio constituents. 
Covariance matrices are randomly generated using 
a wide range of parameter values within a single-
index factor model. We generate multivariate asset 
returns using the Cholesky factorization of these 
matrices, which requires matrix inversion, but we 
address the potential singularity problem by 
reconstructing those matrices with negative 
eigenvalues (Rebonato and Jackel, 1999). 
A further innovation of this paper is to borrow 
the recombining tree structure of the 
Cox et al. (1979) binomial options pricing 
model. We replace the risk-neutral probabilities of 
Cox et al. (1979) with the probabilities implied by a 
single-index model with drift. Multiple markets are 
linked together by the correlations between their 
fundamental values.  The recombining tree 
structure lays the foundation for future research on 
the stochastic arrival of information, as it keeps the 
dealer’s Bayesian updating task manageable. 
Information arrives at the beginning of each trading 
period, with true values revealed at the end of each 
period. 
We draw an important distinction between the 
trading population that generates prices 
(uninformed and informed speculators), and 
portfolio managers who act upon multiple asset 
prices. A feature of the Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) model is that as the dealer processes orders, 
the uncertainty of the true underlying value 
diminishes, in turn leading to narrower bid-ask 
spreads. If we were to posit portfolio managers as 
arriving randomly during the session - like the rest 
of the population - we would also randomly vary 
the impact of transaction costs. We prefer instead to 
place all portfolio manager trades at the opening 
bid- ask spreads of each period, which enables 
transaction costs to be a pure function of the 
probability of informed trade. This abstraction also 
enables us to sidestep the tricky issue of strategic 
behavior when market participants trade more than 
a single unit. Portfolio managers in our model are 
able to accurately signal to the dealer that they are 
uninformed. In concurrent research, we consider the 
liquidity cost that must be borne by portfolio 
managers who are unable to naturally differentiate 
themselves from the rest of the population. In this 
version, portfolio managers operate in multiple 
‘Kyle’ auction markets (Kyle, 1985). 
The final bid-ask spread of each session is 
used to calculate the session ‘close’. Portfolio 
managers mark their holdings to market using 
closing prices. The day-to-day changes in account 
value imply a series of strategy returns, with mean 
returns and risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe ratio) 
following. In addition, volatility timing managers 
use closing prices in the volatility calculations that 
determine their asset allocations. This is why 
trading volume and the probability of informed 
trade have a joint influence on the performance of 
the volatility timing strategy. A large flow of orders 
makes it easier for the dealer’s posterior 
probabilities to converge to the true probabilities, 
but unless there is a sufficient level of informed 
trade, even high volume may be insufficient for 
efficient price discovery.  In the extreme, with an 
entirely uninformed population, a competitive, risk-
neutral dealer quotes a single bid/ask price, and 
sees no reason to adjust the price in response to 
trading volume.  Instead, the price jumps each time 
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the changes in fundamental value become common 
knowledge. 
The model of fundamentals presented in 
Section 2 generates multivariate normal returns 
using a single index factor model. Individual assets 
are characterized by the sensitivity of their returns 
to movements in the market index, and through the 
portfolio’s correlation matrix. These data determine 
the sizes and probabilities of ‘up’ and ‘down’ 
movements in our Cox et al. (1979) discretization 
scheme. Intra-day trade takes place in individual 
competitive markets that are indirectly connected 
by the insiders who make decisions based on 
private access to fundamental information. The 
latest change in fundamental value is made 
common knowledge at the end of each day, with 
dealers adjusting their opening spreads accordingly. 
Although beyond the scope of the current paper, the 
recombining structure of the Cox et al. (1979) 
scheme allows the revelation of information to 
occur stochastically, whilst keeping the dealer’s 
updating task manageable. A natural way to do this 
is to use a geometric distribution to randomly select 
the release of ‘news announcements’. 
Section 2 also describes the Einrich and 
Piedmonte (1991) procedure for transforming 
multivariate normal random variables into their 
Bernoulli equivalents. We describe the Rebonato 
and Jackel (1999) method for dealing with singular 
correlation matrices, and list the parameter 
assumptions used in constructing our various 
portfolios. 
Section 3 describes the model we use to create 
intra-day price dynamics and closing prices. We 
derive probability updating equations in terms of 
the probabilities of informed trade and the 
probability of value rising. The sizes of price 
movements, and their probabilities of occurrence, 
feed from Section 2. 
Once the time series of opening and closing 
prices has been generated, we test the performance 
of the naive diversification and volatility timing 
strategies. In Section 4, upon observing the vector 
of opening bid-ask quotes, each manager re-values 
his current positions, and calculates his desired 
holdings. The naive diversification manager 
allocates capital equally between assets, whereas 
the volatility timing manager allocates capital using 
rolling estimates of volatility. 
In Section 5, we present the results, and we 
use nonparametric methods to identify the key 
drivers of portfolio performance. The key driver of 
mean returns is the probability of informed trade, 
while the key driver of the Sharpe ratio statistic is 
the strategy type. 
The determinants of the highest mean return 
are intuitively straightforward: substantial volume 
in illiquid states, combined with low probabilities 
of informed trade. The determinants of a strategy’s 
Sharpe ratio offer a more interesting story. The 
Sharpe ratios of the volatility timing strategy 
dominate those of the naive diversification strategy 
across all market conditions. Since mean returns are 
not driven by strategy type, it must be that the 
volatility timing strategy offers improved risk-
adjusted returns via lower risks. There are 
substantial improvements in the volatility timing 
strategy’s risk-adjusted performance as the number 
of assets in the portfolio is increased, but the most 
intriguing driver is the probability of informed 
trade—the Sharpe ratios corresponding to a 1% 
probability of informed trade are lower than those 
corresponding to higher probabilities. Evidently, 
the volatility timing strategy benefits from the 
improved price discovery offered by ‘reasonable’ 
levels of asymmetric information, but these gains 
are eventually overwhelmed by higher transaction 
costs. 
The paper concludes with suggestions for 
future research. In particular, our recombining tree 
structure allows for staggered news arrivals, 
without the need for great complexity in the 
dealer’s Bayesian updating problem. The use of a 
geometric distribution for the timing of news 
arrivals would seem a sensible start, with insiders 
maintaining their informational advantage at all 
times. 
 
2. Fundamentals 
 
The log-returns of the portfolio constituents’ 
fundamental values are multivariate normally 
distributed. The returns generating process is 
assumed to be a single-index model, where the 
return on the risk-free asset is normalized to zero. 
An individual asset’s expected returns are a simple 
function of its beta coefficient and the expected 
return to the market index: 
 
 , 
 
where  denotes the expected return to asset , 
and  denotes the expected return to the market 
index.  The beta coefficient  is defined by 
 
, 
 
and measures the ratio of the covariance of the 
returns to an asset and those of the market index to 
the variance of the returns to the market index. 
The expected return to the market index is 
assumed to be constant,  p.a., with a 
constant annual volatility of   p.a.  
Individual volatilities  , betas  , and pairwise 
correlations   are drawn independently from 
various uniform distributions.  Table 1 lists the 
various specifications.  Each asset’s annual 
volatility is assumed to lie in the range 5% to 40%, 
and its beta coefficient in the range 0.50 to 1.50. 
The pairwise correlation coefficient between assets 
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lies in the range 0.00 to 1.00. These parameter 
distributions are chosen to allow for a wide range of 
volatilities, as well as a variety of relationships with 
the market index. 
 
Table 1. Simulation Parameter Distributions 
 
Parameter Description Value 
 Number of portfolios 1000 
 Number of portfolio constituents {2, 5, 10} 
 Market Index volatility (p.a.) 20% 
 Market Index expected return (p.a.) 10% 
 Asset   volatility (p.a.) Uniform (5%, 40%) 
 Asset   beta Uniform (0.50, 1.50) 
 Correlation ( ) Uniform (0.00, 1.00) 
 
Each portfolio consists of 2, 5, or 10 stocks. 
For each of these different portfolio sizes, we 
simulate 1000 portfolios using randomly-generated 
correlation matrices. We assume that each  (
) is drawn independently from a continuous 
uniform distribution with range 
[0, 1]. The elements along the main diagonal 
are set to 1, and those below the main diagonal are 
set (by symmetry) according to .  The 
resulting correlation matrix C is used to generate 
multivariate normal random variables. In order to 
be compatible with the simple intra-day sequential 
trade model, these multivariate random variables 
are then transformed to Bernoulli random variables. 
 The sizes of fundamental value movements 
are described by the following equations: 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
where  denotes annual volatility, and 
 denotes a single day in which prices 
can move up  or down , where the size of the 
down move is simply the reciprocal of the up move. 
The probabilities of the moves are calculated 
using a modified version of the Cox et al. (1979) 
discretization scheme, in which the risk-neutral 
drift rate is replaced by the stock’s expected return: 
 
 (1) 
 
This enables the design of a procedure that 
starts by generating correlated multivariate random 
variables, and then maps those variables into a 
simpler Bernoulli distribution. The binomial 
process for fundamental value fits comfortably with 
the sequential trade model of Section 3, which—
when iterated over many time periods—recaptures 
the statistical properties of the original distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
Multivariate Bernoulli Transformation 
 
The square matrix C can be expressed in terms of 
its diagonal eigenvalue matrix Λ, and the 
corresponding unit-length eigenvector matrix S: 
 
CS = SΛ (3) 
 
Provided the matrix C has only non-negative 
eigenvalues, Equation 3 can be post-multiplied 
throughout by the inverse matrix S
-1
 to yield 
 
C = SΛS-1 (4) 
 
Furthermore, since the eigenvector matrix has 
been defined in terms of unit-length vectors, 
Equation 4 may be written as 
 
C = SΛST (5) 
 
with S
T 
replacing S
-1
.  Now define B = S .  
Then Equation 5 may be rewritten as  
 
C = S  S
T
 = BB
T
, (6) 
 
the spectral decomposition of the correlation 
matrix. A matrix of correlated standard normal 
random variables X is constructed using the 
transformation 
 
X = BZ (7) 
 
where Z is a matrix of independent standard 
normal random variables. 
Our objective is to use a simple mapping from 
the matrix X of correlated normal random variables 
into a matrix P of correlated Bernoulli random 
variables, which in turn are used in the binomial 
branching structure of the Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) sequential trade model. We denote the 
multivariate Bernoulli distribution’s marginal 
probabilities by  , .  These probabilities 
correspond to each asset’s probability of an up 
move, as defined by Equation 2. If a stock’s 
characteristics are such that it has a high expected 
rate of return, then its probability of an up move 
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will be higher - the magnitude of the move is given 
by Equation 1. 
The resulting correlation matrix of returns has 
pairwise correlation coefficients that are 
significantly lower than the original correlation 
matrix C. The problem is overcome by first 
increasing the off-diagonal elements of C using the 
procedure proposed in Einrich and Piedmonte 
(1991). First, the quantiles of the standard normal 
distribution are evaluated at the Bernoulli marginal 
probabilities: 
 
. 
 
Then, the pairwise correlation coefficients of 
C above the main diagonal are replaced by 
numerically solving for in the following 
equation: 
 
 , 
(8) 
 
where  is the c.d.f. of the bivariate 
standard normal distribution. The correlation 
coefficients below the main diagonal are set 
as  , ensuring that the new ‘boosted’ 
correlation matrix  is square-symmetric.  
 Using Equations 3 through 6, spectral 
decomposition is performed on C. However, it is 
well known (especially for larger portfolios) that 
the correlation matrix is likely to have at least one 
negative eigenvalue, making it impossible to invert 
the correlation matrix in the first step of the 
decomposition. One method of addressing this 
problem is to follow Rebonato and Jackel (1999) in 
setting any negative eigenvalues to zero, and then 
reconstructing a new correlation matrix as an 
approximation to the original. The eigenvector 
matrix S is post multiplied by the square-root of the 
corrected eigenvalue matrix  to yield the adjusted 
factor matrix 
 
 , 
 
where T is a diagonal scaling matrix with 
elements  , i.e., the row-wise 
eigenvectors multiplied by the adjusted 
eigenvalues. The adjusted correlation matrix  
is defined by 
 
. 
 
Finally, the boosted matrix of correlated 
standard normal random variables  is 
mapped into a matrix of correlated Bernoulli 
random variables P using the rule 
 
 
 
 
To summarize: we randomly create a target 
correlation matrix  that describes the original 
multivariate distribution of fundamental returns. 
The pairwise correlation coefficients of  are 
boosted in order to construct a new matrix to be 
used in the generation of multivariate Bernoulli 
random variables. If the eigenvalues of  are all 
non-negative, then spectral decomposition is 
performed on ; otherwise, a new correlation 
matrix is constructed from the ‘corrected’ 
diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. The adjusted matrix 
of correlated standard normal random variables is 
then mapped into a matrix of correlated Bernoulli 
random variables, which when used in conjunction 
with Equations 1 and 2 recovers the properties of 
the original correlation matrix . 
 
3. Intra-day Trading 
 
The intra-day model is based on Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985)
1
, and is used to generate time 
series of opening and closing prices, with a view to 
testing various portfolio strategies. Opening prices 
are used to revalue current positions, and to 
determine the prices at which fresh purchases and 
sales are transacted; the opening bid-offer spread 
determines transaction costs. Closing prices are 
prices at which it is not possible to trade, but are 
commonly the ones used to calculate the returns to 
a strategy. They also play a central role in the 
volatility timing strategy, as the strategy uses 
volatility estimates calculated from rolling windows 
of closing prices. Closing prices are determined by 
the set of dealer quotes after the final trade of the 
day. The price discovery mechanism is expected to 
function better in high-volume conditions, with 
aggregate order imbalances reflecting asymmetric 
information. 
There are four market participants: informed 
traders, uninformed traders, portfolio managers, and 
risk-neutral dealers. Price competition between 
dealers ensures that each dealer exactly offsets the 
expected losses from trading with informed traders 
with the expected gains from trading with 
uninformed traders. Provided the details of 
individual trades are made available to all dealers, 
the problem reduces analytically to that of one 
dealer. 
Trading volume λ determines the number of 
trades that take place each day. The sequential trade 
model deals with daily trading volume as a 
sequence of single-unit transactions between 
individual traders and the dealer. Traders are 
randomly selected, one at a time, from a large pool 
                                                          
1
 Other references include Easley and O’Hara (1992), who 
extend the model to include the possibility of infrequent 
information asymmetry, and Back and Baruch (2004). 
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of informed and uninformed traders, with q 
denoting the probability of drawing an informed 
trader. The dealer quotes an ask price at which 
traders may buy a single unit of the asset, and a bid 
price at which they may sell. When presented with 
these quotes, traders have the option to buy, sell, or 
pass on the trading opportunity. The dealer knows 
that informed traders will choose to buy only if Ask 
<  (ask is below fundamental value), and will 
choose to sell only if Bid >  (bid is above 
fundamental value). Uninformed traders choose to 
trade for reasons unrelated to private information. 
They are, for example, motivated by hedging 
requirements, or by the need to meet liabilities. We 
assume that, for all quotes, uninformed traders 
randomly buy or sell with probability 1/2. 
In the basic version of the model, the dealer 
learns the true value of the asset at the end of each 
trading period. In the meantime, his ability to keep 
track of value depends on liquidity (the number of 
trades each period), and the proportion q of 
informed traders. 
Figure 1 illustrates the unconditional 
probabilities of various events, each organized by 
the trading decisions of informed and uninformed 
traders - and two possible changes in value. 
We assume that the dealer is fully conversant 
with the structure of the model, and that his 
specialist knowledge ensures that he uses correct 
values for volatility and expected returns. 
As a consequence, he correctly calculates the 
unconditional probabilities p and 1−p of up and 
down moves. Informed traders never pass, because 
the presence of uniformed traders ((1− q) > 0) 
ensures that if the next trader buys, expected value 
must lie below the ‘up’ value .  This is because 
the buy trade could come from an uninformed 
trader in the ‘down’ value state of the world. 
Similarly, if the next trader sells, expected value 
must lie above the ‘down’ value . 
The asset price is initially set to fundamental 
value , and the returns generating process 
determines whether value moves up to  or down 
to . A trader is chosen at random from the pool 
of informed and uninformed traders, with q 
denoting the probability of selecting an informed 
trader, and 1 − q the probability of selecting an 
uninformed trader. Informed traders immediately 
receive a signal of the new value. The dealer’s risk-
neutrality, and the zero-profit condition, leads the 
dealer to set his quotes according to 
 
 (9) 
 
And 
 
. (10) 
 
The ask is set such that the dealer expects to 
make zero profit if the next trade is a buy. Because 
of the presence of uninformed traders, buy trades 
can occur for both values of V.   Equation 9 
therefore expands to 
 
  (11) 
 
where  and  serve 
as the dealer’s updating equations in a dynamic 
setting.  Using Bayes’ Rule, we obtain 
 
 (12) 
 
And 
 
 (13) 
 
Using the probabilities in the rightmost 
column of Figure 1, 
 
 
 
(14) 
 
And 
 
 
 
(15) 
 
The bid price is derived in a similar manner. 
Using the probabilities in the rightmost column of 
Figure 1, 
 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
Trading volume determines the quantity of 
random draws from the trading population in each 
session. The dealer updates his bid-ask spread using 
the updating Equations 9 and 
10. After the final trade of the day, the mid-
price of the bid and ask prices is used as the closing 
price of the day. With a small probability ζ = 0.1, 
trading volume may change from a low-volume 
regime to a high-volume regime, and vice versa. 
The fundamental value becomes common 
knowledge in the time between the close of the 
current session and the open of the next. The 
dealer’s opening spread reflects this update in 
public information. 
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Figure 1. Probability of different types in the sequential trade model 
 
 
4. Portfolio Strategies 
 
We consider two portfolio strategies: naive 
diversification and volatility timing. Both strategies 
are fully-invested, and exclude the possibility of 
short sales. The naive diversification strategy 
allocates a weight of 
 
 
 
to each portfolio constituent, whereas the 
volatility timing strategy allocates capital on the 
basis of a modified version of the minimum 
variance portfolio. 
The problem set-up for the volatility timing 
strategy is 
 
 
 
subject to 
 
, 
 
where  is the vector of portfolio weights, 
and is the variance-covariance matrix of returns. 
It can be shown that the solution to the problem is 
 
, 
 
where  is the sum of the elements of the th 
column of , the inverse of . However, the 
volatility timing strategy removes the need to 
compute the inverse by setting the off-diagonal 
elements  of to zero. The elements of the inverse 
matrix are now simply the reciprocal of the 
elements of the original matrix, and the solution to 
the problem is 
 
 
 
(16) 
 
where  is the variance of the returns to asset 
.  As with the naive diversification portfolio, the 
weights of the volatility timing portfolio are non-
negative. Both strategies are fully-invested, and 
both strategies attempt to reduce the high turnover 
and estimation errors associated with full mean-
variance optimization. 
We adopt the simplifying assumption that the 
trades made by portfolio managers do not influence 
the intra-day dynamics of price.
2
  Instead, we 
assume that orders are good for any size at the 
opening bid-ask spread, and that portfolio managers 
place all their orders at the open. This has the 
additional analytical advantage of separating the 
influence of private information on transaction 
costs from its influence (in combination with 
trading volume) on ‘price discovery’. The closing 
price is used to value positions at the end of each 
day, which in turn allows calculation of the daily 
returns to each strategy. Closing prices also provide 
the information that the volatility timing strategy 
uses for calculating rolling estimates of daily 
volatilities—the estimates that in turn determine the 
desired weights in each asset for the next session. 
The following algorithms describe the daily 
activities of the naive diversification and volatility 
timing strategies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 An interesting enhancement would be to include portfolio 
managers as part of the trading population, with their 
orders contributing to daily trading volume—and hence 
price dynamics. However, the order-splitting strategy of 
managers needs to be carefully addressed in such a 
setting. 
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Algorithm 1: Naive Diversification 
 
Step 1: Revalue account using opening mid-prices 
 
Positions are revalued at the dealer’s opening 
mid-price :   
 
, 
 
where  is the value of short-term cash 
balances. We allow small temporary negative cash 
positions, but do not allow strategies to manage 
leverage strategically. 
 
Step 2: Calculate Desired Positions 
 
The account size is multiplied by 1/n, and divided 
by the dealer’s opening mid-price to yield a new 
desired holding : 
 
 
 
Step 3: Calculate Orders 
 
New orders are calculated as the difference between 
desired positions and current positions : 
 
 
 
where  denotes today’s order in asset   
 
Step 4: Calculate Expenditure and Income 
 
For buy orders, expenditure is calculated using the 
dealer’s ask price, and for sell orders, income is 
calculated using the bid price: 
 
 
 
The change in the cash position is the sum of 
expenditure and income over all assets: 
 
 
 
Step 5: Revalue Account at Closing Mid-Prices 
 
At the conclusion of intra-day trading, the final 
dealer quotes are used to calculate closing prices—
the final mid-prices for each asset. The account is 
re-valued, and the daily return to the naive 
diversification strategy is calculated using 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 2: Volatility Timing 
 
Step 1: Revalue account using opening mid-prices 
 
Positions are revalued at the dealer’s opening 
mid-price :   
 
, 
 
where  is the value of any cash holdings. 
 
Step 2: Calculate Desired Positions 
 
The account size is multiplied by the weights 
calculated in Equation 16, and divided by the 
dealer’s opening mid-price to yield a new desired 
holding : 
 
 
 
Step 3: Calculate Orders 
 
New orders are calculated as the difference between 
desired positions and current positions  in each 
asset: 
 
 
 
where  denotes today’s order in asset   
 
Step 4: Calculate Expenditure and Income 
 
For buy orders, expenditure is calculated using the 
dealer’s ask price, and for sell orders, income is 
calculated using the bid price: 
 
 
 
The change in the cash position is the sum of 
expenditure and income over all assets: 
 
 
 
Step 5: Revalue Account at Closing Mid-Prices 
 
At the conclusion of intra-day trading, the final 
dealer quotes are used to calculate closing prices—
the final mid-prices for each asset. The account is 
re-valued, and the daily return to the volatility 
timing strategy is calculated using 
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It now remains to examine large-sample 
returns and risk-adjusted returns to the two 
strategies for various market conditions. Each 
simulation generates 10 years of intra-day trade and 
closing prices. Each market condition is tested for 
1000 simulations of fundamental values. 
 
5. Results 
 
Each cell of Table 2 contains the mean annual 
return and Sharpe ratio for 1000 multivariate 
simulations of fundamental values using the single-
index model of Section 2. The upper panel contains 
the results for 2-stock portfolios. The middle panel 
contains the results for 5-stock portfolios, and the 
lower panel the results for 10-stock portfolios. 
Within each panel, the results are split horizontally 
into those results for the naive diversification 
strategy, and those for the volatility timing strategy. 
Vertically, the results are arranged by increasing 
levels of asymmetric information or probabilities of 
informed trade. Within each of these sections, an 
individual cell corresponds (vertically) to the level 
of trading volume in an illiquid state (10, 50, or 
250), and (horizontally) to a level of trading volume 
in a liquid state (50, 250, 1000). For example, the 
upper-left cell of the top panel reports a mean 
return of 10.21%, and a Sharpe ratio of 0.59 for the 
naive diversification strategy.  This corresponds to 
1000 underlying simulations of markets in which 
the probability of informed trade is 0.01, trading 
volume in the illiquid state is 10, and trading 
volume in the liquid state is 50. An alternative to 
the two-state model is a single-state model with 
constant volume, but we prefer to allow for the 
possibility of the price discovery mechanism being 
disrupted at the points where regime shifts occur. 
The probability of switching is ζ = 0.1, which is 
intended to reflect our intuition that markets 
‘remember’ the current regime. 
For the 2-stock portfolio, an interesting pattern 
develops as the level of asymmetric information 
increases from 0.01 through 0.20. For the (10, 50) 
volume combination, the mean return for the naive 
diversification strategy is at its highest when q = 
0.01. This is to be expected, as the dealer quotes 
narrow spreads when the probability of adverse 
selection is low. As the probability of informed 
trade rises from 0.01 to 0.05, and from 0.05 to 0.10, 
the naive diversification strategy’s mean return falls 
to 9.85%, and then to 9.31%.  The interesting 
change, however, occurs when the probability of 
informed trade rises from 
0.10 to 0.20: the mean return rises to 9.53%, 
despite the dealer’s wider spreads. A similar pattern 
occurs for the corresponding Sharpe ratio: 0.59, 
0.58, 0.56, and then an increase to 0.60. As this 
pattern disappears for portfolios with more assets, 
we suggest that the pattern is linked to the naive 
diversification strategy’s in-built tendency to over-
allocate capital to high beta stocks. 
The pattern for mean returns is broadly similar 
for the volatility timing strategy, with apparently 
little difference between the volatility timing and 
naive diversification strategies’ mean returns under 
similar market conditions. The most striking 
difference, however, is in the levels of the Sharpe 
ratio—the volatility timing strategy consistently 
produces results approximately 0.20 in excess of 
those of the naive diversification strategy.  In the 
illiquid volume combination (10, 50), the highest 
Sharpe ratio of the volatility timing strategy (0.81) 
occurs when the level of asymmetric information is 
at its highest. In the most liquid combination (250, 
1000), the highest Sharpe ratio occurs when q = 
0.05, and falls thereafter. The volatility timing 
strategy outperforms the naive diversification 
strategy, not because of its similar mean returns, but 
because of its lower risk. Efficient price discovery 
is essential to its success, with the presence of 
asymmetric information offsetting the impediment 
to price discovery inherent in low trading volume. 
That the volatility timing strategy consistently 
outperforms the naive diversification strategy 
confirms our view that those strategies that rely on 
accurate prices, and in turn returns, benefit most 
from a reasonable level of asymmetric information. 
In the next section we more formally identify the 
drivers of portfolio performance. 
 
Table 2. Mean Returns and Sharpe Ratios 
 
2-Stock Portfolio 
  Naive Diversification  Volatility Timing 
  50 250 1000  50 250 1000 
 10 10.21 0.59 9.77 0.58 9.52 0.55  10.17 0.80 9.83 0.79 9.50 0.74 
q=0.01 50   10.01 0.60 9.96 0.59    10.01 0.80 9.90 0.78 
 250     10.03 0.59      10.01 0.80 
 10 9.85 0.58 9.70 0.55 9.18 0.58  9.94 0.77 9.69 0.78 9.31 0.79 
q=0.05 50   9.44 0.58 10.10 0.63    9.53 0.79 10.19 0.85 
 250     9.80 0.61      9.88 0.82 
 10 9.31 0.56 9.06 0.55 9.31 0.59  9.47 0.76 9.13 0.75 9.58 0.82 
q=0.10 50   9.34 0.58 9.48 0.60    9.54 0.80 9.42 0.80 
 250     10.03 0.60      9.96 0.81 
 10 9.53 0.60 9.13 0.56 9.35 0.59  9.59 0.81 9.29 0.76 9.47 0.81 
q=0.20 50   9.50 0.57 9.38 0.57    9.61 0.77 9.56 0.77 
 250     9.74 0.59      9.76 0.80 
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5-Stock Portfolio 
  Naïve Diversification  Volatility Timing 
  50 250 1000  50 250 1000 
 10 10.03 0.63 9.90 0.64 9.93 0.64  9.92 1.01 9.99 1.05 9.99 1.06 
q=0.01 50   10.21 0.64 9.70 0.63    10.16 1.03 9.97 1.05 
 250     9.82 0.65      9.86 1.06 
 
 10 9.69 0.63 9.54 0.67 9.21 0.69  9.75 1.04 9.88 1.12 9.62 1.17 
q=0.05 50   9.46 0.68 9.15 0.69    9.68 1.12 9.55 1.17 
 250     9.15 0.68      9.62 1.16 
 
 10 9.17 0.65 9.20 0.69 9.29 0.70  9.45 1.09 9.49 1.18 9.53 1.15 
q=0.10 50   8.84 0.66 9.20 0.68    9.36 1.10 9.53 1.14 
 250     9.22 0.60      9.48 1.01 
 
 10 8.71 0.66 9.08 0.66 8.87 0.65  9.15 1.12 9.48 1.11 9.30 1.10 
q=0.20 50   9.07 0.61 9.30 0.64    9.54 1.04 9.67 1.07 
 250     9.33 0.59      9.54 0.99 
10-Stock Portfolio 
  Naïve Diversification  Volatility Timing 
  50 250 1000  50 250 1000 
 10 9.87 0.69 9.75 0.68 9.89 0.70  9.90 1.21 9.90 1.22 9.98 1.23 
q=0.01 50   9.77 0.69 9.62 0.69    9.82 1.20 9.77 1.21 
 250     9.57 0.70      9.75 1.23 
 
 10 9.59 0.70 9.55 0.76 9.31 0.80  9.85 1.26 9.81 1.35 9.74 1.46 
q=0.05 50   9.59 0.79 9.38 0.82    9.86 1.40 9.79 1.48 
 250     9.36 0.81      9.72 1.44 
 
 10 9.25 0.74 9.15 0.80 9.20 0.80  9.62 1.34 9.59 1.45 9.66 1.46 
q=0.10 50   9.23 0.79 8.97 0.76    9.67 1.43 9.55 1.42 
 250     9.38 0.69      9.72 1.23 
 
 10 8.69 0.76 8.71 0.73 8.57 0.73  9.44 1.42 9.37 1.38 9.38 1.39 
q=0.20 50   9.13 0.69 8.97 0.68    9.60 1.27 9.56 1.25 
 250     9.00 0.62      9.51 1.14 
 
5.1 Data Visualization and 
Interpretation 
 
Table 2 presents our results in finely-classified 
samples. While it is clear from the table that the 
Sharpe ratios of the volatility timing strategy 
dominate those of the naïve diversification strategy, 
it is not easy to determine whether strategy type, or 
some other characteristic of market conditions, is 
the key driver of portfolio performance. For 
instance, the probability of informed trade may be 
important, as may be the simple diversification 
effect from increasing the number of portfolio 
constituents. Classification trees, a technique from 
the nonparametric statistics literature, offer an 
excellent way of ranking the determinants of 
portfolio performance, as well as providing a neat 
visual representation of the data. They are ideally 
suited to a ranking task, with the data being 
repeatedly partitioned according to those elements 
of the sample space that most reduce prediction 
error. The key reference is Breiman et al. (1984).
3
 
The response variable Y is predicted using a 
multivariate set of predictors X.  In this paper, we 
consider two response variables—the mean return 
                                                          
3
 Software-based tutorials include Martinez and Martinez 
(2008) and Torgo (2011). 
and the Sharpe ratio of a strategy.  The set of 
predictors includes the strategy type, the number of 
stocks in the portfolio, the probability of informed 
trade, and the volume of trade in the illiquid state.   
Consider first the two trees for the mean 
prediction task. Figures 2 and 3 are in fact drawn 
from one tree, but have been separated to improve 
legibility. Each sample of observations is 
represented by an ellipsis or rectangle. The ellipses 
represent samples that will be divided further into 
smaller groups; the rectangles, known as the 
‘leaves’ or ‘terminal nodes’ of the tree, represent 
the finest partitions of the data. Theoretically, the 
samples can be partitioned into ever-decreasing 
samples, until each terminal node contains only one 
observation, but in practice a tree ceases to be 
grown (or is ‘pruned’) according to a statistical or 
normative criterion. With a view to clarity and 
parsimony, we terminate the trees using a 
maximum depth criterion: the number of levels 
below the initial sample is set to 5, meaning that 
each of the sub-figures, Figure 2 and Figure 3, has 4 
levels. When compared with alternative statistical 
pruning procedures, we find that this level of detail 
errs on the side of parsimony—further nodes, by 
definition, improve the in-sample predictive 
accuracy of the tree, but do so with increased risk 
of over-fitting. 
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There are 144,000 observations in the full 
sample, which correspond to the 144 cells of Table 
2. The pooled mean return is 9.55% for these 
observations. The procedure examines all possible 
partitions across the predictor variables, and 
chooses the best binary split— defined as the 
partition that most reduces the total mean-squared-
error of the tree. 
Formally, the mean of the full sample is 
defined by 
 
 
 
and the mean-squared-error by 
 
R  
 
After the first split, there are two nodes, each 
with its own  and R.  Denote these within-node 
squared errors by and . After the first split, the 
mean-squared-error of the tree is the sum of 
and . 
The first partition of the mean returns 
classification tree splits the full sample into two 
groups. The first contains observations in which the 
probability of informed trade q ∈ {0.01, 0.05}, and 
the second contains observations in which q ∈ 
{0.10, 0.20}. These are the nodes at the top of the 
trees of Figures 2 and 3. Interpreting these two new 
samples as ‘low’ and ‘high’ asymmetric 
information samples, the low asymmetric 
information tree of Figure 2 has a sample mean of 
9.76%, with 72,000 observations. The high 
asymmetric information tree also contains 72,000 
observation, but with a mean return of 9.35%. The 
0.41% fall in mean returns represents a flow of 
wealth from uninformed to informed traders. 
We next consider the low asymmetric 
information and high asymmetric information trees. 
For each tree, we describe a particular path down 
the tree. The highest mean return of Figure 2 is 
9.97%, represented by the second terminal node 
from the left. The first partition of the tree divides 
observations into probabilities of informed trade of 
q = 0.01 and q = 0.05.   In markets with the lowest 
probability of informed trade (q = 0.01), mean 
returns are 9.89%, 0.27% higher than the mean 
returns generated by markets with q = 0.05. 
Continuing down the q = 0.01 branch of the tree, 
the next most important driver of performance is 
the number of portfolio constituents, with those 
portfolios containing 2 or 5 stocks generating 
higher returns than those with 10 stocks. An 
explanation for this phenomenon could be that the 
naive diversification strategy allocates equal levels 
of capital to high-volatility and low-volatility 
assets, thus boosting mean returns when the number 
of portfolio constituents is small. More clearly, in 
the next partition, mean returns are higher when 
trading volume is high in the illiquid state. Note 
that this path down the tree does not distinguish the 
returns to the naive diversification strategy from 
those to the volatility timing strategy. The story is 
different, however, in the high asymmetric 
information tree. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that, conditional on the 
probability of informed trade being 10% or 20%, 
the next partition that most reduces the tree’s mean-
squared-error is strategy type. The returns to the 
naive diversification strategy are 9.18%, whereas 
they are 9.52% for the volatility timing strategy. 
This would suggest that the naive diversification 
strategy generates a higher turnover of trade than 
does the volatility timing strategy—a feature that 
most impacts on performance when bid-ask spreads 
are wide. Continuing down the volatility timing 
strategy path, the next partition is according to the 
volume in the illiquid state, with volumes of 50 or 
250 generating higher returns than a volume of 10. 
The final partition, branching to the farthest-right 
terminal node (9.66% across 6,000 observations), 
further distinguishes illiquid state trading volume of 
50 from trading volume of 250. In sum, in markets 
characterized by high levels of asymmetric 
information, a volatility timing strategy applied 
under conditions of high overall liquidity generates 
on average mean returns of 9.66% p.a. 
We conclude this section by examining the 
classification tree in which the response variable is 
the Sharpe ratio of the volatility timing strategy 
(Figure 5). We describe the path that leads to the 
highest Sharpe ratios. The root node of Figure 5 
contains 72,000 observations, with a mean Sharpe 
ratio of 1.07. The next partition is with respect to 
the number of portfolio constituents, with the 
Sharpe ratios of 5 or 10 stock portfolios, 
substantially exceeding those of 2-stock portfolios 
(1.21 versus 0.79). Of those portfolios with 5 or 10 
stocks, the next partition distinguishes the 5-stock 
portfolios from the 10-stock portfolios. On average, 
10-stock volatility timing portfolios generate 
Sharpe ratios of 1.33, 0.24 higher than 5-stock 
portfolios. It is interesting to note, however, that the 
terminal nodes across the tree are partitioned 
according to the probability of informed trade. For 
2-stock portfolios there appears to be little 
difference between the average Sharpe ratios in 
each sample, with terminal nodes containing 
average Sharpe ratios of 0.78, 0.79, 0.81, and 0.78. 
However, for better-diversified portfolios, the 
optimal partition splits the observations by 
probabilities of informed trade of 1%, and 
probabilities of informed trade of greater than 1%. 
Even though higher levels of private information 
lead to wider spreads and higher transaction costs, 
they lead to higher Sharpe ratios for both the 5-
stock and 10-stock portfolios. This ‘price 
discovery’ effect is most pronounced in the 10-
stock portfolios, with an improvement in the Sharpe 
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ratio from 1.21 to 1.37 when the probability of 
informed trade exceeds 1%. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We develop a framework in which multi-asset 
fundamentals are mapped into binomial processes 
compatible with the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
sequential trade model. Intra-day price dynamics 
are generated by dealers’ Bayesian updating 
equations, with closing prices determined by the 
average of the final bid and ask prices of each 
session. The degree to which closing prices track 
fundamental value is determined by the joint 
interaction between private information and trading 
volume. Higher levels of private information reduce 
mean returns, as dealers widen spreads to 
compensate for the losses incurred from informed 
trade. But private information also helps to improve 
the price discovery process, thus improving the 
risk-adjusted returns of strategies that rely on 
accurate volatility estimates. 
We use nonparametric classification trees to 
identify and rank the determinants of portfolio 
performance. Mean returns are primarily driven by 
the probability of informed trade, whereas the 
strategy type - naive diversification or volatility 
timing - is the key driver of risk-adjusted returns. 
This suggests that the higher Sharpe ratios of the 
volatility timing strategy arise because of its 
objective of minimizing risk; this does not appear to 
sacrifice mean returns. The diversification effect 
from increasing the number of portfolio 
constituents is the next most important driver of 
risk-adjusted returns, with the highest Sharpe ratios 
of both strategies occurring in the 10-stock 
portfolios. We note the interesting dominance of the 
volatility timing Sharpe ratios in markets when the 
probability of informed trade is greater than 1%. 
Indeed, looking down the columns of Table 2, it is 
evident that the lower mean returns associated with 
wider spreads are often accompanied by higher 
Sharpe ratios, there being an apparent ‘optimal’ 
level of asymmetric information, beyond which 
Sharpe ratios decline. These declines occur as 
higher levels of transaction costs begin to dominate 
improvements in the price discovery mechanism. 
With regard to extensions and future research, 
we have deliberately designed the framework with 
flexibility in mind. We have used a single-index 
model, but envisage more elaborate factor models 
in the data generation stage. The recombining tree 
structure of our sequential trade model allows for 
stochastic news arrivals, whilst keeping the dealer’s 
updating task manageable. We would maintain the 
informational advantage of the insiders during the 
‘no news’ days, thus making a distinct contribution 
to the literature. 
 
 
References 
 
1. Breiman, L., Friedman, J., Olshen, R., Stone, C., 
1984. Classification and regression trees. 
Wadsworth, Inc., New York. 
2. Brunnermeier, M. K., 2001. Asset pricing under 
asymmetric information. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
3. Cox, J. C., Ross, S. A., Rubinstein, M., 1979. Option 
pricing: a simplified approach. 
4. Journal of Financial Economics 7, 229–263. 
5. DeMiguel, V., Garlappi, L., Uppal, R., 2009. 
Optimal versus naive diversification: How 
inefficient is the 1/n portfolio strategy? Review of 
Financial Studies 22, 1915–1953. 
6. Easley, D., O’Hara, M., 1987. Price, trade size, and 
information in securities markets. Journal of 
Financial Economics 19, 69–90. 
7. Easley, D., O’Hara, M., 1992. Time and the process 
of security price adjustment. Journal of Finance 47, 
577–605. 
8. Einrich, L. J., Piedmonte, M. R., 1991. A method for 
generating high-dimensional multivariate binary 
variates. The American Statistician 45, 302–304. 
9. Glosten, L., Milgrom, P., 1985. Bid, ask and 
transaction prices in a specialist market with 
heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of 
Financial Economics 14, 71–100. 
10. Ho, T., Stoll, H. R., 1981. Optimal dealer pricing 
under transactions and return uncertainty. Journal of 
Financial Economics 9, 47–73. 
11. Kirby, C., Ostdiek, B., 2012. It’s all in the timing: 
Simple active portfolio strategies that outperform 
nave diversification. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 47 (02), 437–467. 
12. Kyle, A., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider 
trading. Econometrica 53, 1315–1335. 
13. Martinez, W. L., Martinez, A. R., 2008. 
Computational Statistics Handbook with MATLAB. 
Chapman & Hall/CRC, Boca Raton,FL. 
14. O’Hara, M., 1995. Market Microstructure Theory. 
Blackwell, Cambridge, MA. 
15. Rebonato, R., Jackel, P., 1999. The most general 
methodology to create a valid correlation matrix for 
risk management and option pricing purposes. 
Quantitative Research Centre of the NatWest Group, 
1–12. 
16. Torgo, L., 2011. Data mining with R: Learning with 
case studies. Chapman & Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, 
FL. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, Fall 2013 
 
20 
Figure 2. Mean Returns: q ∊ {0.01, 0.05} 
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Figure 3. Mean Returns: q ∊ {0.10, 0.20} 
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Figure 4. Sharpe Ratios: Naïve Diversification 
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Figure 5. Sharpe Ratios: Volatility Timing 
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1. Introduction 
 
The agency theory of the firm has come to 
dominate both the academic literature and the 
practical implementation of organizational control. 
Agency theory is premised on the ability of owners 
to control the actions of management to pursue the 
interests of shareholders and not their own self-
interest. Executive contracts are supposed to 
provide explicit and implicit incentives that align 
the interests of managers with shareholders. The 
empirical literature has usually focused on the 
sensitivity of pay (explicit incentives) and the 
dismissal of executives (implicit incentives) to 
corporate performance.  
The high pay of executives was justified in the 
1990s and 2000s by the extraordinary gains in 
wealth shareholders received. Incentive pay was 
even characterised as one of the driving forces for 
the high market valuation of US corporations 
(Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). Recently, though, 
executive pay has increased despite stagnant 
macroeconomic conditions and stock prices (see 
Carvalhal et al., 2012). Switzerland with its 
successful “people’s initiative against fat-cat pay” 
is the latest example of this trend (Economist, 
2013). 
All forms of control by shareholders over 
management involve agency costs, therefore 
corporate governance revolves around finding 
control mechanisms that reduce agency costs. To 
achieve this goal, monitoring refers, on the one 
hand, to strategies of managerial supervision and, 
on the other, oversight to improve performance 
(Braendle and Noll, 2004). This explains the 
existence of board systems (Kostyuk, 2006)  and 
other external monitoring such as rating agencies 
and institutional investors. On the other hand high-
powered incentive contracts such as shares and 
stock-options to remunerate directors were 
implemented in most companies over the last years 
(Armstrong et al., 2012). 
One of the main control mechanisms that 
shareholders have used to rein in rogue managers is 
compensation. Through a combination of intrinsic 
and extrinsic incentives, shareholders have tried to 
provide the right balance to motivate senior 
managers to perform at their best. Shareholders 
have often failed in achieving this balance through 
compensation. In this paper, we argue that this 
failure is not the result of compensation packages as 
such, but on the focus of compensation packages on 
extrinsic motivators such as pay-for-performance 
bonuses and stock options. Instead, the focus of 
compensation packages should be on cultivating 
intrinsic motivators such as firing and prestige. 
We begin by examining the existing literature 
and paradigms on agency theory and managerial 
compensation. Next, we examine the existing 
literature on employee motivation. This literature 
indicates that intrinsic motivation leads to higher 
performance in non-programmable tasks and that 
extrinsic motivators like pay very often “crowd-
out” the effect of intrinsic motivators on the 
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performance of employees, leading to poorer 
performance in spite of higher pay. In the third 
section, we analyse how the employee motivation 
literature might inform the current agency theory 
debate. We find that, based on the existing 
literature, shareholders may obtain better 
performance from their managers by reducing their 
level of pay, but increasing extrinsic motivators 
through compensation packages. In the fourth and 
final section, we suggest some areas for further 
research in the field to empirically establish 
connections between intrinsic motivation and 
performance among senior managers. We also note 
several limitations to the current paper and how 
they might be addressed in future studies. 
 
2. Agency Theory and Managerial 
compensation 
 
The principal-agent model is based on economic 
models related to the employment relationship 
(Holmstrom 1979). The underlying concept is that 
the principal wants the agent to do something on 
her behalf and therefore must motivate the agent to 
do so. That motivation can come in two forms: 
extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic motivation is what 
we traditionally think of in the agency theory 
context and it takes the form of motivators outside 
of an individual such as pay. Intrinsic motivation is 
inside of an individual and usually derives from 
goal identification or task involvement (Staw 1989; 
Fuller and Dornbusch 1988). 
Managers do not necessarily maximize 
shareholder value (Mueller 2003). As most of them 
only own tiny fractions of their companies’ shares 
(if at all), the separation between ownership and 
control leads to a principal-agent problem (Bebchuk 
et al., 2011). The stockholders (principals) want 
their managers (agents) to maximize the value of 
the company and its shares. But managers may be 
better off pursuing a different strategy. We can 
expect the utility-maximizing manager to increase 
those elements in an input vector that give him 
personal utility (Conyon 2006). In other words, she 
will use some of her residual income to engage in 
on-the-job consumption, up to a point where the 
marginal utility from additional discretionary 
expenditures is near zero. The managerial-
discretion literature put forward some hypotheses 
concerning what it is that managers consume in 
excess: leisure (Edmans and Gabaix, 2009), sales 
(Baumol 1967), staff and emoluments (Williamson 
1979), growth (Marris 1963, 1998) and income 
(Melis et al., 2012). 
One of the key elements of agency theory is 
opportunism, a point stressed by Williamson 
(1979). If the agent has discretion which she is 
supposed to exercise for the benefit of another (the 
principal), she may exercise it to maximise her own 
utility instead. This is inefficient where the 
resulting loss to the principal exceeds the benefits 
to the agent. If the agent is rewarded by the 
principal on a basis which does not correlate her 
effort to the reward, the agent may not have the 
incentive to exercise the highest effort. The costs 
resulting from this agency problem includes both 
the loss of potential benefits and the costs of 
measures designed to reduce the loss of potential 
benefits. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identified 
these costs and termed them “agency costs”. 
Agency theory is based on the incompleteness 
of contracts and the separation of ownership and 
control. Though the resulting problems were 
already mentioned by Adam Smith in the 18th 
century, they were prominently highlighted by 
Berle and Means (1932). Due to the shareholders’ 
perceived “limited liability” and the shareholders’ 
inability in practice to control the management, the 
agency conflict is exacerbated. In academic circles, 
the shareholder and stakeholder visions of the firm 
have been battling for supremacy since at least the 
1930s (Coase, 1937; Dodd, 1932). In general, the 
shareholder vision of the firm sees managers as 
being entrusted large amounts of ownership money 
and that regulation and shareholder control through 
Directors are the only means to stop management 
from abusing this trust (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Again, generally, the 
stakeholder, or “other-regarding”, vision of the firm 
sees managers and Directors as intermediaries 
among different groups with interest – beyond just 
financial – in the firm (Evan and Freeman, 1988). 
Shareholders are only liable to the company to pay 
up their share capital. In other words, they are 
sharing the company’s profits, but they are not 
responsible for all of its losses. Limited liability, so 
the argument goes, shifts the risk of business failure 
from the company’s shareholders to its creditors. 
Both, the companies’ owners and managers 
therefore may have too much of an incentive to take 
risks, as the creditors would be the party which 
would suffer most in case of a bankruptcy. This 
could result in an inefficient use of resources (Bris 
and Welch, 2005) 
The diversity and large number of 
shareholders in a typical public company cannot or 
will not exert effective control over the 
management for various reasons such as the 
existence of a coordination problem (Ingley et al., 
2011). This includes problems of different interests 
of shareholders as well as bringing shareholders 
with the same beliefs together. 
In general we refer to the collective action 
problem, where it might be rational for each of the 
shareholders not to engage in control (Braendle and 
Noll, 2004) 
Due to the consequent danger of the 
inefficient use of resources there is a justification 
for correction. To reinforce the classical model of 
the company where the interests of the owners and 
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managers of the company are aligned, regulatory 
measures – mainly in the form of laws and codes – 
are used. 
These include strengthening shareholders’ 
voting rights, e.g. bolstering minority shareholder 
rights (Braendle, 2006). In addition the 
accountability of the management to shareholders is 
achieved by imposing penalties on managers when 
they behave wrongly (Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006). Furthermore, enforced publicity and 
disclosure should reduce the asymmetric 
information between the parties and therefore lead 
to better control (Braendle and Noll, 2005). All of 
these measures are reflected in corporate 
governance reforms around the world (Mallin, 
2012). 
Public companies are not required to have 
shareholders personally vote their shares because 
the number of shareholders is too large and their 
locations too diverse. As a result, shareholders 
instead often vote by proxy. Traditionally, access to 
the proxy ballot was only provided to senior 
management and board of directors. Recently, 
however, the SEC granted shareholders access to 
the proxy ballot in order to nominate at most one 
director (SEC, 2010). 
So-called “say on pay” votes are a means of 
giving shareholders the ability to challenge 
management compensation packages. The recently 
passed Dodd-Frank Financial Reform bill (2010) 
requires public companies to have “say on pay” 
votes. These votes are advisory in that directors are 
not bound by the decision of shareholders with 
respect to executive compensation. 
The major goals of allowing proxy access to 
shareholders and “say on pay” votes were to 
increase shareholder democracy and make 
management more responsive to the needs of others 
– whether these are shareholders or stakeholders 
(SEC, 2010, p. 331). The purpose of increasing 
shareholder democracy and making management 
more responsive is presumably to reduce the 
amount of excessive risk-taking and poor ethical 
and legal decisions made by executives of public 
companies over the past decade. Yet the poor 
decisions of company management and their 
excessive risk-taking seem to be more directly 
attributed to short-termism. 
Short-termism is the “the obsession with 
short-term results by investors, asset management 
firms and corporate managers” (Krehmeyer et al., 
2006). Theorists of multiple persuasions see short-
termism as a major problem that might be fixed 
through changing executive compensation 
structure, likely via “say on pay” and proxy access 
rule changes (along with other proposals). Theorists 
traditionally associated with the shareholder (Fuller 
and Jensen, 2002) and stakeholder (Evan and 
Freeman, 1988) visions agree not only that short-
termism is a problem, but that it must urgently be 
fixed. Though law and management theorists have 
come up with a variety of proposals to solve short-
termism, most relate, in some way, to simply 
adjusting the criteria by which senior management 
is incentivized (Bebchuk et al., 2011). 
Though executive compensation is certainly 
not the only facet of corporate governance, it is 
easier to measure compensation of executives than, 
the relative power or prestige of being the CEO of 
one company or another. So it is not surprising that 
much of the literature which has tested for the 
effects of managerial discretion has looked at 
managerial compensation. Executive compensation 
in the USA has risen continuously since 1970, with 
the bulk of the increase stemming from granted 
option plans (Conyon and Murphy 2000). 
 
2.1 Base Salary 
 
The base salaries for executive officers are in most 
cases determined by benchmarks based on industry 
salary surveys. These surveys typically adjust for 
company size, reinforces the observed relation 
between compensation and firm size. Even though 
base salaries only make up a declining percentage 
of the total compensation, they are key component 
of executive employment contracts. As these 
salaries are fixed, risk-averse executives will 
naturally prefer a dollar increase in the base salary 
than in the variable bonus compensation. 
 
2.2 Bonus 
 
Almost any company offers an annual bonus plan 
based on performance over the year, covering all of 
its top executives. Despite heterogeneity across 
industries and companies, executive bonus plans 
can be categorized in terms of three basic 
components: performance measure, performance 
standards, and the structure of the pay-performance 
relation (Murphy 1999). Usually no bonus is paid 
until a minimum performance hurdle is reached – 
commonly 80% of a budgeted target. Exceeding 
this hurdle, the manager receives a bonus, which 
increases as performance mounts. Target bonuses 
are paid for achieving the performance standard, 
and there is usually a “cap” on bonuses paid – 
120% of the target is common. The value between 
the minimum hurdle bonus and the cap is named 
the “incentive zone”. The target is normally 
somewhere in the middle of this incentive zone. 
Companies normally use accounting elements 
like revenues, net income, EBIT, etc., to measure 
the performance. The most common non-financial 
performance measures used in annual incentive 
plans is to quantify the deviation from ex ante 
specified objectives, customer satisfaction or plant 
security. 
As long as the managers believe they can 
make the minimum hurdle, they will naturally try to 
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increase performance – by legitimate means or, if 
push comes to shove, by illegitimate ones. 
According to the point on the pay line, they will 
either by pushing expenses into the future or 
shifting profits from present to the future. 
Some companies even went further. The Swiss 
bank UBS implemented in 2008 the bonus-malus 
plan to remunerate its top executives (UBS, 2013). 
The main characteristic of the plan is that the bonus 
pay out is spread over several periods and that - in 
the case underperformance - a delayed pay out can 
be reduced or even set to zero. Underperformance 
is mostly based on the profit and loss results of the 
bank. 
 
2.3 Stock options 
 
Stock options are contracts which give the 
management the right to buy a share of stock at a 
pre-specified exercise price for a per-specified term. 
Stock options are a form of deferred compensation, 
i.e. an arrangement in which a portion of an 
employee's income is paid out at a date after which 
that income is actually earned. 
 These options normally become “vested”, i.e. 
exercisable, over time: for example, 20% might 
become vested in each of the five years following 
grant. These options are non-tradable, and the 
exercise price is often “indexed” to the industry or 
markets. The mechanical explanation for the 
explosion in stock options, although unsatisfactory 
to economists, is rooted in institutional details on 
granting practices and exacerbated by the bull 
markets at the end of the end 90’s and beginning of 
21st century. Therefore stock option which are not 
indexed to the relevant industry are in the line of 
fire, as managers can free ride on the positive 
temper on stock markets and profit from an 
environment where their own performance does not 
matter. Or the managers will try to increase the 
stock price in short term to cash in instead of 
implementing a long-term strategy.  
Agents can game the competition system 
when they have multiple instruments at their 
control. This incentive problem has become known 
as multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1990; 
Baker 1992), where compensation on any subset of 
tasks will result in a reallocation of activities 
toward those that are directly compensated and 
away from the uncompensated activities. Using 
ratios like sales margin or return on assets as 
performance measure is dangerous, as it motivates 
gaming. That is because managers can increase the 
measure in two ways: either increasing the 
numerator or decreasing the denominator. 
As we can see, both schemes are not incentive 
compatible and therefore lead to manipulations. 
The only way to solve the problem is according to 
Jensen (2001) to remove all the kinks from the pay-
for performance line shown above. His solutions 
are linear incentives and he convicts nonlinear, 
especially convex incentives as those will increase 
the variability. 
But it is not easy to make a switch to adopt a 
linear compensation system. Target-based bonuses 
are deeply ingrained in minds of managers. For 
incentive compensation to work, corporate boards 
must choose both the right measures and the right 
levels of performance. In principle stock options 
employ the right measure of performance for 
corporate executives, but they do not set the right 
level. Shareholders expect boards to reward 
management for achieving superior returns – that is, 
for returns equal or better than those earned by the 
company’s peer group or by broader market 
indexes. Stock options are often not indexed and 
therefore do not provide this possibility. 
In the early 90s it was the consensus view in 
the literature that the sensitivity of pay to 
performance in the United States was too low 
(Jensen and Murphy 1999). According to these 
studies executives did not receive enough cash after 
good corporate performance and did not incur 
sufficient losses, through dismissal, after poor 
performance. The same result was observed in other 
countries like Japan (Kaplan 1994). The change in 
executive wealth normalised by the change in firm 
value appears small and falls by a factor with firm 
size, but the value of the CEO’s equity stake is 
large and increases with firm size. But the 
probability of dismissal remained unchanged 
between 1970 and 1995 (Murphy 1999).The use of 
equity based compensation and pay-performance 
sensitivity has risen in other countries as well, and 
in the UK the percentage of companies with an 
option plan has risen from 10% in 1979 to over 
90% in 1985 (Main 1999). 
It is hard to see just how changing executive 
compensation requirements to be more closely 
linked to actual performance through “say on pay” 
votes (Bebchuk et al., 2011) will have any effect on 
the “vicious cycle” created by short-termism 
(Lipton et al., 2009). 
It is also hard to see why boards, shareholders, 
and legal theorists alike have largely ignored the 
rather large body of social psychology research that 
suggests that monetary rewards for performing a 
task (e.g. achieving the highest quarterly profit for a 
firm) actually decreases the effort put into a job 
that requires the accomplishment of multiple tasks 
by a performer - e.g. a CEO (Deci et al., 1999). If 
we accept the agency theory of the firm, that is, that 
management is simply the agent to its principals 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), i.e. shareholders, then 
we would also, by extension apply the research that 
relates to compensation of other employees in 
agency relationships. Social science research has 
also produced fairly convincing evidence that 
rewarding non-manual workers with explicit 
rewards for explicit tasks decreases performance 
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for any non-rewarded task (Baker, 1992 as well as 
Holmström and Milgrom, 1990). Furthermore, 
incentive-based contracts for agents specifically 
reduce an agent’s motivation to succeed in fulfilling 
his contract (Sliwka, 2003). It shouldn’t be 
surprising then that when management is paid 
largely in accordance with the success or failure of 
a company’s stock price would do so to the 
detriment of other important needs such as long-
term shareholder wealth maximization and the 
interests of stakeholders. 
This research thus suggests that management 
and law scholars might be focusing on fixing a 
system that is unable to actually capture what 
actually motivates senior management to act in the 
best interests of shareholders or stakeholders. 
Employees who are intrinsically motivated to do 
their jobs well do not need extrinsic motivators to 
succeed in their jobs. They simply need sufficient 
pay. During the 1950s and 1960s, senior 
management pay at public companies was 
substantially less linked to performance than it is 
today, yet firm growth was substantially stronger 
then than now (Frydman and Saks, 2007). If we 
take all of the research in this context seriously, we 
could easily come to a conclusion that is directly 
opposite from existing proposals to re-focus senior 
management on “better” priorities – eliminate pay 
for performance entirely and simply provide pay 
that is commensurate with the job. 
  
3. Employee Motivation 
 
Research on motivation within the psychology and 
social science literature has been pursued since at 
least the 1940s (Maslow, 1947; Fuller and 
Dornbusch, 1988). The prevailing view regarding 
motivation is that incentives are often a great 
motivator (Van Herpen et al., 2005). Motivators 
themselves fall into two categories. Extrinsic 
motivation is that which comes from outside an 
individual. Extrinsic motivation has been found to 
sharpen focus on individuals and allow them to 
accomplish manual tasks substantially faster than 
without incentives targeting extrinsic motivation 
(Deci, 1980). The most common incentive in the 
principal-agent relationship is an external 
motivator, namely, salary. In fact, all most of the 
executive compensation and economics literature 
focuses on extrinsic motivators. Only recently have 
economists and agency theorists had their attention 
drawn to the potential power of intrinsic 
motivation, the second category of motivation (Falk 
and Fehr, 2002). Intrinsic motivation is most often 
based on social norms, like reciprocity and fairness, 
that drive individuals to achieve some goal or task 
internal to themselves, even if the perceived 
benefits are to one’s community or society 
(O’Reilly and Main, 2010; Fehr et al., 2007). 
A robust set of research in psychology and 
behavioral economics indicates that extrinsic 
motivation (i.e. pay-for-performance) is counter-
productive to success of a non-manual (i.e. 
thinking) task (e.g. Titmuss, 1972; Deci, 1980; 
Ariely et al., 2009; Camerer et al. 1997). A linked 
finding is that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
“crowd” one another out individuals only have a 
certain “pool” of motivation that they can draw 
from and too much of one type of motivation will 
force out the other. In other words, too much 
extrinsic motivation, like pay, will reduce the 
likelihood that individuals will be motivated 
intrinsically, for instance by a desire to reciprocate 
goodwill.   
 
4. Current intrinsic motivator: takeover 
threats 
 
Managers may behave opportunistically as we have 
seen above. In addition, agents in agent-principal 
relationships, including corporate executives, are 
often only motivated with extrinsic incentives, such 
as salary and stock options. Within current 
executive pay contracts, however, there does exist 
one major intrinsic motivational tool to encourage 
executives to do their best work: takeovers. 
In a zero transaction costs world even a slight 
deviation of a company’s market value from its 
potential maximum would lead someone to 
purchase a controlling interest in it and remove the 
management, alter its policies, and claim the wealth 
gain from bringing the company to its maximum 
value (Mueller 2003). This threat of a takeover was 
the chief constraint on managerial pursuit of 
growth, but sufficiently loose to allow managers to 
deviate significantly from shareholders’-wealth-
maximising policies (Marris 1963). The term 
“market for corporate control” was introduced later 
on to describe this process, and it was argued that 
this “market” did provide sufficient discipline to 
constrain managers effectively. 
When Marris discussed this process, one of 
the most radical mechanisms for disciplining 
managers, hostile takeovers (Becht et al. 2002), 
were sufficiently rare. This mechanism is highly 
disruptive and costly and therefore seldom used. On 
this issue, the analysis by Scharfstein (1988) stands 
out. Building on insights of Grossman and Hart 
(1986) he considers the ex-ante financial 
contracting problem between a financier and a 
manager. This contract specifies a state-contingent 
compensation scheme for the manager to induce 
optimal effort provision. In addition the contract 
allows for ex-post takeovers. The important 
observation made by Scharfstein is that even if the 
firm can commit to an ex-ante optimal contract, this 
contract is generally inefficient and will induce too 
few hostile takeovers on average. 
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If hostile takeovers are a disciplining device 
for management, they should predominantly affect 
poorly performing firms. But this prediction is not 
borne out by the empirical literature. Successful US 
takeover targets are smaller than other companies, 
but that’s the only difference from their peers 
(Comment and Schwert 1995). Furthermore, if 
hostile takeovers should correct managerial failure 
and enhance the efficiency, the value of the bidder 
and the target under joint control should be larger 
than the value of the bidder and the target 
separately. The empirical literature neither supports 
this prediction (Andrade et al. 2001; Burkart 1999). 
Therefore takeovers do not seem to be an 
efficient measure to guarantee behaviour of the 
management in the sense of the shareholders. 
 
5. Well-balanced packages 
 
Agency theory predicts that incentive pay and 
takeover threats are substitutes (Kole 1997). This 
finding matches the findings of motivation theory 
which suggest that intrinsic and extrinsic motivators 
“crowd” one another out. Moreover agency theory 
predicts that incentive pay should be tied to 
performance relative to comparable firms, not to 
absolute performance. Early studies found that 
changes in the CEO cash compensation were 
negatively related to market performance, but 
positively related to firm performance (Gibbson and 
Murphy 1990). Equity-based compensation, in 
contrast, is most of the time not corrected for 
market stock index movements, consequently 
leading to a solid rejection of the relative 
performance evaluation hypothesis in all recent 
surveys due to accounting problems, tax 
considerations, difficulties in obtaining 
performance date from competitors (Abowd and 
Kaplan 1999; Bebchuk, Fried et al. 2001; Murphy 
1999). 
Agency theory can be used to determine the 
optimal exercise price of granted options. The 
options with an exercise price equal to the 
company’s stock price, which are very common in 
practice, are a clear contradiction of the predictions 
of this theory (Bebchuk et al. 2001:69). Theory also 
predicts that incentive schemes and the adoption of 
the latter should result in an increase in shareholder 
wealth. The latest empirical literature generally 
rejects this prediction, whereas earlier event studies 
generally support it (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001). 
Furthermore, firms subject to blockholder 
monitoring are less likely to implement stock 
option plans (Kole 1997), because more discipline 
substitutes for more sensitivity of pay. 
Managements protected by anti-takeover laws or 
anti-takeover amendments provide more incentive 
pay to compensate for less discipline from hostile 
takeovers, while in the UK takeover threats are 
higher while incentive pay and the level of pay are 
lower than in the US (Conyon and Murphy 2000). 
However, this theory is not consistent with what we 
observe. Companies in industries with more 
disciplining takeovers should therefore pay less, 
while in fact they pay more. 
In addition to these explicit incentives, 
implicit incentives take the form of executive 
dismissal or post-retirement board services. In the 
US, this latter point seems to be true, as 75% of the 
CEOs are holding at least one directorship after 
retirement. This is a point which is opposed by 
many corporate governance codes. 
 
6. Conclusion of these measures 
 
It has become difficult to maintain the widely held 
view of the 90s that US pay practices provide 
explicit and implicit incentives for aligning the 
interests of managers with those of the 
shareholders. On contrary, it seems that the 
managers have got the possibility and the power to 
set their own wage at the expense of shareholders 
(Bebchuk et al. 2001). Long-standing debates all 
over the world show that the opinions are 
controversial. 
We suggest a new approach with the help of 
penalties for the management. Instead of designing 
a “standard” contract with a base salary and a bonus 
if a certain given project is successfully enforced, 
the shareholder can think about a contract with a 
higher bonus for a successful project and a penalty 
for failure. 
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RISKS TO CONSIDER WHEN INVESTING OFFSHORE 
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Abstract 
 
When investors engage in international business, transactions and operations, they encounter 
additional risks compared to trading domestically. Different languages, currencies, jurisdictions, 
customs and habits can be translated into extra informational asymmetries and transaction costs that 
may affect the smooth operation of business. Political transitions can also play an important role in the 
success of an offshore investment, especially in a world full of political uncertainty. As such, mitigating 
offshore risks is a significant factor in the success of overseas projects, investments and contracts. As 
such, this paper aims to identify risks which investors are exposed to when investing offshore and 
ranking these risks in order of importance, based on a literature review as well as views and 
experiences of South African investment brokers registered with the Financial Services Board.  
 
Keywords: Risks; Investors; Offshore Investments; Foreign Exchange; Market Risk, Exchange Rate 
Risk; Credit Risk; Liquidity Risk; Technological Risk 
 
* University of South Africa, PO BOX 392, UNISA, Pretoria, 0003,  
Tel.: +27 12 429 8895, +27 82 460 3735 
Fax: +27 86 569 8843 
E-mail: godinj@unisa.ac.za 
** University of South Africa, PO Box 52 185, Wierda Park, Centurion, Pretoria, South Africa, 0149 
Tel.: +27 12 429 3010 
Tel.: +27 83 307 6265 
Fax: +27 86 695 3324 
E-mail: youngj@unisa.ac.za 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Offshore risks have been acknowledged to have a 
relevant impact on investor’s decisions due to 
losses suffered in the past. In some cases, offshore 
risks have forced several major investors into 
bankruptcy and throwing a number of businesses 
into disarray through job losses. Uncontrolled 
offshore risks can be regarded as one of the main 
reasons that lead to unfavourable results. According 
to Saunders and Cornett (2008), an offshore-
oriented investor that mismatches the size and 
maturities of its foreign assets and liabilities is 
exposed to foreign currency and foreign interest 
rate risks. Even beyond these risks, and even when 
investing in dollars, holding assets in a foreign 
country can expose an investor to an additional type 
of foreign investment risks. 
Regardless of the risk under consideration, 
investors strive toward an investment that yields the 
greatest possible income with the least possible 
risk. When choosing an investment, investors are 
advised to think carefully about how much risk they 
are willing to take. This is emphasised by Lucas 
(2009), who warns that while money may ensure 
security, placing capital in a high-risk environment 
could cause investors more concerns than the 
investment is worth. Additionally, in the volatile 
state of financial markets, the risk of investments 
should be considered more carefully than in stable 
markets. It is at times like these that investors are 
reminded that there is no such thing as risk-free 
investments. Everything has its price, and in the 
case of offshore investments, that price could be a 
result of offshore risks.  
In the face of plunging markets, some 
investors discovered that they are not quite as 
tolerant to offshore risks as they might have 
thought. A number of investment portfolios are 
adjusted during difficult times, with investors 
adopting a mix of assets which they consider to be 
profitable in the long term. When reassessing 
investment portfolios, some offshore investors use 
risk analysis as an essential tool for adjusting their 
portfolios. Risk analysis is defined by Aven (2003) 
as a technique used to identify and assess the 
factors that may jeopardise the success of a project 
or of achieving a goal. This technique also helps to 
define preventive measures that can be used to 
reduce the probability of these factors from 
occurring and identify counter measures to deal 
with these constraints successfully. Therefore, 
analysis can help investors decide whether a given 
investment is too volatile or if the investment is not 
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providing a return proportionate to the risk 
associated with it.  
During the past number of years, the South 
African economy has developed rapidly and is 
affected by global market fluctuations. A number of 
South African investors are becoming global 
players by investing in foreign countries and 
markets. Thus, there are a number of risks to 
consider when considering doing business or 
investing in foreign countries. This paper seeks to 
identify and rate, in order of importance, the risks 
that should be considered when investing offshore. 
In support of this objective, the paper is divided 
into a brief literature review of the various risk 
types, followed by a methodology to determine the 
appropriate risks in order of importance that should 
be considered by offshore investors. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Offshore risks vary from one country to the next. 
Some countries have high risks that discourage 
foreign investors. For example, when a domestic 
corporation is unable or unwilling to repay a loan, 
an investor usually recourses to the domestic 
bankruptcy courts and eventually may recoup at 
least a portion of its original investment when the 
assets of the defaulted firm are liquidated or 
restructured. By comparison, a foreign corporation 
may be willing but unable to repay the principal or 
interest on a loan. Most commonly, the government 
of the country in which the corporation is hosted 
may prohibit or limit debt payments because of 
foreign currency shortages and adverse political 
reasons.  
In the event of such restrictions, rescheduling 
or outright prohibitions on the payment of debt 
obligations by sovereign governments, the investor 
has little, if any, recourse to the local bankruptcy 
courts or an international civil claims court. The 
major leverage available to an investor to ensure or 
increase repayment probabilities and amounts is its 
control over the future supply of loans or funds to 
the country concerned. However, such leverage 
may be very weak in the face of a country’s 
collapsing currency and government (Saunders and 
Cornett, 2008). 
In summary, the notion of offshore risk itself 
is very old and integrated into the assessment of 
risk and return in international operations. Usually, 
it was seen as inextricably linked with doing 
business abroad. When doing business abroad, 
investors need to consider a number of factors prior 
to investing offshore, since changes in political and 
economic policies can be detrimental to investors’ 
success. According to Frenkel, Karmann and 
Scholtens (2004), politics is a major factor in 
determining the overall structure of financial 
markets and the regulatory framework. Countries 
have different rules that regulate investments in 
their countries. For this reason, offshore investors 
investing in countries that have unstable political 
economic systems should consider adding a risk 
premium when determining their required rate of 
return for these additional uncertainties. Risk 
premium refers to an increment in interest rates that 
would have to be paid for loans and investment 
projects in a particular country (Chapman, 2006). 
One way of establishing the risk premium for a 
country is to compare the interest rate that the 
market establishes for a standard security in the 
country to the comparable security in the 
benchmark country. For the securities to be 
comparable, they should have the same maturity 
and involve payment in the same currency. 
The reason why the payments should be the 
same is that otherwise the differential in the interest 
rates would reflect the differential rates of inflation 
in the two countries instead of solely the market 
perceived risk of non-payment. The interest rate 
that is relevant is the market-determined yield to 
maturity rather than the coupon interest rate. The 
coupon interest rate is valid only if the issuers were 
careful to set the coupon rate so that it is equal to 
the yield to maturity of the security. For example, 
suppose the US government has issued a five-year 
bond that has a yield to maturity of 6% and the 
government of Poland borrows dollars by selling a 
five-year bond that pays in dollars and the yield to 
maturity of that bond is 8%. The risk premium for 
Poland would be 2%. The 2% is the correct value 
providing the yields to maturity, which is expressed 
as instantaneous rates. If they are expressed as 
effective annual rates then the correct computation 
of the risk premium (ρ) is as follows: 
 
1+ρ = (1+0.08)/(1+0.06) = 1.01887 
and thus 
ρ = 0.01887 
 
The above procedure is easily implemented if 
a country's government borrows through securities 
denominated in dollars. This is common among the 
various emerging market economies but rare in the 
developed economies. Developed countries like the 
United States are generally considered the 
benchmark for low country risk, and most nations 
can have their risk measured as compared to the 
United States (Huang, 2009).  
Political analysts as well as economic analysts 
are increasingly drawn into the debate of the 
interplay between politics and stock markets. In this 
regard, Moran (1998) warns investors that, if 
different political parties manipulate the economy 
according to their policies, the results would be 
reflected on the stock market. For example, there 
was instability in the South African stock market 
prior to the outcome of the African National 
Congress (ANC) policy conference in Mangaung in 
December 2012. In addition, it is assumed that 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, Fall 2013 
 
34 
electoral uncertainty is directly related to stock 
market volatility and that political events, such as 
the election of a politician who is expected to enact 
market-friendly policies, lead to increases in stock 
market returns. Conversely, political events that are 
expected to have a negative impact on the economy 
and specific businesses lead to decreases in stock 
market returns. Therefore, it can be deduced that 
political variables cause fluctuations in stock 
market returns. According to Saunders and Cornett 
(2008), political variables take many different 
shapes and forms as changes in domestic and 
foreign policy, as well as uncertainty brought about 
by national elections. The re-distribution of 
political power could have important implications 
in the future political and economic course of a 
country. 
Consequently, an election brings a major 
uncertainty to both domestic and foreign investors. 
Although exchange control regulations in South 
Africa have been dramatically eased since 1996, 
investors still need to follow a bureaucratic process 
when they wish to invest offshore using the R2m 
foreign investment allowance (Thorne and Cloete, 
2010). Investors should ensure that they follow 
domestic as well as international rules and 
regulations during international investments. Some 
trade agreements are extremely convoluted and 
complicated and may involve not just one 
international agreement between two countries, but 
agreements between multiple countries. As a result, 
international investments can be confusing and 
difficult to maintain, particularly if those 
investments span several different industries. As the 
aim of this paper is to identify risks that should be 
considered when investing offshore, the next 
section will briefly discuss the possible offshore 
risks that could be detrimental to an offshore 
investment plan.  
 
2.1. Risk types to consider when 
investing offshore  
 
Most investors are debating the differences between 
risk types. Although some regard this debate as 
semantic, it is necessary to clearly define each risk 
type that need to be considered when investing 
offshore. This understanding will allow investors to 
identify the risk proactively and manage it, thus 
protecting their investments and assisting them in 
making the most appropriate investment decisions. 
Some of the primary offshore risks to be considered 
are identified in this section. 
 
2.1.1. Exchange rate risk 
 
According to Madura (2009), exchange rate risk is 
a form of risk that arises from the change in price or 
value of one currency against another currency. 
Whenever investors or companies have assets or 
business operations across national borders, they 
face exchange rate risk. As economic conditions, 
such as import and export change, exchange rates 
could change substantially. According to Madura 
and Fox (2007), each currency is valued in terms of 
other currencies, so that currencies can be 
exchanged to facilitate offshore transactions. The 
values of most currencies fluctuate over time 
because of market and government forces.  
Exchange rates are thus affected by risks 
associated with a particular country. For example, 
there may be political or military involvement, and 
restrictions may be imposed. There are also 
commercial factors, like a major foreign customer 
becoming bankrupt or defaulting. Major customers 
in the domestic country can also default, however, 
they are not operating under unfamiliar legal or 
regulatory systems. It is possible for investors to 
insure themselves against such risks, but this can be 
costly.  
A number of South African companies trade 
with companies overseas or obtain foreign capital 
abroad. As such, they are not insulated from 
exchange rate risk, political instability, inflation, 
economic policy, interest rates, unemployment and 
the economic growth rate that can lead to changes 
in exchange rates. 
 
2.1.2. Market risk 
 
Young (2006) defines market risk as the risk of a 
decrease in the value of a financial portfolio as a 
result of adverse movement in market variables 
such as prices, currency exchange rates and interest 
rates. In other words, market risk is an exposure 
arising from adverse changes in the market value of 
a financial instrument or portfolio. 
Markets are highly competitive resulting in 
thousands of intelligent and well-backed analysts 
constantly scouring the securities markets searching 
for the best options. This competition means that 
investors should expect to find few, if any, 
investments that are obvious bargains. Market risk 
is therefore another important risk that needs to be 
addressed for the success of an offshore investment 
plan. 
 
2.1.3. Inflation risk 
 
Appel (2008) defines inflation as the overall 
general upward price movement of goods and 
services in an economy, usually measured by the 
consumer price index (CPI) and the producer price 
index (PPI). 
When inflation occurs (the cost of goods and 
services increase), the value of a currency decreases 
because investors will not be able to purchase as 
much with the same currency as they previously 
could. For example, if one Rand could buy three 
candy bars last year and today it can buy only two, 
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the purchasing power of the Rand has decreased. In 
periods of declining price levels (deflation), the 
purchasing power of a currency increases.  
Efforts on the part of government to curb the 
rate of inflation are usually accompanied by an 
increase in interest rates. Higher interest rates, in 
turn, increase the cost of credit, and this could 
eventually limit the demand for goods and services 
in a country. Some of the main factors, which have 
an influence on the interest rate as well as other 
factors, do not function in isolation, but have 
implications for many other aspects of a country’s 
economy. 
 
2.1.4. Interest rate risk 
 
According to Whittaker (2009), interest rate is the 
rate payable on borrowed money. This rate is 
applied to the principal of a loan and can be 
compounded in many ways. For example, interest 
rates can be compounded daily, weekly, monthly or 
annually. According to Sharpe (2007), interest rate 
risk is a general increase or decrease in market 
interest rates as a result of the monetary policy of 
the central bank. After the central bank has adapted 
its general lending rate, those in the banking sector 
alter their own prime and other lending rates 
accordingly. This has a ripple effect throughout the 
entire economy and influences all economic 
activities because changes in interest rates affect 
cash, bonds and stocks (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 
2004). 
As a result, the risk of a particular investment 
could increase as interest rates increase. As risk 
increases, the cost of stocks decreases and investors 
may lose money. However, the converse is actually 
beneficial. For example, if interest rates are 
reduced, stock prices are bound to increase. 
Investors could make money by selling stock at a 
higher price. An increase in interest rates will 
increase the cost of capital (Chapman, 2006). 
 
2.1.5. Credit risk 
 
Wagner (2008) defines credit risk as a failure to 
make required debt payments on a timely basis or 
to comply with other conditions of an obligation or 
agreement. It may comprise, for example, the 
possibility that a bond issuer will default by failing 
to repay the principal amount and interest in the 
time agreed upon. 
Movements of financial capital between 
countries are normally dependent on either credit or 
equity transfers. Credit is in turn dependent on the 
reputation or creditworthiness of an investor that 
takes responsibility for the funds. Actual credit 
losses depend on the collateral and netting 
agreements. In some (but not all) instances, 
collateral taken can be liquidated upon default to 
cover losses, while a netting agreement allows a 
portfolio of deals to be collapsed into a single 
payable or receivable (Wagner, 2008).  
While the term credit risk can encompass 
credit scoring, it is more commonly used to refer to 
processes that entail human judgement. As such, it 
is necessary that offshore investors assess and 
review information about the counterparty. This 
might include the counterparty’s balance sheet, 
income statement, recent trends in its industry, and 
the current economic environment. It is clear that 
credit risk provides another likely explanation of 
why the required rate of return is not always 
realised. According to Wagner (2008), default 
bonds are regarded as those bonds that constitute 
failure to pay interest. From an investor’s point of 
view, insolvency can be regarded as a serious issue 
where the repayment of the capital sum in total or 
in part is at stake.  
 
2.1.6. Liquidity risk 
 
According to Tracy (2005), liquidity risk is an 
investment that has no immediate access to either 
the ability to buy or sell the investment, such as a 
stock or mutual fund, or the ability to access and 
withdraw funds, from a savings account. According 
to Gitman and Joehnk (2008), a liquid asset has 
some or more of the following features: can be sold 
rapidly; with minimal loss of value; any time within 
market hours. The essential characteristic of a 
liquid market is that there are ready and willing 
buyers and sellers at all times.  
For the purposes of asset allocation, it is 
critical that illiquid asset classes be made 
comparable to liquid asset classes. An estimation 
procedure may help to assess the true risks and 
diversification benefits presented by illiquid asset 
classes more accurately. Even though the approach 
involves some assumptions, it should provide a 
better picture of the variations in illiquid returns. 
Usually when an investor acquires an asset, it 
expects that the investment will mature or that it 
will be sellable to another investor.  
In either case, the investor expects to be able 
to convert the security into cash and use the 
proceeds for current consumption or other 
investments. The more difficult it is to make this 
conversion, the greater the liquidity risk. According 
to Rose and Hudgins (2005), an investor must 
consider two questions when assessing the liquidity 
risk of an investment, namely: 
 how long will it take to convert the 
investment into cash; and 
 how certain is the price to be received? 
Similarly, uncertainty faces an investor who 
wants to acquire an asset, namely: 
 how long will it take to acquire the asset; 
and 
 how uncertain is the price to be paid? 
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Based on the abovementioned discussion, it is 
clear that liquidity risk can be regarded as one of 
the key risks an investor should consider when 
investing offshore. Liquidity management will not 
only ensure that risks are kept minimal but also that 
opportunities presented are exploited. 
 
2.1.7. Legal risk 
 
According to Young (2006), legal risk is the risk 
arising from violation of or non-compliance with 
laws, rules, regulations, prescribed policies and 
ethical standards. This risk also arises when laws or 
rules governing certain products or activities of an 
organisation’s customers are unclear or untested. 
According to Chapman (2006), legal risk is defined 
as failing to operate within the law, to be aware of 
legal obligations, to honour contractual 
commitments, to agree remedies for compensation 
with the offshore company in the event of default, 
and to show evidence that a corporation has 
operated within the law, or to recognise and 
effectively manage legal threats. According to Rose 
(1999), the scope of legal risk for a business may be 
considered to include, but is not limited to: 
 breach of environmental legislation; 
 inaccurate listing information in terms of 
misstatements, material omissions or misleading 
opinions; and 
 breach of copyright. 
Offshore investors’ objectives may be 
compromised when legal risk is not minimised in a 
foreign country. Failure to manage legal risk can 
result in the cancellation of offshore investment 
contracts, penalties, fines and termination of trading 
licenses in extreme cases, which will be detrimental 
to the investors’ objectives in the international 
arena. However, when legal risk is managed, 
offshore investors can realise great benefits. 
 
2.1.8. Technological risk 
 
Technological risk has become a major concern for 
offshore investors in recent years. Since the 1980s, 
banks, insurance companies and offshore 
investment companies have sought to improve 
operational efficiency with major investments in 
internal and external communications, computers 
and an expanded technological infrastructure. 
Technological risk arises when existing 
technology malfunctions or back-office support 
systems break down (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). 
According to Chapman (2006), technology risk 
refers to sources of risk that are considered to be 
embraced within the term technology. Technology 
risk includes the following, for example: 
 a lack of investment in technology and the 
resultant erosion of the ability to compete; and 
 inadequate technology governance, in 
particular, IT governance. 
A general lack of adequate technology can 
lead to investors having to withdraw offshore 
investments as a result of an inability to compete 
and leading to frustrations and losses. When 
investors envisage offshore investments, they need 
to ensure that they can afford the technology 
needed to trade with their offshore counterparts. As 
such, there are technological factors that need to be 
considered by offshore investors before investing 
offshore. 
In conclusion, the decision to invest offshore 
is not one to be taken lightly, as there are many 
risks that need to be considered, which could be 
detrimental to an offshore investment plan. 
According to the discussions of each risk type, it is 
apparent that offshore investments are not risk free. 
Thus, offshore investors need to assess each and 
every risk individually, to determine the extent of 
the risk exposure before making an investment. The 
next section will focus on certain risk-related 
control measures which could reduce the risk 
exposure when investing offshore. 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
The aim of the paper is to determine and rank, in 
order of importance, the risks that should be 
considered when investing offshore. As such the 
investment brokers registered with the Financial 
Services Board (FSB) and licensed to trade offshore 
were selected as the target population to respond to 
a closed structured questionnaire. A web-based 
questionnaire using LimeSurvey was used to collate 
data from the respondents. The SPSS statistical 
methodology was used for the analysis from where 
recommendations and conclusions were drawn.   
According to the data obtained from the FSB, 
the investment industry in South Africa consisted of 
fifty-two (52) investment brokers in July 2011. 
However, it was confirmed that only twenty-eight 
(28) investment brokers were registered and 
licensed to trade offshore. A response rate of 44% 
was achieved which was regarded as sufficient to 
make reliable and valid conclusions.  
 
4. Discussion of findings  
 
The response was subjected to a descriptive 
statistical analysis process and focused only on the 
identified respondents, which has been at the 
forefront of offshore investments and plays a key 
role in the South African offshore investment 
market. According to empirical evidence obtained 
from the respondents, there are eight risks that 
should be considered when investing offshore. The 
respondents were requested to rate the importance 
of considering these risks from very important to 
irrelevant when investing offshore using the Likert 
scale below. 
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Table 1. Responses concerning the level of the risk when investing offshore 
 
Scale 
value 
Scale name Scale description 
1 Irrelevant Indicates that the risk is irrelevant to consider when making an offshore investment 
decision according to the respondents’ views and experiences. 
2 Unimportant Indicates that the risk is not important to consider when making an offshore 
investment decision according to the respondents’ views and experiences. 
3 Neutral Indicates that the respondents are neutral regarding the risk when making an offshore 
investment decision according to their views and experiences. 
4 Important Indicates that the risk is important to consider when making an offshore investment 
decision according to the respondents’ views and experiences. 
5 Very 
important 
Indicates that the risk is very important to consider when making an offshore 
investment decision according to the respondents’ views and experiences. 
 
The eight risks identified in the literature 
review were confirmed as risks that are important to 
consider when making an offshore investment 
decision. However, the respondents rated the risks’ 
level of importance differently as indicated in the 
figure below. 
 
Figure 1. Offshore risk’, order of importance 
 
 
 
The above figure indicates that market risk 
should receive the most attention when considering 
investing offshore and technological risk should 
receive the least attention. When rating the 
importance of considering market risk during an 
offshore investment decision, 67% of the 
respondents regarded market risk as very important, 
while 33% regarded market risk as important. 
Market risk incorporates, to a lesser or greater 
extent, political decisions in offshore countries, 
monetary and fiscal policies, which could lead to 
losses if they are not in favour of investments in the 
country. Investors need to track the market trends in 
the offshore country, and unstable markets should 
not be considered. 
Of the respondents, 67% regarded interest rate 
risk as very important to consider when making an 
offshore investment decision. Seventeen per cent 
regarded interest rate risk as important and the other 
17% were neutral as far as interest rate risk is 
concerned. Interest rate fluctuations could 
negatively affect a perfect investment plan. Highly 
volatile markets have higher risks in relation to 
lower volatile markets. When diversifying 
investments in offshore countries, investors need to 
strike a good balance between these markets. 
Changes in interest rates influence the value of the 
investor’s stocks, cash and shares. As a result, the 
risk of a particular investment could increase as 
interest rates increase, and decrease as interest rates 
decrease. Offshore investors need to be mindful of 
these movements.  
In terms of liquidity risk, 67% of the 
respondents rated it as very important, while 33% 
regarded it as important to consider when making 
an offshore investment decision. Liquidity risk can 
be regarded as one of the key risks an investor 
should mitigate when investing offshore. Liquidity 
management will not only ensure that risks are kept 
minimal but also that opportunities presented are 
exploited.  
Sixty-seven per cent of the respondents 
regarded legal risk as very important, 17% rated it 
as important and 17% were neutral. Offshore 
investors’ objectives may be compromised when 
legal risk is not adequately addressed before 
investing in a foreign country. It could, for 
example, result in the cancellation of offshore 
investment contracts, penalties, fines and 
termination of trading licenses, which will be 
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detrimental to the investors’ objectives in the 
international arena. However, when legal risk is 
managed effectively, offshore investors can realise 
great benefits. 
When rating the importance of exchange rate 
risk during an offshore investment decision, 66% of 
the respondents regarded exchange rate risk as very 
important. Seventeen per cent regarded exchange 
rate risk as important while the other 17% regarded 
exchange rate risk as unimportant. The movement 
in exchange rate can enhance or reduce the value of 
an offshore investment; hence, it is vitally 
important to minimise this risk when making 
offshore investments. 
Fifty per cent of the respondents regarded 
inflation risk as very important, 33%rated it as 
important and 17% were neutral. When the general 
price level rises, each unit of currency buys fewer 
goods and services. Thus, it is important for 
offshore investors to take into account the inflation 
rate in the offshore country concerned and forecast 
the future trend and the potential influence on the 
planned investment. 
The respondents were equally divided 
between very important and important when rating 
the credit risk and technological risk during an 
offshore investment decision. Although these risks 
were rated the lowest, it does not mean that they 
cannot be detrimental to an offshore investment. As 
such, it is also necessary to consider the potential 
influences of these risk types during an offshore 
investment decision. 
Although the respondents rated the risk types 
in order of importance, not one risk type was rated 
as irrelevant or unimportant. Therefore, it can be 
deduced that all the identified risk types should be 
analysed and evaluated as part of an offshore 
investment decision. However, the success of an 
offshore investment cannot be limited to identifying 
and ranking the risks. The overall planning and 
execution of an offshore investment strategy 
remains vital for success.   
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this paper was to identify risks which 
investors are exposed to when investing offshore 
and ranking these risks in order of importance. The 
literature review discussed risks to be considered 
when investing offshore. This was followed by a 
research methodology which was used in this paper. 
Then the findings were discussed, which ranked the 
risks in order of importance according to the views 
and experiences of the respondents.  
Offshore investments are based on the 
freedom to trade with the rest of the world, freedom 
to invest where the profits are favourable, and 
generally speaking the freedom to do business in 
any country. However, to exploit these international 
flows in profitability and safety conditions, it is 
necessary to identify and manage risks that could 
arise in the receiving economies.  
As a global player, South African investment 
corporations exchange trades with corporations in 
other countries. These trades are, however, not risk 
free and trading in foreign markets can lead to 
corporations suffering losses if their investment 
plans are not well formulated and executed.  
From the literature review, it is evident that 
there are many risks to consider when investing 
offshore. The risks were considered individually to 
assess the possible impact on offshore investments 
and thereafter ranked, amongst others, in terms of 
importance. Market risk was rated as the most 
important risk to consider when investing offshore, 
while technological risk was rated the least 
important. 
In order of importance, the risks that should 
receive the highest attention from most important to 
the least important were ranked as follows: 
 
1. Market risk 
2. Interest rate risk 
3. Liquidity risk 
4. Legal risk 
5. Exchange rate risk  
6. Inflation risk 
7. Credit risk 
8. Technological risk 
 
The above priority list is not exclusive to all 
offshore investors. However, it can be used as a 
guideline when considering risks of investing 
offshore.  
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ENHANCING ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY THROUGH 
CODES OF ETHICS: THE CASE OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES 
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Abstract 
 
Codes of ethics aims to disclose corporate social responsibility and to promote ethical culture 
throughout the firms. Several studies have investigated the content of such codes to identify what 
values are declared within. However, so far literature on codes of ethics seems not to have considered 
adequately the question of environmental protection. Therefore this paper focuses on the disclosure of 
environmental sustainability in codes of ethics, investigating the case of Italian listed companies. 
Adopting a content analysis methodology, the paper explores the environmental section of these codes 
in order to assess the salience of environmental sustainability in the strategic orientation of the firms, 
identifying the environmental principles, objectives, instruments and certification stated within the 
codes of ethics and highlighting whether and to what extent the environmental disclosure varies 
among industries. The research findings suggest that the Italian listed companies are more oriented to 
emphasize the environmental principles rather than to define precise objectives and instruments 
useful to achieve the environmental sustainability in practice. Nevertheless the more polluted 
industries seem to provide a wider environmental disclosure. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The environmental disasters caused by companies 
(e.g. Exxon, British Petroleum) have generated a 
great deal of attention on the impact of business 
practices on environment and, more in general, on 
sustainability. Concern about the environment has 
become an emerging topic for regulators, scholars 
and business, generating an exponential interest in 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities 
and reporting.  
Most important international bodies (i.e., 
OECD, European Commission) invited companies 
to move beyond legal requirements, integrating 
corporate social responsibility as a strategic 
investment into their core business strategy, 
management instruments and operations (European 
Commission, 2001). 
Several studies pointed out how many 
corporations reacted to these changes, integrating 
environmental issues into their mission statements 
and starting to adopt various instruments, such as 
the code of ethics or environmental, social or 
sustainable reporting (KPMG, 2008; Perrini, 2006). 
Among all CSR instruments the code of ethics 
occupies a central role (Erwin, 2011; Lugli et al., 
2009; Mittal et al., 2008), since it can be considered 
an ethical tool employed to establish and 
communicate CSR policies and to develop ethical 
organizational culture (Kaptein, 2004; Schwartz, 
2001; Van Tulder et al., 2009). Through codes of 
ethics companies declare their ethical responsibility 
and behaviours towards various internal and 
external stakeholders (Farrel and Cobbin, 2000; 
Winkler, 2011). Therefore the study of codes of 
ethics is an established field within business ethics 
research (Svensson et al., 2009; Winkler, 2011).  
Numerous scholars have investigated the 
codes using a content analysis methodology (Helin 
and Sandström, 2007). Specifically, literature 
analyses country-specific features or industries; 
other studies compare codes issued in different 
countries; several articles emphasize different kind 
of ethical issues. However, academic research on 
the environmental sustainability in codes of ethics 
seems to be limited. Only few studies investigate 
whether and to what extent the industry sector may 
influence the content and the quality of codes of 
ethics (Lugli et al., 2009).  
Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to fill 
this gap investigating the environmental section of 
such codes, trying to identify the features of the 
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environmental sustainability’s disclosure in codes 
of ethics and to identify the main differences among 
industries according to the general framework of 
legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995). In other words, 
we aim to answer to the following research 
questions: what types of environmental issues are 
disclosed through codes of ethics? And, whether 
and to what extent the pieces of environmental 
information given to the stakeholders are affected 
by the industry sector in which the company 
operate. 
To answer these questions, we present a 
content analysis investigating the codes of ethics of 
230 companies, listed on the Italian Stock 
Exchange. The content analysis is focused on the 
environmental section of these codes. The empirical 
results highlight that companies are more oriented 
to emphasize the environmental principles rather 
than to define precise objectives and instruments 
useful to achieve the environmental sustainability in 
practice by converting the environmental values 
into rules of conduct. This is probably due to the 
fact that environmental protection is still considered 
by firms as an additional cost (Friedman, 1970) or 
as a regulation to comply with rather than as 
fundamental business strategy leading to a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006). 
In sum, this paper contributes to research on 
codes of ethics in the following ways: first, it 
explores the disclosure of the environmental 
sustainability in codes’ content; second, it identifies 
the factors addressing the environmental orientation 
of the firm in codes of ethics; third, it highlights the 
differences in the environmental disclosure among 
industries. 
Our results have several implications for 
scholars, practitioners and regulators. First, the 
study points out that there is a need to investigate 
more closely the environmental disclosure in codes 
of ethics, focusing on environmental instruments 
and standards. Second, the research findings 
suggest that the establishment of a code of ethics by 
itself is not enough; it should be supported by the 
adoption of strictly compliant rules of conduct and 
other ethical initiatives. Thus, a clear implication is 
that implementation and monitoring of codes of 
ethics are two critical steps for their effectiveness. 
Third, in order to develop the environmental 
sustainability in practice, the values stated in the 
codes of ethics have to be translated into 
organizations behaviour mainly through training 
and communication programs.  
Therefore, the paper is organized as follows. 
In section two, the theoretical framework and the 
previous studies on codes of ethics are reviewed. In 
section three, the research design is presented. In 
this section our approach to use content analysis as 
suitable method to examine codes of ethics is 
discussed, then the data collection and data analysis 
are depicted. Next, the environmental 
sustainability’s factors disclosed in codes of ethics 
are presented. In section four, the research results 
are presented and, consequently, in section five 
they are discussed. Finally, in section six the 
conclusions of the analysis and the research 
implications are presented. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and 
literature review on code of ethics  
 
Although several theories have been used to explain 
the motivations for both CSR and voluntary 
disclosure, a clear and recognized theoretical 
framework has not yet been developed. However, 
as pointed out by Deegan (2002), stakeholder, 
legitimacy and institutional theories should not be 
considered as separated frameworks since the fact 
they have been developed from a similar 
philosophical background and they all share some 
common characteristics. In fact, as also noted by 
Chen and Roberts (2010: p. 661), even if these 
theories have different level of perspective and 
specificity, they all are aimed to explain how 
organizations survive and, mostly important, they 
all emphasize that maximization of profit is not the 
only responsibility of business organizations.  
Therefore, “the choice of broad theoretical 
framework depends on whether the researcher 
approaches the question of CSR from an economic 
or an ethical standpoint” (Holder-Webb et al., 2009: 
p. 499). In this debate, Chen and Roberts note 
“legitimacy theory is more appropriate when the 
research primarily focuses on how corporations 
manage their public image. […] Institutional theory 
is considered the proper choice for studies that 
investigate a specific corporation structure, system, 
program […] resource dependence theory and 
stakeholder theory are suitable for research 
interested in the relationship and interaction 
between two or more organizations and groups” 
(2010: p. 661-662). 
Stemming from these considerations, we 
embrace a legitimacy perspective as a main 
explanatory theory to investigate what is the 
disclosure of the environmental sustainability in 
codes of ethics and wheter and to what extent the 
environmental content of such codes varies across 
industries. Legitimacy theory (Lindblom, 1994; 
Suchman, 1995) focuses on whether the principles 
of an organization are aligned with the value system 
of the society in which it operates, and whether an 
objective of organizations is to meet social 
expectations. Legitimacy theory, however, does not 
specify how the congruency between the 
organizational and societal values could be reached 
or what actions should be taken to pursue it (Chen 
and Roberts, 2010). 
As noted by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975: p. 
122), “organizations seek to establish congruence 
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between the social values associated with or 
implied by their activities and the norms of 
acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of 
which they are part. Insofar, as these two value 
systems are congruent we can speak of 
organizational legitimacy. When an actual or 
potential disparity exists between the two value 
systems, there will exist a threat to organizational 
legitimacy”.  
Based on a systems-oriented point of view, 
legitimacy theory believes that each company is 
influenced by the society in which it operates but, 
in the same time, it uses corporate disclosure as a 
means to influence societal perceptions about its 
activities (Deegan, 2002; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Woodward et al., 2001). Providing social and 
environmental information, organizations expect 
that society approve their actions and objectives 
and consequentially their survival (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975; Parker, 2011). 
Organizational legitimacy is a resource for 
survival but it can be also manipulated (Woodward 
et al., 2001). In this perspective, corporate social 
responsibility disclosure is a strategy tool that a 
company can use to respond to the various 
expectations of its stakeholders (McKinney et al., 
2010; Perrini et al., 2007). Organizations seek to 
get a legitimacy status through different instruments 
commonly used to manage and communicate CSR 
practices. These instruments generally range from 
voluntary tools, as codes of ethics, to complex 
environmental management systems and 
communication tools (Clarkson et al. 2008; Gray, 
2010). 
As argued by notable authors (Kaptein and 
Schwartz, 2008; Lugli et al., 2009) code of ethics 
represents one of the main instruments for 
implementing CSR inside organizations and to 
communicate to follow an ethical behaviour 
towards the external environment. The application 
of the ethical values to the behaviour of the 
operators inside the firm increases the firm’s 
reputation and improves its image, in order to 
generate trust on the outside. In this sense, code of 
ethics is not only an internal instrument, but also a 
point of reference for relations between the firm 
and the outside world (Lugli et al., 2009). 
Langlois and Schlegelmilch (1990) define it as 
“a statement setting down corporate principles, 
ethics, rules of conduct, codes of practice or 
company philosophy concerning responsibility to 
employees, shareholders, consumers, the 
environment, or any other aspects of society 
external to the company” (1990: p. 522). 
Since the diffusion of codes of ethics, the 
academic community has extensively studied them. 
Scholars generally address the content, output and 
implementation of codes of ethics (Helin and 
Sandström, 2007; Stevens, 1994).   
Regarding content, research concentrates on 
country or non-country specific features (Lugli et 
al., 2009; O’Dwyer et al. 2006; Singh, 2006; Singh 
et al., 2005; Snell et al., 1999); specific industries 
(Dumas and Blodgett, 1999; Flanagan and Clarke, 
2007; Gaumnitz and Lere, 2002; Kinchin, 2007; 
Preston et al., 1995; Sirgy et al., 2005); specific 
types of organizations (Asgary and Mitschow, 
2002; Farrell and Cobbin, 2000; Preuss, 2009), and 
different kind of ethical issues (Gordon and 
Miyake, 2001; Kapstein, 2004; Singh, 2011; 
Valentine and Barnett, 2002). With respect to 
output, there is a lively discussion about the 
effectiveness and quality of codes of ethics 
highlighting what effects on behaviour they have 
(Adams et al., 2001; Erwin, 2011; Helin et al., 
2011; Jensen et al., 2009; Kaptein and Schwartz, 
2008; Lere and Gaumnitz, 2003; McKinney et al., 
2010; Singh, 2011; Stevens, 2008; Winkler, 2011). 
In terms of implementation, studies ask why and to 
what extent companies and other organizations 
adopt codes of ethics (Adam and Rachman-Moore, 
2004; Haxhi and van Ees, 2010; Valentine and 
Johnson, 2005) and communicate such documents 
(Bernardi and LaCross, 2009; LaCross and 
Bernardi, 2006). 
Several studies have investigated the business 
codes of ethics from around the world to determine 
which ethical and social values are prevalent. For 
example, Dumas and Blodgett (1999) analysed 50 
family business mission statements and identified 
the following as the most prominent core values: 
quality (42%); commitment (25%); social 
responsibility (20%) and fairness (18%). Kapstein 
(2004) investigated the codes of two hundred of the 
largest corporations in the world. He found the 
following prevalence of ‘stakeholder principles’ 
(i.e., values): transparency (55%), honesty/truth 
(50%) and fairness/impartiality (45%), with no 
reference to social responsibility. 
Lugli et al. (2009) examined the codes of 
ethics of companies operating in the private sector 
in Italy in order to identify any correlation among 
the characteristics and the contents of these 
documents. From the data analysis, they found that 
the environmental protection is one of the most 
declared social value (62%) but examining the 
“conversion” of environmental questions into rules 
of conduct, only 52% of the codes contained 
concrete actions which the firm announced its 
intention to take in order to fulfil its duties towards 
the human society and the environment. 
Erwin (2011) observed a significant 
relationship between the quality of codes and 
ethical performance. The author found that 
companies maintaining high quality were they are 
significantly presented among CSR ranking 
systems for corporate citizenship, sustainability, 
ethical behaviour and public perception.  
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Despite the mixed findings of research studies 
on the effectiveness of corporate codes of ethics in 
influencing behaviour (Kaptein and Schwartz, 
2008; Lugli et al., 2009), these codes are potentially 
valuable in corporate decision-making and they 
may be considered as a signal to stakeholders about 
the organizational values of the company (Clark 
and Leonard, 1998; McKinney et al. 2010; 
Schwartz, 2001; Singh et al., 2005).  
However there is a lack of studies focused on 
the environmental disclosure in codes of ethics. 
Thus, the understanding of the determinants and 
effects of corporate environmental strategies is still 
not sufficiently investigated. Moreover, just few 
studies analyse the influence of the company’s 
industry sector on the content and quality in codes 
of ethics (Lugli et al. 2009; Perrini et al., 2007). 
Thus, we attempt to fill this gap through a content 
analysis of the environmental disclosure in the 
codes of ethics of Italian listed companies in order 
to understand what are the environmental 
sustainability’s factors disclosed in those codes and 
whether and how the industry sector affect the 
environmental disclosure. In other words, we aim to 
define to what extent companies are environment-
oriented and if and how they disclose the value of 
environmental sustainability in their mission 
statements as well as their environmental policies 
(principles and objectives), instruments and 
certifications in codes of ethics. 
According to legitimacy theory, we expect 
that the more the industry is pollutant the more the 
companies belonging to that industry care about 
environmental sustainability and extensively 
disclose this issue in the code of ethics (see, for 
example, Du and Vieira, 2012). This is due to the 
fact that companies aim to protect their public 
image and reputation and, as a result, that the more 
polluting industries (Clarkson el al., 2008), such us 
Oil and Gas, Utilities and Basic Materials are more 
sensitive to environmental sustainability. 
 
3. Research design 
 
The aim of the analysis is to identify how codes of 
ethics declare and communicate specific 
understanding of company’s environmental 
sustainability. In other words, codes of ethics are 
the object analysed and the content analysis is the 
tool used to achieve this goal.  
We adopt a content analysis to quantify and 
classify codes’ information because this method 
provides researchers with a systematic approach to 
analyse large datasets (Krippendorff, 1980). 
Moreover, content analysis is a widely used method 
by which selected items of qualitative data are 
systematically converted to numerical data (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009) and it is extensively used in the 
analysis of code of ethics (Helin and Sandström, 
2007; Gaumnitz and Lere 2004). Normally, the 
method provides to examine a document (in this 
study the code of ethics) and determine the coding 
units, such as a particular word, character, item or 
theme, which is found in the code of ethics. The 
next step is to construct a coding frame, which lists 
the coding units in the first column, leaving room 
for the analysis of each communication to be added 
on the horizontal axis. So, the analysis can be based 
on the frequency of occurrence and its percentage 
on the overall observations.  
 
3.1. Data collection and sample 
 
The sample includes all codes of ethics adopted by 
the Italian companies listed on the MTA (Mercato 
Telematico Azionario) of the Italian Stock 
Exchange. We selected these companies because 
they are the most visible Italian firms and, 
therefore, the most important as perceived by 
investors, business analysts and the public. At the 
end of the collection period (March 2011), 259 
companies were listed.  
Data collection started with visiting the web 
pages of the companies and searching for formal 
documents addressing business ethics issues 
(usually titled ‘Code of ethics’ or ‘Code of 
conduct’). In most cases, the document has been 
found within the sections “Corporate Governance” 
or “Investor Relations” of the company’s web sites. 
We collected 230 codes of ethics. 
Concerning the sample composition, Table 1 
shows the categories classifying companies by 
Stock Exchange segments whereas Table 2 
illustrates the companies forming the sample 
categorized by industry sector. 
 
Table 1. Sample composition by Stock Exchange segment 
 
MTA SEGMENTS 
Number of 
firms 
Number of firms adopting a code of 
ethics 
Percentages of firms adopting a code of 
ethics 
FTSE MIB 40 40 100% 
FTSE MID CAP 60 58 97% 
FTSE SMALL CAP 140 116 83% 
FTSE MICRO CAP 19 16 84% 
TOTALS 259 230 89% 
Source: our elaboration 
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Table 2. Sample composition by industry sector 
 
SECTOR 
Number of 
firms 
Number of firms adopting a code               
of ethics 
Percentage of firms adopting a code 
of ethics 
Oil and Gas 5 5 100% 
Basic Materials 7 6 86% 
Industrials 63 55 87% 
Consumer Goods 47 44 94% 
Health Care 7 7 100% 
Consumer Services 30 25 83% 
Telecommunications 4 4 100% 
Utilities 19 17 89% 
Financials 57 49 86% 
Technology 20 18 90% 
TOTALS 259 230 89% 
Source: our elaboration 
 
3.2. Data analysis 
 
We empirically explore the content of corporate 
codes of ethics in the leading Italian listed 
companies looking at the disclosure of 
environmental sustainability.  
First, data analysis began with the 
identification of the general structure of the 
documents. Generally, a code of ethics is structured 
on several parts, such as general principles; ethical 
norms regulating firm’s relations with stakeholders; 
ethical behavioural standards; internal sanctions; 
implementation. In the next step, the analysis 
focuses on the actors addressed in the codes and 
additionally it concentrates on the tools of 
communication and dissemination of such 
documents. The following step of the study regards 
the analysis of the environmental sustainability’s 
disclosure. Adopting an inductive approach it 
sought to identify the main issues addressed in the 
environmental section of the codes and, as a 
consequence, the similarities and differences 
existing among the codes of companies belonging 
to different industries.  
The analysis of codes of ethics is manually 
done by one author and checked for accuracy by the 
second and third authors. Then, the dataset is 
analysed by descriptive statistics (frequencies and 
percentages) and the research results are discussed 
in the research findings section. Note that the 
percentages showed in the tables are obtained 
dividing the number of observations by the total 
number of firms adopting a code of ethics for each 
sector. 
 
3.3. Environmental sustainability’s 
factors disclosed in codes of ethics 
 
Starting from codes of ethics observations we 
identify six broad categories in order to analyse the 
contents of the codes of ethics. The detected 
environmental sustainability’s factors are as 
follows: (1) code of ethics dissemination; (2) 
salience of environmental sustainability; (3) 
mission and environmental orientation; (4) 
environmental principles and objectives; (5) 
environmental instruments; (6) reference to specific 
certifications and environmental declarations. 
We measure the disclosure of environmental 
sustainability’s factors using binary indicators, 
specifying whether information was given about a 
factor of environmental sustainability or not. In the 
next paragraphs the environmental sustainability’s 
factors disclosed in codes of ethics are explained.   
1) Code of ethics dissemination 
The first area of investigation identifies the 
scope of codes of ethics and the instruments used to 
disclose the firm’s values and rules of conduct 
inside and outside the company. 
2) Salience of environmental issue  
This area analyses the salience of 
environmental sustainability in codes of ethics 
exploring the number of pages of codes and the 
presence of an environmental section (Gaumnitz 
and Lere, 2004). When the latter variable is present, 
we consider the number of pages and lines 
dedicated to it. 
3) Mission and environmental orientation 
The third area of investigation focuses on the 
mission declared by the companies with the aim to 
verify how the concepts of sustainability and the 
environment are specified therein. 
Every organization defines its identity, 
purposes, and values and why it should exist 
through a mission statement. By deﬁning the core 
values, purposes and goals, the mission statement 
clariﬁes the essence of an organization (Blodgett et 
al., 2011). It reﬂects the organization’s values and 
clearly enumerates the reasons why the 
organization exists (Collins and Porras, 1995). It is 
a codification of the essential corporate behaviour 
(Trevino and Nelson, 2010).  
Stemming from these considerations, we 
expect that the mission statements of Italian listed 
companies reﬂect their core values and 
environmental orientation. Hence each mission 
statement was content analysed for expressed 
environmental values. Specifically, we employ 
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content analysis to verify the frequency of the 
words “environment” and “sustainability”. 
4) Environmental principles and objectives 
The fourth area investigated is the 
“environmental principles and objectives”. By this 
expression we refer to the environmental principles, 
which guide the firm in its activities. Consequently, 
we identify three categories most widely found in 
codes’ contents: (1) the company claims to guide its 
actions to sustainability; (2) the code indicates the 
guiding principles of environmental policies; (3) the 
code indicates the objectives of environmental 
policies.  
In order to identify if the company claims to 
guide its actions to sustainability, we verify if the 
company declares to orient its business towards 
sustainable development and, in particular, if it 
claims to take decisions and actions towards 
environmental sustainability. We consider that the 
code indicates the guiding principles of 
environmental policies if it refers to any principles, 
declared by the company, underpinning the 
environmental sustainability. Finally, we consider 
that the code indicates the objectives of 
environmental policies, if the firm declares the 
environmental objectives to pursue. These 
objectives represent an element of the 
environmental policy and, in the same time, the 
output of the environmental management system 
(Kirkland and Thompson, 1999). 
5) Environmental instruments 
This area analyses the instruments adopted by 
the companies to achieve the declared 
environmental sustainability objectives. The codes’ 
observation allow us to divide these instruments 
into four broad categories: the adoption of an 
environmental management system; planning and 
control instruments (e.g., life cycle assessment; 
environmental auditing; environmental 
performance indicators); instruments of 
environmental reporting and communication to the 
market (e.g., integrated report; sustainability report; 
social report; environment report; environment 
statement; network development); other voluntary 
instruments (e.g., voluntary agreements; training 
programs; customers and stakeholders programs for 
national resources optimization; green procurement 
tools). 
6) Reference to specific certifications and 
environmental declarations 
The last area of investigation is the adoption 
of specific certifications and environmental 
declarations clearly included in the codes of ethics. 
The most widely mentioned certifications are: 
environmental certification systems (e.g., Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme, ISO 14001, 
Environmental, health and safety), environmental 
product certifications (e.g., Eco-label) and other 
voluntary adherence to other environmental 
initiatives (e.g., Unep, Equator Principles, Global 
Compact). 
 
4. Research Findings 
 
From the analysis we found that codes of ethics are 
similar for shape and structure but different for 
quantity and transparency of the information 
available on environmental sustainability. The 
research findings of the content analysis on the 
environmental sustainability’s factors in codes of 
ethics are presented as follows. 
1) Code of ethics dissemination 
With respect to the code dissemination our 
data – in line with other studies (Lugli et al., 2009) 
– confirm that codes of ethics are considered not 
only internal instruments, but also tools to disclose 
company values and rules of ethics to the general 
environment (see Table 3).  
The codes composing the sample are normally 
addressed to directors, employees and 
collaborators. In particular, data reveal that greater 
attention is given to the employees (93%), 
collaborators (86%) and directors (85%) by a large 
part of the industry sectors. In addition, 58% is 
extended to the subsidiaries of the issuer. However, 
it seems interesting to underline the high percentage 
(70%) of codes that extend the application to 
external parties (e.g. suppliers, agents).
 
Table 3. Scope of code of ethics 
 
SECTOR Shareholders Directors Employees Collaborators Subsidiaries External Parties Generic 
Oil and Gas 0% 80% 100% 60% 40% 20% 40% 
Basic Materials 0% 67% 83% 83% 50% 83% 0% 
Industrials 11% 87% 96% 89% 60% 80% 4% 
Consumer Goods 2% 84% 93% 89% 61% 75% 9% 
Health Care 14% 71% 100% 57% 57% 71% 14% 
Consumer Services 8% 92% 92% 84% 48% 64% 12% 
Telecommunications 25% 75% 100% 75% 50% 25% 0% 
Utilities 0% 82% 100% 94% 71% 82% 6% 
Financials 16% 88% 86% 88% 55% 65% 14% 
Technology 6% 83% 89% 83% 61% 56% 11% 
TOTAL 9% 85% 93% 86% 58% 70% 10% 
Source: our elaboration 
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As showed by Table 4, the most used 
disclosure instrument is the publication of the code 
of ethics on the company’s website (37%). The 
33% communicate the code by hand delivery, 
especially in case of the new intake. Only 36% of 
the codes contemplate the training courses among 
the means of code of ethics dissemination.
 
Table 4. Tools for disclosing the code of ethics 
 
SECTOR 
Delivery 
by hand 
Online 
disclosure 
Intranet 
Posted on 
notice 
board 
Declaration of 
awareness 
On demand  
to the proper 
office 
Training 
courses 
Oil and Gas 40% 40% 40% 0% 0% 40% 60% 
Basic Materials 17% 0% 17% 17% 33% 0% 0% 
Industrials 27% 36% 18% 15% 15% 18% 36% 
Consumer Goods 34% 41% 18% 11% 11% 16% 36% 
Health Care 57% 57% 0% 14% 0% 0% 43% 
Consumer Services 20% 28% 16% 12% 4% 20% 32% 
Telecommunications 0% 25% 25% 0% 25% 0% 50% 
Utilities 59% 35% 35% 6% 12% 18% 47% 
Financials 39% 39% 24% 4% 27% 12% 29% 
Technology 28% 39% 17% 11% 22% 22% 50% 
TOTAL 33% 37% 20% 10% 16% 16% 36% 
Source: our elaboration 
 
The cross-sector industry analysis highlights 
that the companies belonging to the Oil and Gas 
sector and to the Utilities sector pay more attention 
to the actual dissemination of the codes of ethics 
through the organization. In fact, most of these 
companies deliver the code by hand (respectively 
40% and 59%) and organize training courses to 
convert the ethical values into organizational 
behaviour (respectively 60% and 47%).  
2) Salience of environmental sustainability 
Considering a number of 230 codes of ethics 
with a number of 19 pages on average, we found 
that 57% of codes have a paragraph, or a particular 
section, that illustrates the question of 
environmental sustainability. Based on the number 
of lines and pages dedicated to the environmental 
section, we found that, on average, the value of 
environmental sustainability is not stated but only 
mentioned in about half of the codes. In addition, 
where the environmental section is present it does 
not invest more than one page. In many cases, the 
company provides a separate section for the 
environmental issues without specifying policies 
and strategies to achieve the sustainable 
development of its activities. Many firms have 
sections or sub-sections in which declare, in a 
generic way, to protect the environment and to 
respect the environmental legislation, as showed by 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Salience of environmental sustainability 
 
SECTOR 
Number of 
firms 
adopting a 
code of ethics 
Number of 
pages of the 
code of ethics 
(on average) 
Presence of 
environmental 
section/sub-
section/article 
Percentage of 
presence of 
environmental 
section/sub-
section/article 
Number of 
pages 
dedicated to 
environmental 
section 
Number of 
lines 
dedicated to 
environ-
mental section 
(on average) 
       
Oil and Gas 5 33 5 100% 1 30 
Basic Materials 6 16 5 83% 1 19 
Industrials 55 21 38 69% 1 16 
Consumer Goods 44 9 25 57% 1 13 
Health Care 7 16 4 57% 1 6 
Consumer Services 25 16 15 60% 1 6 
Telecommunications 4 17 0 0% 0 0 
Utilities 17 30 17 100% 1 23 
Financials 49 17 16 33% 1 13 
Technology 18 17 7 39% 1 6 
TOTAL 230 19 132 57% 1 13 
Source: our elaboration 
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As we expected, the empirical results of the 
cross-sector industry analysis highlights that the 
more polluted industries, such as Oil and Gas, Basic 
Materials and Utilities, on average present a higher 
percentage of presence of environmental section 
(respectively 100%, 83% and 100%) and dedicates 
a wider space to the environmental sustainability’s 
disclosure in codes of ethics (respectively 30, 19 
and 23 lines). 
3) Mission and environmental orientation 
The findings of the mission statements 
analysis are shown in Table 6. From the analysis, a 
limited orientation to the principles of sustainability 
and environment protection emerges. Only 139 
mission statements (60%) have been detected, thus 
analysed. As a result, only 9% makes specific 
reference to “environmental sustainability” and 
12% contains the word “environment” or 
equivalent. It seems that most companies do not 
perceived the environmental sustainability as a 
strategic aim and the environment protection as a 
part of their business strategies. 
 
Table 6. Mission and environmental orientation 
 
SECTOR Missions Available Sustainability Environment 
Oil and Gas 80% 0% 0% 
Basic Materials 33% 0% 50% 
Industrials 65% 8% 8% 
Consumer Goods 57% 8% 12% 
Health Care 57% 0% 0% 
Consumer Services 52% 8% 8% 
Telecommunications 75% 0% 0% 
Utilities 71% 25% 42% 
Financials 51% 8% 0% 
Technology 83% 7% 20% 
TOTAL 60% 9% 12% 
Source: our elaboration 
 
However, the cross-sector industry analysis 
partially confirms our expectation, in fact, on 
average, the companies belonging to the Basic 
Materials sector and to the Utilities sector quotes 
the word “environment” more often (respectively 
50% and 42%) than the others in the mission 
statements. The high percentage observed in the 
Basic Materials sector is probably due to the huge 
use of natural resources in this industry. On the 
contrary, the mission statement of the Oil and Gas 
companies point out the value creation for all the 
stakeholders. Nevertheless the environment could 
be seen as a stakeholder to protect and safeguard 
(Banerjee and Bonnefous, 2011; Gibson, 2012; 
Schwartz, 2011) according to the triple bottom line 
approach to corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 
1979). 
4) Environmental principles and objectives 
The analysis of the environmental principles 
and objectives statements has shown a reluctance to 
declare policies and strategies towards 
environmental sustainability. Table 7 presents the 
percentages of environmental policies expressly 
declared. 
 
Table 7. Environmental principles and objectives 
 
SECTOR 
The company claims to 
guide its actions to 
sustainability 
The code indicates the guiding 
principles of environmental 
policies 
The code indicates the 
objectives of environmental 
policies 
Oil and Gas 100% 100% 100% 
Basic Materials 0% 83% 67% 
Industrials 29% 73% 67% 
Consumer Goods 32% 57% 45% 
Health Care 43% 57% 29% 
Consumer Services 0% 68% 48% 
Telecommunications 0% 25% 0% 
Utilities 71% 100% 100% 
Financials 14% 35% 29% 
Technology 28% 44% 33% 
TOTAL 27% 60% 51% 
Source: our elaboration 
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Only 27% on average claims to guide its 
action to environmental sustainability and 
protection. As we expected, according to legitimacy 
theory, the percentage is higher in the Oil and Gas 
sector (100%) and Utilities sector (71%). 
Obviously, we can explain this difference looking 
at the diverse nature of what is produced in these 
industries. In other words, it seems that the grater 
attention given by these industries to the 
environmental policies is justified by the major 
impact that companies’ activities and processes 
have on the environment (Du and Vieira, 2012; 
Shrivastava, 1995), especially in terms of pollution 
(Freedman and Jaggi, 2005). The salience of 
environmental sustainability is even confirmed in 
the definition of the guiding principles and 
objectives, where the percentage is 100% of the 
companies belonging to these sectors.  
It is important to highlight that, in very rare 
cases, the guiding principles of environmental 
policy are specified in a particular section, whereas 
they are quite often generically mentioned in the 
disclosure of the business activity orientation. 
However, 60% of companies on average indicate 
the guiding principles of environmental policy 
within the code of ethics. In most cases, specific 
reference is made to law compliance and 
preservation of natural resources.  
5) Environmental instruments 
The disclosure regarding the instruments 
adopted by the companies to implement 
environmental policies and strategies show that 
only 20% of companies state to adopt an 
environmental management system (see Table 8). 
However, the cross-sector industry analysis 
highlights that this percentage is higher in the Oil 
and Gas (80%), Utilities (65%) and Basic Materials 
(33%) sectors.  
 
Table 8. Environmental instruments 
 
SECTOR 
The company adopts an 
environmental 
management system 
Planning and 
control 
instruments 
Instruments of 
environmental reporting 
and communication to the 
market 
Other 
voluntary 
instruments 
Oil and Gas 80% 80% 20% 100% 
Basic Materials 33% 67% 33% 50% 
Industrials 18% 22% 11% 35% 
Consumer Goods 20% 25% 2% 23% 
Health Care 29% 0% 14% 14% 
Consumer Services 4% 8% 4% 28% 
Telecommunications 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Utilities 65% 65% 47% 53% 
Financials 2% 4% 2% 10% 
Technology 28% 22% 11% 11% 
TOTAL 20% 22% 10% 27% 
Source: our elaboration 
 
A greater percentage (22%) states to use 
specific planning and control instruments to 
monitor environmental performance, however the 
declarations of the applied instruments are rare. As 
we expected, the percentage is higher in the Oil and 
Gas (80%), Basic Materials (67%) and Utilities 
(65%) sectors.  
In addition, the instruments adopted for the 
environmental reporting and disclosure to the 
market are mentioned only in the 10% of the 
observations. However, the percentage is higher in 
the Utilities (47%), Basic Materials (33%), and Oil 
and Gas (20%) sectors.  
Finally, the other voluntary instruments are 
declared in the 27% of the analysed companies. 
But, the industry analysis highlights that this 
percentage is higher in the Oil and Gas (100%), 
Utilities (53%) and Basic Materials (50%) sectors. 
As a result, we can confirm our expectation 
about a grater attention to the ethical value of 
environmental sustainability by the more polluted 
industries. 
6) Reference to specific certifications and 
environmental declarations 
The results on environmental certifications 
and declarations reveal a limited disclosure of 
environmental certifications; only 28% of the 
sample declares the adoption of an environmental 
certification system. The most cited are the ISO 
14001 and the Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme. However, the cross-sector industry 
analysis highlights that this percentage is higher in 
the Oil and Gas (100%), Utilities (53%) and Basic 
Materials (50%) sectors.  
ISO 14001 in one of the most common 
certification adopted by thousands of companies 
worldwide and consists of monitoring internal 
environmental processes of the organization. 
KPMG (2008) reports that 51% of the Global 
Fortune 250 (G250) and 41% of the 100 largest 
companies by revenue (N100) are actually using 
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ISO 14001. However, it addresses only 
environmental issues and so it is not a 
comprehensive sustainability framework. It is also 
process-focussed, not outcome-focussed, so the 
environmental outcomes could still be 
unacceptable, even if the process was itself certified 
(Hubbard, 2011).  
The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS) has also been widely adopted within 
Europe (Castro and Chousa 2006). However, like 
ISO 14001, it is limited to environmental and 
process issues. In addition, it has no impact outside 
Europe. KPMG (2008) reports that only 8% of the 
Global 250 and 5% of the N100 organisations use 
it.  
In addition, we observe that the environmental 
product certifications receive less attention than 
process certifications. Only 1% of companies state 
the adoption of a product certification. The 
prevalence of system certificates on product 
certifications may be due to several factors, such as 
the type of company, the business strategy and the 
limited understanding whether product 
certifications can really stimulate purchases or not.   
Finally, the mention of voluntary 
environmental initiatives is very rare (2%) as 
shown by Table 9. As we expected, this percentage 
is higher in the Oil and Gas (20%), Basic Materials 
(17%) and Utilities (6%) sectors. 
 
Table 9. Reference to environmental certification and declarations 
 
SECTOR 
Company declares 
environmental certification 
systems 
Company declares 
environmental product 
certifications 
Voluntary adherence to other 
environmental initiatives 
Oil and Gas 100% 0% 20% 
Basic Materials 50% 0% 17% 
Industrials 36% 2% 0% 
Consumer Goods 25% 5% 0% 
Health Care 14% 0% 0% 
Consumer Services 28% 0% 0% 
Telecommunications 0% 0% 0% 
Utilities 53% 0% 6% 
Financials 10% 0% 2% 
Technology 17% 0% 0% 
TOTAL 28% 1% 2% 
Source: our elaboration 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Financial crisis has generated a growing demand 
for transparency in corporate governance 
disclosure, especially with respect to business 
ethics. However, despite the increasing attention to 
the corporate social responsibility, the research 
findings suggest that business companies seem to 
underestimate the role of environmental 
sustainability in code of ethics. However, by 
developing this exploratory study on the codes of 
ethics of 230 Italian listed companies in different 
industries we obtain four main insights regarding 
the environmental disclosure in codes of ethics.  
First, the fact that firms seem not to integrate 
the concept of environmental sustainability within 
their mission statements suggests that they have 
different aims for the environmental declaration in 
the codes of ethics, varying from true assessments 
of environmental sustainability’s orientation to 
marketing communications of ‘doing good’, such as 
window-dressing policies or green washing 
practises. This is probably due to the lack of 
mandatory requirements, standards and formats for 
the environmental disclosure in code of ethics. 
Second, despite the large amount of 
information presented, companies are more oriented 
to emphasize the environmental principles rather 
than to define precise objectives and instruments to 
implement and manage environmental 
sustainability strategies. A number of companies 
emphasize very broad commitments to 
environmental protection, but neglect to provide 
details on how these commitments will be met. 
Moreover, in most cases, disclosing companies are 
at the very early stage in the adoption of 
environmental sustainability’s approach. According 
to Lugli et al. (2009), the function of the 
environmental disclosure seems to be more 
communicating firm’s position on environmental 
issues towards external partners than implementing 
ethical rules of conducts inside the organizations. 
Third, the empirical results show that within 
codes of ethics there is little evidence of an 
extensive attention to environmental issues in terms 
of either quantity and/or quality. Nevertheless, the 
most “polluting” industries, such as Basic 
Materials, Oil and Gas and Utilities, are more active 
in declaring to act in a sustainable manner (see for 
example Du and Vieira, 2012). Conversely, a 
sustainable development should be not correlated 
with the kind of activities done but integrated and 
motivated as strategic aim (see, for examples, 
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Flammer, 2013; Gibson, 2012; Porter and Kramer, 
2006).  
In other words, the environmental values 
stated in the codes of ethics seem to be affected by 
industry characteristics. According to Lugli et al. 
(2009), we suggest that companies choose to 
declare their orientation to the environmental 
sustainability, and more in general, to the corporate 
social responsibility, to obtain the consensus from 
the part of the society that is most sensitive to those 
issues and to improve their public legitimacy (Chen 
and Roberts, 2010; Clarkson et al., 2008).  
It probably depends on the fact that most 
companies still view the environmental protection 
as barrier to profitability or as a regulation to 
comply with rather than fundamental business 
strategy leading to a sustainable competitive 
advantage. In other words, this lack of attention to 
environmental sustainability could be addressed to 
the huge investments that companies necessarily 
would be obliged to perform in order to renewal 
their production processes for adopting a 
sustainable approach to growth (see Sprinkle and 
Maines, 2010 for a review of the costs and benefits 
of corporate social responsibility). 
Forth, an environmental sustainability’s 
approach involves difficult choices because not all 
actions that reap benefits to society and 
environment also benefit shareholders, at least in 
the short term. Additionally, the investments to 
become sustainable are significant and often reflect 
their value in the long term (Flammer, 2013). Quite 
often scholars distinguish between companies that 
look to the environmental sustainability as a key 
factor to achieve a competitive advantage and those 
that are compliant with the minimum environmental 
requirements. The empirical results suggest that 
most of the Italian listed companies belong to the 
second category.  
Thus, the research findings suggest that 
regulators could encourage firms to believe in the 
sustainable economic development in order to 
change their approach to the environmental 
sustainability from a mere principle declaration 
and/or a minimal compliance with the regulation to 
a truly environmental awareness and to become an 
“ecologically sustainable corporation” (Shrivastava, 
1995). 
 
6. Conclusion and research implications 
 
Our research findings make several contributions to 
the literature. To best of our knowledge, this study 
is the first to theorize and provide empirical 
evidence on the features of environmental 
sustainability’s disclosure in codes of ethics.  
As a result, the empirical analysis identifies 
the factors of environmental sustainability disclosed 
in codes’ content. However, the research findings 
point out that the environmental disclosure in the 
codes of ethics of the Italian listed companies 
seems to be limited, primarily for what concerns the 
environmental instruments and the ethical rules of 
conduct. This might be affected by the fact that the 
study is based on data collected in March 2011, just 
some months before that the Italian Government, 
according to the European guidelines, introduced 
into Italian law, the administrative responsibility of 
legal persons, companies and associations without 
legal personality, pursuant to Legislative Decree no. 
231/2001, for the commission of environmental 
offenses. So, for research purposes it seems 
interesting to study the evolution of codes of ethics 
to assess whether they have implemented the recent 
legislative changes on the administrative 
responsibility. 
Additionally, the research findings highlights 
that there is a discrepancy in terms of 
environmental disclosure among Italian listed 
companies and suggest a standardization of this 
disclosure. Furthermore, the study is potentially 
significant for companies (e.g., SMEs) that have no 
experience in terms of environmental disclosure; in 
fact the empirical analysis highlights the more 
environmental oriented companies that could be 
examples to learn from to implement an 
environmental sustainable approach to the business 
activities. 
Another interesting avenue for research is the 
study of the relationship between the adoption of 
administrative responsibility, and more generally of 
corporate social responsibility, and the reduction of 
the company’s risk profile because, as argued by 
Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001), the adoption of an 
ethical and social responsible conduct could reduce 
the firm risk in practice.  
In conclusion, our research findings have 
several implications for scholars, practitioners and 
regulators for what concerns the disclosure of 
environmental sustainability throughout codes of 
ethics.  
First, the study points out that there is a need 
to investigate more closely the environmental 
disclosure in codes of ethics, focusing on 
environmental instruments and standards. Hence 
further research on disclosure of planning and 
control systems, environmental reporting and 
standards adopted by companies is needed. 
Second, the research findings suggest that the 
establishment of a code of ethics is not enough; it 
should be supported by the adoption of strictly 
compliant rules of conduct and other ethical 
initiatives. Thus, a clear implication for 
practitioners is that not only codes development and 
contents but also codes implementation and 
monitoring are critical for their effectiveness 
(Erwin, 2001; Singh et al., 2005).  
As a result, research efforts should examine 
how environmental values are implemented in the 
organizations in practice, focusing on 
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environmental managing and reporting system. In 
order to develop an environmental sustainability 
culture in the organizations, the environmental 
values included in codes of ethics need to be 
transferred into the organizations behaviour through 
training and communication programs (McKinney 
et al. 2010). These programs have to underline that 
the achievement of a long-term competitive 
advantage is affected by both external and internal 
factors. 
Among the external factors (e.g. the behaviour 
of other companies, the environmental awareness of 
consumers and civil society, the conditions of the 
natural environment and the laws and regulations 
which the company is subject), the greater social 
awareness of environmental issues plays a central 
role, creating a new market for business companies 
that is more careful in respect to the environmental 
protection and the proper management of natural 
resources (Flammer, 2013). This demand raises the 
pressure exerted by the external parties on the 
organizations behaviour. More specifically it can be 
assumed that the main advantage achieved with the 
environmental sustainability of the firm is an 
improvement in terms of reputation that results in 
greater customers’ loyalty and attractiveness for the 
new ones (Du and Vieira, 2012; Chen and Roberts, 
2010). 
Among the internal factors, we could consider 
the organization’s resources. When a company 
decides to include an eco-efficient and sustainable 
growth in its processes it must own specific 
resources and capabilities. Improving the 
production in an environmentally sustainable way 
would mean, for example, decreasing the intensity 
of the use of raw materials and energy, promoting 
the recyclability of products that could generate a 
costs reduction in the long term (Sprinkle and 
Maines, 2010). In addition, a new theoretical 
insight considers the environment itself as a 
strategic resource for the firm (Flammer, 2013; 
Gibson, 2012). 
Environmental sustainability should be 
improved within the value chain of the companies, 
to ensure a timely response to the interest of the 
community in ecology and environment. In fact, a 
sustainable environmental protection approach 
would allow companies to achieve a modern 
competitive advantage (Porter and Kramer, 2006) 
as they may boast the use of technologically 
innovative and more environmental respectful 
production processes that lead to an increase in 
profit. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly from a 
policy perspective, regulators (i.e., national and 
supranational, governmental and non governmental 
organizations) should provide for stringent 
enforcement mechanisms for companies that 
damage the environment and continue in their 
efforts to disseminate the principles of social and 
business sustainability, morally supporting and 
providing incentives for the development of 
environmental sustainable corporations.  
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ECONOMIC CRISIS IMPACT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & 
INTERNAL AUDIT: THE CASE OF GREECE 
 
Michalis Bekiaris*, Thanasis Efthymiou**, Andreas G. Koutoupis*** 
 
Abstract 
 
The 2007 was the year that the global economic crisis broke which resulted in the creation of a 
recession situation in almost the entire world. During this period, there were significant weaknesses in 
corporate governance, which refer to the practices followed by the board in risk management and 
shareholders' activism. The rapid growth in new products and changes in market structure can affect 
the development of processes and infrastructure of risk management. It is generally accepted that risk 
management, prevented businesses to fully identify the nature and severity of the recent economic 
crunch that the market faced. As the financial crisis is increasingly affecting the economic activities, 
the basic objective of internal audit directors is to find ways to add value to the business. The adoption 
of ERM should not be panacea for effective risk management, as well as empirical evidence suggests 
that the application does not indicate the existence of a protective shield. It should be noted that 
internal audit is a subset of risk management and may not have received the attention it deserved, 
despite the fact that the EPM is already running. Regarding the role of internal audit in the financial 
crisis, it needs to assess business activities, strategies, and thus the risk posed to business. Therefore, it 
should focus on issues such as the evaluation of existing business capabilities, collaboration with other 
risk and control functions, participation in meetings with major shareholders, assisting in business 
development for short-term strategies, etc. The purpose of this paper, is to record the current situation 
regarding the mode of interaction of the economic crisis in corporate governance and risk 
management. This is achieved by conducting research which underpins the distribution of structured 
questionnaires in Greeks professionals. In this way, it is presented a substantial imprinting of Greek 
views on a number of issues arising from the investigation of the above relation. In order to gather as 
much as possible essential information, it is performed a comparison of these global positions, by 
surveys carried out by the IIA, which had almost the same content. The conclusion is that the current 
economic conditions require a more effective form of corporate governance, while the three main 
weaknesses mentioned above are the areas that more focus should be given. Additionally, the most 
important factor that could highlight all risks in time is to perform audits on liquidity, capital and 
balance sheet consolidation. Still, there is a view that the ERM failed to recognize timely the danger of 
imminent economic crisis. Finally, budgets on internal audit have increased significantly, both in 
national and international level, while in the future the internal audit itself should have as a priority to 
consult the board, in order to identify, manage and monitor the key risks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ninth of August 2007 marks the great outbreak 
of the financial crisis in the U.S.Α. when an 
important part of the population could not meet 
loan obligations that originated from sub-primes 
(Poulter and Sims, 2007). The "bubble" in the real 
estate market in the U.S.A. which "popped" in 
2007, caused the destruction of many financial 
institutions worldwide (Simkovic, 2009). A 
significant institution, BNP Paribas, deteriorated 
the situation due to the fact that that it ceased its 
activities regarding three hedge funds, specialized 
in mortgages in the U.S.A. (Elliott, 2011). The 
inability to collect accounts receivable of U.S.A. 
banks by borrowers of sub-primes, led to the 
defaulted obligations in coupons, values of bonds 
and CDOs in which many European banks had 
invested. The liquidity problem caused distrust in 
the payment in case of a bank would borrow from 
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another, leading to increased interest rates in the 
interbank market. A possible application in case of 
a Greek bank borrowing from another one was both 
difficult and expensive, meanwhile this cost rolled 
over to customers, along with increases in Euribor 
(Poulter and Sims, 2007). 
The initiate of reaching a solution came a year 
later when the U.S.A. government allowed the 
investment bank Lehman Brothers in bankruptcy. 
After its collapse, the idea that all banks were "quite 
big to fail" started to fade, as a result each bank was 
considered dangerous. Within one month, the threat 
of a domino effect of the global financial system 
caused the interference of Western governments by 
granting huge amounts of capital into banks to 
prevent their collapse. The banks were rescued in 
the ultimate moment, but it was too late to prevent 
the free fall that had already begun in the global 
economy. 
Once the IMF and the European Union 
announced that they would provide financial 
assistance to Greece, the issue was no longer the 
solvency of banks but the solvency of governments. 
The budgets deficit were swelling during the 
recession, mainly not only as a result of lower tax 
revenues and rising welfare costs, but also because 
of the budgetary measures announced in the winter 
of 2008-09 (Elliott, 2011). Six years after the 
outbreak of the financial crisis, Greece has to 
address its own serious economic issues. At the end 
of 2009 the global economic crisis turned into 
European and, thus, Greek too; consequently, it 
intrigued the rating agencies and the markets in 
Greece’s weaknesses and in the imperfections that 
the structure of the eurozone presents. In 2009 
Greece stopped to enjoy low interest rates and high 
growth and entered the vicious cycle of high 
interest rates, loan denial and indefinite recession 
(Hardouvelis and Gortsos, 2011). 
According to the literature review the root 
causes of the financial crisis are (Travlos, 2011): 
(1)the irrational use of securitized mortgage loans 
(Securitization), (2)excessive use of loans 
(Financial Leverage), (3)the incorrect classification 
of credit risk from relevant organizations (Bond 
Rating Agencies), (4)the non-effective 
remuneration system of the executives, 
(5)inadequate supervision of financial system and 
lack of transparency in the balance sheets and 
(6)finally the weak corporate governance in 
financial institutions. 
The global financial crisis has exposed a 
number of 'concealed' economic conditions which 
are usually confined to the regulators and investors 
on Wall Street. These conditions are the basis of the 
effort to understand and resolve the economic crisis 
and contain: (1) the systemic risk, (2) the 
deleveraging, (3) the pre-cyclicality, (4) the 
preferred equity, (5) the Collateralized Debt bonds 
(CDOs) and (6) the credit default exchange (CDS) 
(Nanto, 2009). 
 
2. The role of corporate governance in 
financial crisis 
 
The crisis in the market of sub-prime in the U.S.A. 
and the liquidity constraint had significant impact 
in many financial and banking institutions around 
the world. Interest on late payments on mortgage 
loans with higher than prime rate began to rise in 
the U.S.A. in 2006, when various consulting 
organizations began doubting about the future. In 
mid-2007, credit spreads began to rise and the 
international credit rating agencies announced the 
first significant declines as they began to excite the 
first doubts about the degree of risk in which many 
investors were exposed because of their investment. 
It is a fact that the boards of many financial 
institutions faced competitive conditions and 
permissive regulatory environment (OCED, 2009). 
One of the major causes of the financial crisis, 
according to Professor Jang, is the failure of 
corporate governance. Transparency and 
accountability are the two basic principles of the 
CG were violated by the investment and 
commercial banks in the developed world, which 
resulted to the crisis. All risk management and 
financing mechanisms are founded without any 
regulatory mechanism. In fact, the current crisis and 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 have a common 
failure cause of corporate governance. The core of 
the problem is a crisis of liquidity, not insolvency. 
All Asian economies have made significant 
progress in the CG after the crisis. However, this is 
limited mainly to the introduction of new rules and 
regulations, without particular attention to their 
application. For example, on a board of a company 
there are some independent directors but the critical 
factor is the influence they exercise (Jang, 2008). 
A recent survey (Erkens et al., 2012) provides 
empirical evidence on how corporate governance 
affects the performance of financial institutions 
during the financial crisis. The current economic 
environment has special importance in the 
evaluation of corporate governance as well as 
indicates that business lack an effective corporate 
governance and mainly in financial institutions that 
comply with local regulations and corporate 
governance models as they characterized them as 
best practices (Moxey and Berendt, 2008). Another 
significant part of the survey mentioned, is that 
despite the fact that all businesses have been 
affected by the crisis, it was found that firms 
characterized by higher institutional ownership and 
more independent boards had worse stock 
performance indicators in relation to other 
companies. This is because (1) firms with higher 
institutional ownership took more risk before the 
crisis, which led to heavy losses for shareholders, 
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and (2) firms with more independent board 
members raised more owners’ equity during the 
crisis, which led to a transfer of wealth from 
existing shareholders to debt-holders. The results 
show us that corporate governance had a significant 
impact on business performance during the crisis by 
taking risks and financing policies (Erkens et al., 
2012). 
Fundamental role of the board is to provide 
the necessary guidance and carry out the necessary 
controls. Since the corporate scandals in the early 
00’s (Enron, WorldCom), revealed that the non-
executive members did not report any significant 
manager’s oversights. The recent economic events 
indicate that this happened in many financial 
institutions. This may be due to the complexity of 
the business. However, the answer to this problem 
is not the further education and in any case the 
regulatory provisions should not substitute the 
business judgment (Moxey and Berendt, 2008). 
Therefore, the market today, according to 
current economic conditions, corporate governance 
requires to response in an effective way. For 
example, management should be clear about the 
strategy followed and its risk appetite, responding 
on time requiring effective reporting systems. The 
results of the crisis so far, indicate the existence of 
a number of weaknesses in factors that make an 
organization more effective. The way in which the 
implementation of risk management was decided in 
many cases was associated with the incentive 
system that prevailed in many businesses. It seems 
to have been, in many cases, a mistaken 
combination among the incentive system, risk 
management and internal control systems. 
 
3. The management of business risk and 
the financial crisis 
 
Over the last twenty years, the financial risk 
management has played an important role for 
companies and financial institutions. The current 
financial crisis has revealed significant weaknesses 
in risk management practices across the financial 
mainstream. The risk management is now seen as a 
core activity for all companies. Many of the 
catastrophic losses of the 1990s, such as the Orange 
County in 1994 and Barings in 1995 could have 
been avoided if the risk management practices were 
implemented (Voinea and Anton, 2009). According 
to a report conducted by the IIA, risks associated 
with the financial crisis can be categorized into: 
credit risks, risks of cost reduction, risks from the 
exposure to third parts, risks related to the 
company's reputation and liquidity risks (IIA, 
2009). 
The ERM triggered some companies, for 
example Alfac, Wells, Fargo, BB & T, and JP 
Morgan, while in others it did not function 
effectively and thus they experienced the effects of 
the crisis (Aldhizer and Stone, 2009). In a survey 
conducted in 2008 by the economic magazine 
“Economist”, 500 senior executives involved in risk 
management from the largest banks around the 
world, identified weaknesses in risk management 
that contributed to the current financial crisis 
(Voinea and Anton, 2009). Several theoretical and 
empirical studies showed limitations of risk 
management practices before and during the current 
financial crisis. Rene Stulz (2008) argued that there 
are five ways in which risk management systems 
cannot function effectively and they are verified by 
the current crisis. Specifically, these are: fail to use 
appropriate metrics for risk measurement, mistaken 
assessment of known risks, failure to take into 
account the known risks, failure to communicate 
the risks to the senior management, failure to 
monitor and manage risk. 
The audit committee requires for more 
effective risk management, risk mitigation and 
inter-operational risk assessments. It seems that the 
internal audit is aware of these pressures and should 
not continue to provide a reasonable assurance for 
the activities of the board. According to a report 
conducted by the IIA one of the points of interest 
for risk management of the internal audit is to 
assess the skills and competencies of the audit. One 
of the challenges that the internal audit faces in an 
effort to broaden the scope of its issues related to 
risk management, is the perception, according to 
which risk management is outside the scope of the 
internal audit and not associated with its features. 
As an organization's ability to manage risk 
increases, there should be a response from the 
internal audit so that these needs should be met. In 
today's business environment, internal auditors 
must be able to recognize and associate risks across 
all business functions. It is essential to be able to 
examine complex financial transactions and make 
presentations to the audit committee and the board. 
Once the business skills in risk management have 
reached a sufficient level of maturity, internal audit 
should be able to provide assurance to the business 
processes of ERM (IIA, 2009). 
 
4. Quantification of the interaction of 
the global economic crisis on the 
internal audit function 
 
As developments in the global economy are 
growing rapidly, the interest in recording and 
mapping the role of internal audit in the global 
economic crisis is becoming more and more 
intense. This is immediately apparent from a 
systematic effort for the quantification of this 
interest with the assistance of a series of surveys 
carried out. Their main research interest focus on a 
number of issues that study the existing interaction 
between the internal audit activity which was 
affected by the current economic developments. 
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The IIA in an attempt to capture the impact of 
the economic crisis in the audit function conducted 
three different surveys
4
 with different sample 
periods. These surveys examine some important 
parameters that fall into five categories which are 
summarized below. 
The number of staff employed by the 
department of internal audit: The highest rates 
appear in the category where the firm employs from 
3 to 6 employees while there is a proportion of 36% 
of Fortune 500 companies stating that each of the 
companies belong to this category, the size of the 
internal audit department more than 30 people. 
The impact of the economic crisis on the 
budget of internal control: As businesses operate in 
an uncertain and ever-changing environment, they 
have to face a number of risks. One of the first 
moves of companies is to make cutbacks in order to 
balance losses in a certain degree. There are a few 
times when the internal audit has been downgraded 
for his work, while there is the perception that it 
does not worth any money, or proposing the 
absorption by some other part of the business that 
will be responsible and deal with the procedures for 
internal control. 
The majority of respondents say that the 
budget for the internal audit department remained at 
the same level, but on the other hand in many 
companies there were reductions of 10 to over 50%. 
At the same time the years 2008-2010 there was a 
stable rate in all companies while there were 
marked some important percentages of business in 
which it increased in 2010 even before the crisis 
defused. 
The role of risk management and internal 
control in the financial crisis: The main reason that 
shaped the financial situation of business today is 
the inefficient management practices relating to the 
risk management. According to the surveys, 33.4% 
believe that better risk management practices could 
have been an omen of the global financial crisis for 
the company. Business risks may increase the risk 
of counterfeit issues in the financial statements. The 
40% of respondents believe that the internal audit is 
thought to be a crucial in identifying and mapping 
the risks that arise due to the international economic 
circumstances. Moreover, according to the results, 
the risk management practices are still being 
developed but have received no official status 
(36%). In addition, participants were asked to 
identify the level involved in risk management. 
Despite the fact that the results from two different 
                                                          
4
 Specifically the surveys are: 
 Institute of Internal Auditors (2009): “Internal Auditing 
and Risk Management”, Altamonte Springs 
 Institute of Internal Auditors (2009): “The financial 
crisis and its impact on the Internal Audit Profession”, 
Altamonte Springs 
 Institute of Internal Auditors (2010): “Internal Auditing: 
Shifting Priorities for a Changing Environment”, 
Altamonte Springs 
questions confirm that the application of the 
processes of risk management is applied by the 
upper to the lower hierarchical levels, many 
companies have no official department in which 
these processes will be the primary object. 
Nevertheless, the existence of audit committee in a 
percentage of 11%, suggests that risk management 
is a subject of interest for the senior management. 
The essential assistance for the internal control 
seems to be the easiest identification of the major 
risks and their assessment and they are followed by: 
the participation in the identification of emerging 
risks, the provision of reassuring reports regarding 
the management of significant risks, assisting 
management on how the risk should be managed, 
providing assurance that risks are identified and 
there is a proper evaluation of the management 
procedures etc. 
Participants were also asked on the criteria 
used in making assessments of risk. It is observed 
that the top positions with high rates are the impact 
and probability, followed by other effects such as 
the index of the effect to the client, the index ROI, 
the assemblage with other risks etc. 
Despite the fact that risk management is a 
critical factor for both crisis prediction and its 
treatment, the auditors were asked to answer the 
question: Which the primary roles and 
responsibilities should be (beyond traditional 
standards) in the new continuously changing 
environment. The most important areas are: 
research for possible fraud (65%), research on 
ethics (42%), issues relating to compliance with the 
provision SOX (39%) and, finally, risk 
management (33%). An important point arising 
from these results is that actually, internal audit 
should strengthen its basic purpose, namely 
providing assurance and consulting, while at the 
same time it should apply business knowledge and 
skills in important audit operational initiatives 
relating to fraud and risk management. 
 
The barriers that have been created for internal 
audit: The first survey gives more concrete actions 
on the obstacles facing the risk management that 
namely in descending order of frequency are: the 
view that board thinks that manage the risks 
effectively, firms characterized as decentralized do 
not apply effectively risk management across the 
enterprise, management has not hold anyone 
responsible for these issues, management ignores 
the positive cost-benefit ratio (due to different 
political areas their alignment is prevented), CAE 
has more limited presence than required, top 
management does not support adequately the 
overall design and finally, risk management is not 
an issue subjected to the internal audit when the 
latter has to deal with important issues. 
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5. Restructuring of Internal Audit in the 
future 
 
The role of Internal Audit may take several versions 
going from an independent assurance function in 
real management consultant. The future of Internal 
Audit should be based on a balance between these 
two roles, with respect to the expectations of 
stakeholders. 
This role may increase in the next years as 
companies, beyond the financial pressures they 
face, they have to deal with a series of regulatory-
normative pressures from governments in the form 
of regulatory measures against the economic crisis. 
The challenges the internal audit has to face are 
summarized as following (Kramer, 2009): 
 Focus on internal control as risk-based, not 
only on trade. 
 Curb on the analytical data and use of 
these data in the planning process in order to built 
controls which add real value to businesses. 
 The internal auditors and firms should be 
characterized by a high degree of adaptability to the 
legal-regulatory environment. 
 Ensuring that risk management and 
compliance is an integral part of the methodology 
used by the company as far as the risk is concerned. 
 Another factor is the communication 
between internal audit and chief advisor and 
continuous communication between internal control 
and audit committee (where one exists).  
 The existence of stability 
 Internal auditors should think and operate 
more efficiently. 
Deloitte conducted a survey on the evolution 
of internal audit in 2015 (Vandedooren and Bullens, 
2010). One of the elements of the research is the 
size of the internal audit department in 2015. It is 
obvious that the auditors believe that the future size 
of the segment will grow significantly in the 
percentage of 60%, while the size of the audit 
committee appears to be more sensitive to cost, as 
54% believe that the size will remain the same. 
Nearly 50% of executive management believes that 
it will remain at the same level meanwhile the other 
half thinks its size will increase. 
In the realm of professionals, research is 
ongoing to map the internal control in the future. 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2007) presented a new 
proposal on the future of the function of internal 
audit. The new value proposition should include the 
provision of assurance on risk management in 
conjunction with the traditional responsibility to 
ensure all controls. Increasing the scope of risk 
management inevitably internal audit function will 
be aligned on operational risk management 
functions regardless of their level of maturity. In 
this way, the traditional method of managing risks 
is part of the past by giving each position to a more 
risk-centric philosophy. 
This philosophy means that internal auditors 
should adopt a complete conceptual approach to 
audit, risk assessment, risk management, and 
everything that extends beyond a narrow focus on 
simple tests. With such a philosophy, internal 
auditors will increase their functional values at a 
time when the valuation and risk management have 
become the key concerns of interested parts. Based 
on the survey results the value of internal control 
depends on two key factors: the nature of the initial 
focus of internal control and the degree of maturity 
of the processes of risk management that it serves. 
These correlations demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The added value model 2012 of internal audit, source: PwC 
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6. Economic crisis and internal control: 
Lessons and Opportunities 
 
In a broader effort to understand the financial crisis, 
it is easy to attribute responsibilities to external 
financial and economic factors as they are raised 
and studied more widely. However, the external 
factors are only the visible part of the failure of 
internal corporate governance. Therefore, the first 
important lesson arising from the financial crisis for 
internal control is the significant deficiency in 
corporate governance, risk management processes 
and internal control many weak companies had to 
deal with (Millichip, 2010). In summary, the 
following table presents the main lessons drawn 
from the financial crisis and the appropriate actions 
for the internal auditors. 
 
Table 1. Courses for internal auditors arising from the crisis, source IIA 
 
Courses for internal auditors  Actions of Internal Auditors 
The businesses failed due to insufficient internal 
governance 
Control whether adequate procedures in corporate 
governance, risk management and internal controls 
are in place 
Failures in governance is usually unintentional 
consequence of other activities 
Considering unintended consequences as part of the 
daily operating control 
The failures of governance, come from exploitation 
opportunities that involve large amounts of audit risk 
Control in any activity for hidden influences, is there 
a risk that has not been calculated? 
Companies do not learn from the mistakes of other 
enterprises 
Stay Informed of the actions of competitors. 
Exploiting positive points-Avoid negative ones 
Failures in governance are inevitable The goal is rationality and not absolute assurance 
The failures come from people not from the 
procedures 
Control of human recourses, there is adequate control 
for the work undertaken 
Companies are less reactive rather than they should 
be in identifying failures in governance 
Attention to signs of emerging risks and focus on 
their reactive limitation 
 
 
An important opportunity that emerges from 
the financial crisis is creating a world-scale 
reflection of the internal auditors, as well as an 
important source of feedback to correct major 
weaknesses in both corporate governance and risk 
management system with a view to avoiding such 
significant failures in the future (Millichip, 2010). 
 
7. Research methodology 
 
Aim of the research: The objective of the survey is 
recording the Greek reality regarding the interaction 
of (1) corporate governance, (2) internal control and 
(3) the risk management to the global economic 
crisis. Moreover, a discovery of common-place 
items of professionals at local and international 
level is pursued. Through analysis of the facts 
proposals for the future development of the internal 
audit function are presented. 
The research method used is the questionnaire, 
containing 28 questions. The questions were of 
three kinds: 
• Sealed (Yes / No or increase / decrease) 
• Multiple choice questions 
• Questions with rating scale of 1 to 5 (Likert 
scale). According to this scale, 1 indicates the 
lowest level of satisfaction while 5 the highest. 
As far as the analysis of the research is 
concerned, descriptive statistics was used (eg 
frequency tables), tabulation and statistical 
techniques based on the chi-squared control. 
 
The Sample 
 
For the formulation of safer and effective results, it 
was crucial that the sample consists of professionals 
subject to audit. Given the difficulty in finding such 
a qualified sample, two tactics were followed. 
Initially, there was an invitation email to staff 
auditors. But because of limited access to e-mail by 
many internal auditors and since it has not yielded 
adequate results, an alternative method was 
preferred. 
The process by which data and most answers 
were collected involves a widely known 
professionals networking site. The population of the 
study was 85 internal auditors who operate in many 
sectors of the Greek economy. Out of the 85, 40 
were successfully updated, while 28 replied. The 
remaining 5 come from the first procedure. 
Therefore, the participation rate in the survey was 
70%. 
Participants were men and women of internal 
auditors, of all ages. All respondents regardless of 
gender are above 30 years. The 55% of the sample 
were men between 30 and 40 years, while women 
have relatively low participation rate of any age. 
The largest part of the sample has professional 
experience in the field of internal audit at least 6 
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years. This fact leads to conclude that the answers 
received are based on people who have a close 
relationship with matters relating to audit. 
Most companies and 42% are active in the 
Greek economy from 10 to 20 years. Equally 
important is the percentage of firms operating 
above 31 years (29%). 
The internal auditors, who participated, work 
in companies belonging to different industries. 
More specifically, most companies are in the 
banking industry. This is quite useful, as in many 
parts of the paper attitudes and reactions of 
financial institutions were discussed, as it is worth 
mentioned that they all have internal audit 
department. 
Regarding the size of the internal audit 
department, the firms that have an internal auditor 
constitute of 27% of the sample. Firms staffed with 
2 to 3 internal auditors are the 18% of the sample. 
The rate for businesses whose internal audit 
department consists of 4 to 6 people is identical to 
that of the companies whose internal audit 
department has more than 6 people, and is 27%. 
Regarding the hierarchical dependence of 
internal audit director in the business the higher 
figure represents the audit committee, i.e. the 
internal auditor is directly referring to it, with 63%, 
the Board is following with 18%, the CEO with 
12% and finally the president with 6 %. 
 
What research learnt us: Corporate governance 
and financial crisis 
 
Respondents, in a vast majority, agree with the 
view that the current economic conditions require a 
more effective form of corporate governance. This 
view is in complete agreement with the theoretical 
approach of the correlation between economic crisis 
and corporate governance. For this reason, from 
now on, the government should be clear on the 
strategy followed and determine from the beginning 
the risk appetite, responding on time, requiring 
efficient reporting systems. Also, businesses should 
have as a key concern the supervision of their 
efficient function and their compatibility with the 
business targets and the risk appetite. 
Moreover, the empirical results on the wrong 
connection of the three factors leading to 
ineffective corporate governance seems to fully 
support the theoretical approach to incorrect 
connection, i.e. to associate risk management with 
incentive schemes and systems of internal control. 
Furthermore, all Asian economies after the crisis of 
1997 made significant progress in the CG. 
In the banking sector, there were companies 
that failed to fully identify the severity and nature 
of the recent pressure accepted by the market. 
However, there were bank institutions that were 
able to cope with these pressures. For the 
respondents, there were four important factors 
placed, and they were asked to evaluate the most 
important factor that would work positively for the 
business and bring in time all the risks. In the first 
place of importance was to conduct audits on 
liquidity-capital consolidation balance sheets. This 
factor, according to the literature was the one that 
were applied yielded positive results, and helped 
the company to develop on time sources of 
significant hazards. According to recent literature, 
two of the key areas where corporate governance 
showed significant weaknesses, so it cannot 
successfully meet its mission, are the remuneration 
processes and the behavior of shareholders. 
Respondents were asked to give their opinion 
on the two dimensions. Regarding the procedures 
and specifically reward bonuses, theoretical 
approach considers as a failure of corporate 
governance, because they somehow encouraged pay 
schemes to take excessive and dangerous levels of 
risk. Practically, however, this is not imprinted is 
this research. So, it is observed that there is a 
common consensus between theory and practice 
and the degree of significance of this factor from 
the survey sample was relatively low. 
As for the other factor, the fact is that many 
people who claim that there is no correlation 
between the size of the shareholders and their 
behavior during the process of the enactment of 
important issues, from the beginning of the 
economic crisis and many companies, a number of 
important decisions were taken by a few 
percentages of the shareholders. The sample also 
moved towards the same direction. This factor was 
welcomed with neutrality, which suggests that 
perhaps for them it is not so significant barrier to 
effective corporate governance behavior of 
shareholders. 
 
What research learnt us: Internal audit, ERM and 
global financial crisis 
 
In the second part of the analysis, and more 
specifically in the relationship between the business 
risk management and the economic crisis, the 
theoretical approach supports that the ERM failed 
to recognize on time the danger of the coming 
economic crisis citing as an example the companies 
Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac Failures where the 
mere existence of a CAE, reassured that 
management has in place a comprehensive risk 
management program, and the paradox is that he 
did not exploit the information that even this sole 
director gave. The findings regarding this piece 
indicate an agreement degree on this conception, so 
we have a certain harmony of views between theory 
and practice in this area. 
Another issue that was raised is whether the 
effective communication between the audit 
committee and management could highlight all the 
dangers on time, so that the company could avoid 
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the consequences of the economic crisis. The 
theoretical approach supports the existence of 
communication in highlighting risks. A typical 
example is JP Morgan, where the audit committee 
of the company held regular meetings with the 
financial director. The company's dedication to 
addressing the risk, allowed it to acquire Bear 
Stearns and Washington Mutual. The audit 
committee of the company believes that most 
committees in the various businesses have an 
overrated view of management thinking that has 
complete knowledge about the business risks. The 
audit committee should adopt a new view which not 
only shows the confidence in management but also 
makes verification activities when assessing the 
knowledge of the management across the business 
risks. The results of research, on the other hand, 
show a neutrality in the field of communication, 
which makes it hard work to draw reliable 
conclusions. 
There are many suggestions for the role that 
internal control should have against the ERM. In 
the literature review we found plenty of suggestions 
on how we could improve the ERM. Some of them 
were assisting the management and the audit 
committee, assuring that management has set the 
minimum acceptable level of risk, etc. The research 
results come in complete identification with the 
theoretical approach, as well as the internal auditors 
of the sample believe strongly that the internal audit 
can improve the functioning of ERM. 
 
What research learnt us: Comparative analysis 
research 
 
The purpose of the next section was the 
comparative analysis of some studies conducted 
abroad with the Greek reality in a number of 
different issues. Initially the expenditure profile of 
the company was examined with respect to internal 
control in the period of crisis. An interesting result 
has come after this comparison. Once in the rest of 
the world in the last 2 years, the costs related to the 
internal audit activity grew at 9%, in Greece, those 
who answered that in recent years the company has 
increased spending was 25%, almost the double. 
Deloitte, conducted a survey on the evolution of 
internal audit in 2015 One of the factors considered 
by the research is the size of the internal audit 
department in 2015. This does not seem to be very 
realistic and in line with the current data that 
surveys record. 
Even a comparison of "domestic" and 
international opinion is the view that the main 
reason that determined the economic situation of 
businesses today are ineffective management 
practices relating to the operation of risk 
management. In Greek reality, this view was rated 
high in level of agreement from respondents. In 
short, that the percentage of those who share this 
view is important. On the other hand, in a study by 
the Institute, over 50% of respondents said they 
disagreed with this view and an approximately 20% 
held a neutral attitude. 
When asked for a formal risk management 
program, the Greek companies had relatively low 
average of application, with the exception of the 
banking industry and the service sector that showed 
a relatively high score. The responses from the 
surveys in the respective foreign matter are that a 
significant proportion of firms (36%) had informal 
risk management program, while firms with a 
formal program were also somewhere on the same 
level (31 %). 
Regarding the role of internal audit in risk 
management our research highlighted as important 
the role of participation in the identification and 
assessment of critical risks. Instead, the Institute's 
studies highlighted the most important role of 
internal audit, the involvement in the effort to 
highlight the risks. 
In the question of which should be the primary 
role of Internal Audit in the current environment 
views are diametrically opposed in comparison with 
the researches. The research of the Institute 
demonstrates as primary role the investigation of 
fraud, followed by research on ethical issues, then 
issues relating to risk management and finally 
issues related to regulatory compliance. While the 
research conducted in this paper, marks as primary 
role issues related to risk management, following 
by the investigation of fraud, then the research on 
ethical issues and end on regulatory compliance. 
The most important area in which Internal Audit 
should focus, is to assist the authorities in order to 
identify, manage and monitor the key risks. This 
view has wide acceptance by both surveys of the 
Institute and the investigation of this paper.  
 When asked what type of risk is estimated 
to be inextricably linked to the economic crisis and 
control should focus, there were significant 
differences in the responses. While in this research 
important category was the liquidity risk, in the 
research of the institute were the risks arising from 
exposure of the company to third parts. 
Nevertheless, the second largest category in both 
surveys was credit risks. 
 
What research learnt us: The future development 
of the internal audit 
 
Regarding the future development of the internal 
audit function, the literature involves much 
discussion about a strategic focus on risk. Greek 
internal auditors were also asked to evaluate this 
variable, and seem to agree to a large extend with 
this view. Therefore the studies made for the future 
dimension of the internal control and want it to pass 
in a risk-centric approach things have an actual 
base. 
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Typical example is the proposal of PwC 
where: The new value proposition should include 
the provision of assurance on risk management in 
conjunction with traditional responsibility to ensure 
all checks. Increasing the scope of risk management 
inevitably the internal audit function will be aligned 
with the operational risk management functions 
regardless of their level of maturity. In this way, the 
traditional way of managing risks is part of the past 
by giving its position to a more risk-centric 
philosophy. This philosophy means that internal 
auditors should adopt a complete conceptual 
approach to audit, risk assessment, risk 
management, and everything that extends beyond a 
narrow focus on simple tests. 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
The market today, according to current economic 
conditions, requires corporate governance to 
perform effectively as much as possible. Besides, 
one of the major causes of the financial crisis is the 
failure in corporate governance. Regarding the 
banking sector, there is a matter of morality for 
management to ensure that the borrowing or the 
actions of the mediators will not reduce the value of 
the business. In this effort, the important role of 
government is to provide the necessary guidance 
and carry out the necessary controls. It is argued 
that nowadays the top management tries to limit as 
much as possible the impact of the economic crisis 
within a business. 
In recent years, enterprise risk management has 
played an important role for companies and 
financial institutions. As the economic crisis is 
increasingly affecting the economic activities, the 
main focus of many internal audit directors is to 
find ways to add value to their businesses. 
Despite the fact that financial institutions and 
the insurance industry had the highest rates of 
adoption of the framework COSO ERM, these two 
sectors received the greatest negative impact of the 
global economic crisis. Inefficiencies of ERM can 
lead to: recognition and risk assessment, barriers for 
a full installation, measures to address the risk and 
the type of reports. 
The role of the internal auditor can be 
enhanced by the economic crisis by promoting the 
creation of integrated business risk management 
processes or increasing the existing processes 
across the enterprise. The data which the internal 
audit should use that result from the economic crisis 
include: the assessment of capabilities of the 
company, collaboration with other risk and control 
functions, participation in meetings with major 
shareholders, strengthen the communication, 
evaluation of controls and meanwhile keep pace 
with evolving practices. 
The current challenges faced by the internal 
audit concern not only in the scope, but also in the 
ways that auditors carry out the activities. 
In the context of ever increased reductions in 
their spending in order to survive, there is the 
perception that internal control is considered as a 
needless expense. The reductions should be 
cautious and should be compensated if the cost of 
the expense is greater than the benefit provided by 
the internal audit in time. 
It is a fact that the main reason that shaped the 
financial situation of enterprises today is the 
inefficient management practices related to the risk 
management. Risk management practices are still 
being developed without have received an official 
status in most businesses, meanwhile the companies 
which have a formal risk management program in 
place are few. 
Auditors have to deal with many challenges 
such as: the focus on risk-based-internal-audit, the 
usage of the data in order to construct controls 
which add real value to businesses, the adoption of 
a high degree of adaptability to the legal-regulatory 
environment as an increase regarding the quality of 
communication. 
The added value that the internal control will 
provide in the future will be determined largely by 
the influence of the same function in the business, 
which is reflected in the importance of the 
presentation of audit results. 
It is stated that most businesses consider risk 
management as a fundamental process for the 
operational functions. This means that the risk and 
its control are no longer technical aspects of the 
internal audit function or other activities. On the 
other hand, the management has begun to take 
responsibility for the risks it faces and ensure the 
effectiveness of the controls to limit them. 
The future internal audit model activity should 
include the provision of assurance on risk 
management in conjunction with traditional 
responsibility to ensure all controls. 
Given the empirical evidence, current 
economic conditions require a more effective form 
of corporate governance. Regarding the internal 
control the important role in its participation in the 
effort to predict the economic crisis is the 
identification and assessment of critical risks. At 
the same time ERM failed to timely recognize the 
danger of the coming economic crisis. In addition, 
effective communication between the audit 
committee and management could highlight all 
risks promptly, so that the company could avoid the 
consequences of the economic crisis. 
The primary role of Internal Audit in the 
current environment is researching for possible 
frauds and dealing with issues related to risk 
management. Regarding the future development of 
the internal audit function, the surveys conducted 
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lead to to the conclusion that internal audit should 
turn into a risk-centric approach. 
 
References 
 
1. David H. Erkens, Mingyi Hung, Pedro Matos 
(2012): “Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 
financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions 
worldwide”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vo. 18. 
2. Dick Nanto (2009): “The Global Financial Crisis: 
Analysis and Policy Implications, Congressional 
Research Service”, CRS Report for Congress. 
3. George Aldhizer and Mark Stone (2009): 
“Knowledge briefing: The impact of the current 
financial crisis on the global business community”, 
Global Audit Information (GAIN), The Institute of 
the Internal Auditors, Altamonte Springs. 
4. Gheorghe Voinea, Sorin Gabriel Anton (2009): 
“Lessons from the current Financial Crisis. A Risk 
Management Approach”, Review of Economic and 
Business Studies Volume 2009, No 3. 
5. Gikas Hardouvelis Gortsos and Chris (2011), "The 
international crisis, the crisis in the eurozone and the 
Greek financial system," Greek Union Bank. 
6. Hasung Jang, Dean (2008), Failure of corporate 
governance has led to the global economic crisis, 
available on line: 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/failure-of-
corporate-governance-has-led-to-the-global-
economic-crisis/401099/1. 
7. Institute of Internal Auditors (2009): “Internal 
Auditing and Risk Management”, Altamonte 
Springs. 
8. Institute of Internal Auditors (2009): “The financial 
crisis and its impact on the Internal Audit 
Profession”, Altamonte Springs. 
9. Institute of Internal Auditors (2010): “Internal 
Auditing: Shifting Priorities for a Changing 
Environment”, Altamonte Springs. 
10. Institute of Internal Auditors, 2009, Knowledge 
Alert, Internal Auditing and Risk Management, 
Altamonte Spring. 
11. Institute of Internal Auditors (2009), “A World in 
Economic Crisis: Key Themes for Refocusing 
Internal Audit Strategy”, Altamonte Springs. 
12. Institute of Internal auditors (2009): “Knowledge 
Alert: What’s next for Internal Auditing: Expanding 
the Focus to Address Emerging Risks”, Altamonte 
Springs. 
13. Larry Elliott (2011): “Global financial crisis: five 
key stages 2007-2011”, available on line: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/07/gl
obal-financial-crisis-key-stages (Accessed 
10/12/11). 
14. Laurent Vandedooren and Joris Bullens (2010): 
“The changing role of Internal Audit”, Deloitte 
15. Michael Simkovic (2009): “Secret Liens and the 
Financial Crisis of 2008”, American Bankruptsy 
Law Journal Vol.83. 
16. Michael Simkovic Competition and Crisis in 
Motgage Securitization”, Indiana Law Journal, 
Vol. 88. 
17. OECD. “Principles of Corporate Governance”, 
2004, Paris, OECD. 
18. O’Donnell E. (2005) “Enterprise Risk Management: 
A system-thinking framework for the event 
identification phase”, International Journal of 
Accounting Information systems, Vol. 6. 
19. Paul Moxey and Adrian Berendt (2008): “Corporate 
Governance and the Credit Crunch”, Discussion 
paper, ACCA. 
20. Philippe Haspeslagh (2010): “Corporate governance 
and the current crisis”, Corporate Governance 
Vol.10 No.6. 
21. Price Waterhouse Coopers (2007) “Internal Audit 
2012 A study examining the future of internal 
auditing and the potential decline of a controls-
centric approach”. 
22. Richard Millichip (2010): “Internal Auditing: A 
New Direction in the Wake of the Financial Crisis”, 
The Institute of Internal Auditors Research 
Foundation. 
23. Sean Poulter and Paul Sims (2007): “Police called to 
break-up Northern Rock panic queues as customers 
withdraw millions” Available on line 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
481778/Police-called-break-Northern-Rock-panic-
queues-customers-withdraw-millions.html. 
24. Stulz, Rene (2008), “Risk Management Failures: 
What Are They and When Do They Happen?”, 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 20, No.4 
25. The Auditing Practices Board (2008): “Audit issues 
when financial market conditions are difficult and 
credit facilities may be restricted”, FRC Publications 
26. Travlos Nicholas (2011), "Corporate Governance 
before and after the crisis", Collective Volume of 
GREEK UNION BANK "The international crisis, 
the crisis in the eurozone and the Greek financial 
system'. 
 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, Fall 2013 
 
65 
РАЗДЕЛ 2 
КОРПОРАТИВНОЕ 
УПРАВЛЕНИЕ 
И СОВЕТ ДИРЕКТОРОВ 
SECTION 2 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND BOARD ISSUES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD INDEPENDENCE  
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE POST-SARBANES OXLEY 
 
Kiridaran Kanagaretnam*, Gerald J. Lobo**, Dennis J. Whalen*** 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the relationship between board independence and firm performance over multiple years, 
post-Sarbanes Oxley. The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July, 2002 coincided with the 
NYSE/NASDAQ proposals to alter their standards for listed companies. These changes included a 
requirement that boards be comprised of a majority of independent directors and tightened the criteria 
for a director to be considered “independent”. We hypothesize and find that the passage of SOX, 
together with the new NYSE/NASDAQ regulations, result in independent directors who are more 
effective monitors of management, leading to stronger firm performance. Our results should bolster 
investor confidence in the financial markets at a time when the NYSE/NASDAQ has strengthened the 
corporate governance standards for listed companies. 
 
Keywords: Board Independence, Firm Performance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
* McMaster University 
** Corresponding author, Bauer College of Business, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77204 
Tel: (713) 743-4838 
E-mail: gjlobo@uh.edu 
*** Otterbein University 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent corporate scandals at Enron, Tyco, and 
WorldCom demonstrate that management will 
sometimes engage in unethical conduct for personal 
gain, to the detriment of their stockholders. This has 
led to a renewed focus on the importance of corporate 
governance in today’s society. Corporate governance 
encompasses the controls and procedures that exist to 
ensure that management acts in the interests of 
shareholders, and thereby maximizes the value of the 
firm. Legislators, in an attempt to prevent future 
scandals, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
July, 2002, which mandates, among other things, that 
executives attest to the accuracy of corporate financial 
statements and that corporations disclose whether or 
not they have a code of ethics for senior financial 
management. In addition, at this time, both the NYSE 
(Rule 303A) and NASDAQ (Amendment to Rules 
4200 and 4350) proposed, and later adopted, stricter 
guidelines for a director to be considered 
“independent.”  
We examine the relationship between board 
independence and various measures of corporate 
performance during the post-SOX period. Our study, 
like that of Larcker et al. (2007), utilizes an 
exploratory approach given that no theory exists to 
rigorously define the relationship between board 
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independence and firm performance. While several 
recent studies also investigate how different aspects of 
corporate governance relate to firm performance, the 
results of that research are mixed. We argue that the 
link between board independence and firm 
performance has strengthened since the passage of 
SOX and the adoption of the NYSE/NASDAQ 
proposals for several reasons.  
First, the post-SOX environment is a particularly 
good one for studying the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance because the 
revised NYSE/NASDAQ listing requirements 
tightened the criteria for a director to be considered 
“independent”. The typical board of directors is 
comprised of both insiders (i.e., company employees) 
and outsiders (i.e., directors who are unrelated to the 
company other than being board members). The 
loyalty an inside director has toward management 
may compel her/him to overlook fraudulent activity, 
in an extreme case, or merely to support an ineffective 
management team. Morck (2004, pg. 3) states that 
(referring to the Milgram (1974) experiments) “a 
human subject suppresses internal ethical standards 
surprisingly readily when they conflict with loyalty to 
an authority figure. This accords well with officers 
and directors’ stalwart loyalty to misguided CEOs, 
even under clear signs of impending financial doom.”  
Previous studies conducted in the pre-SOX period 
(e.g., Molz, 1988, Bhaghat and Black, 2002) have 
been unable to find any link between board 
independence and firm performance, possibly due to 
the “pseudo” independence of these directors. An 
independent director in the post-SOX period should 
have no loyalty to management and should, therefore, 
fulfill her/his fiduciary duty to shareholders by 
monitoring management to ensure that shareholder 
wealth is maximized.  
Second, corporate executives as well as directors 
are now being held more accountable for their actions. 
Indeed, outside directors at both Enron and 
WorldCom were found to be liable in multi-million 
dollar class action lawsuits. Klausner et al. (2005) 
suggest that “the WorldCom and Enron settlements 
will increase liability fears among outside directors.” 
This should compel those directors to scrutinize 
management actions more closely.  
Third, the typical board member now holds 
fewer directorships and the percentage of directors 
who are retired has increased (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2007). This should provide directors with 
additional time to perform their duties and enable 
them to monitor management more effectively (Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006). 
 Our study employs three corporate 
performance measures – buy-and-hold equity returns, 
return on assets, and Tobin’s Q. We utilize five 
variables to capture various dimensions of board 
independence, including board leadership, and three 
additional corporate governance variables as control 
variables. The board independence variables include 
the percentage of independent directors on the board 
(PCTONBD), and the percentage stock holdings of 
officers and directors (DOHOLDINGS).  In addition, 
we use indicator variables to denote the existence of a 
separate chair for the board of directors (SEPCHR), 
whether there is a lead director (LEADDIR), and 
whether the CEO has any relatives on the board 
(REL). Our governance control variables include 
indicator variables to denote whether a firm has an 
optimal board size of four to seven members 
(BDSIZE) and an optimal board meeting frequency of 
four to twelve per fiscal year (NUMMTGS). As an 
additional governance control variable, we use the 
fraction of CEO compensation that is comprised of 
stock options and restricted stock (COMPMIX). 
We use principal components analysis to group 
the eight board variables into four composite factors – 
board independence (FBI), board leadership (FBL), 
board size (FBS), and other (FOTH) - based on the 
characteristics of the individual corporate governance 
variables that are related to each factor. We then 
utilize ordinary least squares regression to relate both 
the board independence factors and the individual 
board variables to each of our performance measures 
for the post-SOX period (i.e., 2002-2005) while 
controlling for a firm’s capital structure and other 
variables associated with firm performance.  
Our results indicate that the board independence 
factor (FBI) is significantly positively related to future 
equity returns. The board leadership factor (FBL), the 
board size factor (FBS), and the “other” board factor 
(FOTH) each have a significant positive relationship 
with future ROA and Tobin’s Q. In addition, the 
individual governance variables generally exhibit the 
predicted relationships with future firm performance, 
demonstrating that more independent boards are more 
effective monitors of management.  
Our results demonstrate that independent 
directors are fulfilling their fiduciary duty to 
shareholders by effectively monitoring management 
in the post-SOX period. This finding also has 
important implications for investors and regulators. 
Both groups should welcome these results, 
particularly since the percentage of independent 
directors on the typical board has increased. Investors 
can take comfort in knowing that independent 
directors are now truly “independent”. In addition, our 
findings reinforce the recently adopted 
NYSE/NASDAQ corporate governance rules, 
requiring that each listed company has a majority of 
independent directors.  
The remaining sections of the paper are 
organized as follows. First, the research background 
on board independence and firm performance is 
presented. Next, we describe the data and sample 
selection, followed by the empirical analysis. The 
final section provides the conclusion. 
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2. Research Background on Board 
Independence and Firm Performance 
 
Studies which examine the relationship between 
board independence and corporate performance 
generally yield inconsistent results. One line of 
reasoning suggests that the presence of independent 
directors on the board should enhance corporate 
performance. Since they have no links to current 
management, independent directors should not be 
biased toward management in their decision-making, 
suggesting that they are better able to monitor 
management and ensure that management acts in the 
interest of shareholders by maximizing firm value.  
Baysinger and Butler (1985) find a positive 
relationship between the percentage of independent 
directors on the board and subsequent (i.e., ten years 
later) return on equity. Larcker et al. (2007) 
demonstrate, using only one year of data (i.e., June, 
2002 through May, 2003), that there is a negative 
relationship between future stock returns and their 
“Insider Power” factor. One component of this factor 
is a variable that represents the percentage of inside 
directors on the board.  Lefort and Urzua (2008) find 
a positive relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors on the board and Tobin’s Q for 
a sample of Chilean firms. 
Other factors also suggest that the presence of 
independent outside directors on the board should 
strengthen company results. For example, Weisbach 
(1988) reports that companies with a higher 
percentage of outside directors are more likely to 
replace a chief executive officer if the firm performs 
poorly. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) demonstrate that 
the appointment of an outside director to the board is 
accompanied by a positive stock price reaction. Klein 
(2002) finds that firms with a greater percentage of 
outside directors on the board are less likely to 
manage earnings (as measured by abnormal accruals). 
Bhagat and Black (2002) report that less profitable 
firms strive to make their boards of directors more 
independent. Walters et al. (2007) find that 
shareholder returns around acquisition 
announcements are positively related to the 
percentage of independent outside directors on the 
board when CEO tenure lengthens. Le et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that the strength of the relationship 
between research and development spending and firm 
performance is influenced by independent outside 
board members. 
However, it is also possible that the presence of 
independent outside directors on the board could 
adversely affect firm performance. Independent 
directors may not have detailed knowledge and 
sufficient expertise about company operations to be 
effective monitors of management. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) recognize that outside directors enhance the 
monitoring ability of corporate boards but also 
emphasize that insiders are a valuable source of 
information. Indeed, Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
demonstrate that the presence of independent directors 
on the board can reduce shareholder wealth. They find 
a nonlinear relation between the percentage of 
independent directors on the board and abnormal 
equity returns when firms make tender offer bids. 
Firms with boards comprised of 40-60 percent of 
outside directors have higher returns while firms with 
boards comprised of more than 60 percent of outside 
directors have lower returns. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) observe a significant negative relationship 
between the percentage of outside directors on the 
board and firm performance (as measured by Tobin’s 
Q). Vance (1978) demonstrates that firms whose 
boards are controlled by management perform better 
than those whose boards are controlled by outsiders. 
However, Bhagat and Black (2002) do not find (using 
several metrics of performance) that firms with more 
independent boards perform better than those with 
less independent boards. Molz (1988) also does not 
find that outside directors enhance financial 
performance. 
 The results of these studies indicate that it is not 
clear whether independent directors contribute to or 
undermine firm performance. This suggests that an 
investigation of the relationships between key 
variables that proxy for board independence and firm 
performance over multiple years, post-SOX, is an 
important addition to the current literature on 
corporate governance. In particular, if SOX and the 
recently adopted NYSE/NASDAQ corporate 
governance rules have actually bolstered the quality 
and responsibility of independent directors, then we 
would see a positive relation between proxies for 
board independence and firm performance in the post-
SOX period. 
 
3. Methodology, Sample Selection, Data 
and Variable Definitions 
 
The data on board quality are obtained from the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
database for board practices for the years 2002-2005. 
The IRRC database covers firms that have their 
annual general meeting during the first seven months 
of the year.  The data are based on the firms’ proxy 
statements filed with the SEC.  Merging the IRRC 
database with COMPUSTAT and CRSP gives us 
samples of 3,008 and 2,854 firm-year observations 
with all required variables for tests of firm 
performance based on ROA and stock returns, 
respectively.  
We estimate the following simple regressions of 
firm performance and board independence using 
ordinary least squares (hereafter, OLS). The first 
regression (equation 1) employs the individual 
governance variables as regressors, while the second 
regression (equation 2) utilizes the governance factors 
as regressors. We estimate these regression equations 
using 2002-2005 data from the post-SOX period.  
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Firm performance = a + Σ b*Individual 
Governance Variables + c*Capital 
Structure + Σ d*Control Variables + e 
 
(1) 
Firm performance =   a + Σ b*Governance 
Factors + c*Capital Structure + 
Σ d*Control Variables + e 
(2) 
 
The above model specifications are similar to 
models used in prior research (for example, Brown 
and Caylor, 2006, and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 
2007) examining various aspects of corporate 
governance and firm performance. We examine the 
relationship between board independence and firm 
performance after controlling for capital structure and 
various control variables specific to each firm 
performance measure.  
It is well known that capital structure 
determination is an important corporate finance 
decision for a firm. Prior research indicates that 
aligning the manager’s interests too closely with 
stockholders’ interests will result in sub-optimal 
investment policies and increase the agency cost of 
debt (John and John, 1993). Thus controlling for 
capital structure becomes necessary in any 
examination of firm performance.   
We discuss the choice of control variables 
specific to each firm performance measure in the 
results section. We also include industry and year 
indicator variables to control for industry and year 
fixed effects. For industry controls, we employ the 
commonly used Fama and French (1997) 48 industry 
categories. 
 
Empirical Measures of Corporate 
Performance 
 
Our study utilizes several metrics of corporate 
performance. We use Return on 
Assets (ROA), defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item 18) deflated 
by beginning total assets, as our measure of operating 
performance. We also use annual buy-and-hold equity 
return (RETURN), calculated from CRSP for a given 
year, as the measure of stock performance. Finally, 
we utilize Tobin’s Q, a variable that is often 
employed to evaluate the impact of governance 
quality on overall firm value. Prior research has 
examined the association between Tobin’s Q and 
governance variables such as board size (Yermack, 
1996), dual CEO-chair (Yermack, 1996), and board 
structure (Bhagat and Black, 2002). Consistent with 
the prior literature, we measure Tobin’s Q as total 
assets plus market value of equity minus book value 
of equity minus deferred tax, all divided by total 
assets. 
 
 
 
Empirical Measures of Board 
Independence/Control Variables 
 
The typical board of directors consists of both inside 
and outside directors. Inside directors are employees 
of the firm while independent outside directors have 
no business or other relationship with the firm that 
could bias their decision-making. The variable 
PCTONBD represents the percentage of independent 
directors on the board. Klein (2002) finds a negative 
relation between board committee independence and 
abnormal accruals. This suggests that boards 
structured to be more independent of the CEO are 
more effective monitors of the financial accounting 
process. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) find that 
boards with a greater percentage of outside directors 
are more likely to dismiss an ineffective manager. 
Also, Xie et al. (2003) indicate that companies with 
greater outside representation on the board exhibit a 
lower level of earnings management. The results of 
these studies are consistent with the view that 
independent directors are more effective monitors 
because they have no ties to management and are, 
therefore, not biased. However, Bhagat and Black 
(2002) find no evidence that board independence 
enhances firm performance. This finding is consistent 
with the view that independent directors may lack the 
expertise of company insiders to be effective monitors 
of management. However, we expect a positive 
relation between PCTONBD and our firm 
performance measures in the post-SOX period. This 
should result from the tightening of the criteria for a 
director to be considered “independent.”  
The director and officer ownership variable 
(DOHOLDINGS) represents the percentage 
stockholdings of officers and directors. Officers and 
directors who own a greater percentage of company 
stock are more likely to act in the interests of 
shareholders (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Klein 
(2002) finds that the level of earnings management is 
inversely related to the stockholdings of the CEO. 
Warfield et al. (1995) hypothesize that the level of 
managerial ownership affects both the 
informativeness of earnings and the magnitude of 
discretionary accounting accrual adjustments. Their 
results show that managerial ownership is positively 
associated with earnings’ explanatory power for 
returns and inversely related to the magnitude of 
accounting accrual adjustments. Therefore, we expect 
a positive association between DOHOLDINGS and 
firm performance. However, we also note that higher 
DOHOLDINGS could reduce the overall board 
independence. 
The variable REL is an indicator variable which 
equals “1” if the CEO has a relative on the board of 
directors and “0” otherwise. Board members who are 
related to the CEO are more likely to be biased and, 
therefore, not as effective at monitoring management. 
The variable SEPCHR is an indicator variable which 
equals “1” if the CEO is not the chairman of the board 
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and “0” if the CEO is the chairman of the board. A 
CEO who is also chairman of the board of directors 
could undermine the independence of the board by 
dissuading directors from expressing alternative 
viewpoints. Companies whose CEO is not also the 
chairman of the board should have stronger 
performance. 
The variable LEADDIR is an indicator variable 
which takes the value of “1” if the company has a lead 
director and “0” if not. A lead director is an outside 
director who is responsible for chairing executive 
sessions of the board (i.e., meetings of the board with 
no senior management present). Ideally, these 
sessions should promote a freer exchange of ideas 
between directors and thereby enhance corporate 
performance. However, according to IRRC, “most 
companies appoint a lead director when the 
company’s chair also serves as CEO, as a way to 
satisfy shareholders that an independent serves as a 
conduit of communication to the board.” This 
suggests that boards with a lead director will be less 
effective monitors of management and, therefore, may 
have weaker performance.   
The number of directors on the board is captured 
by the indicator variable BDSIZE; this variable equals 
“1” for boards which are comprised of an optimal 
board size of four to seven directors, and equals “0” 
otherwise. Dey (2005) defines optimal board size as 
four to eight members. Yermack (1996) finds that 
board size and firm performance, as reflected in 
Tobin’s Q, are negatively related. Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) suggest that boards with more than seven or 
eight members are less effective. Therefore, we 
expect companies with an optimal board size to have 
stronger performance. 
The variable NUMMTGS is an indicator variable 
which equals “1” if a company has between 4 and 12 
board meetings per year, and equals “0” otherwise.  
Too many board meetings can be symptomatic of 
problems at a company. On the other hand, boards 
that meet infrequently may not be able to monitor the 
management effectively. Jensen (1993, pg. 866) states 
that “…in well-functioning organizations the board 
will be relatively inactive and will exhibit little 
conflict. It becomes important primarily when the rest 
of the internal control system is failing, and this 
should be a relatively rare event.” Indeed, Vafeas 
(1999) finds that the number of board meetings per 
year is negatively associated with firm value. 
Therefore, we expect a positive relation between 
NUMMTGS and firm performance. 
The variable COMPMIX is the percentage of 
total CEO compensation in a given year which is 
comprised of stock options and restricted stock. This 
is similar to the variable employed by Larcker et al. 
(2007); however, we do not include stock 
compensation in the variable DOHOLDINGS. The 
link between equity-based compensation and firm 
performance is not clear. This form of remuneration 
may induce executives to focus too much on the 
short-term performance of their stock (Roell, 2008) or 
even to manipulate information (Goldman and Slezak, 
2006). However, Hanlon et al. (2003) find a positive 
relation between executive compensation which 
consists of stock options and future earnings. 
Therefore, we make no directional prediction on the 
relation between COMPMIX and firm performance. 
 We use principal components analysis to group 
the individual board independence variables into 
composite factors that capture different dimensions of 
board independence. This results in the identification 
of four composite factors that retain 63 percent of the 
variance in the individual corporate governance 
variables. We use varimax oblique rotation to 
minimize the number of variables that have high 
loadings on each factor so that we can more easily 
interpret the factors.  
 The individual board independence variables 
associated with factor one (FBI) are PCTONBD, 
DOHOLDINGS and REL. We label this factor the 
board independence factor.  Factor two (FBL), labeled 
the board leadership factor, is highly associated with 
SEPCHR and LEADDIR. The variable BDSIZE is the 
only factor with a high loading on factor three (FBS), 
the board size factor. The variables NUMMTGS and 
COMPMIX are highly associated with factor four 
(FOTH), the “other” board factor. The board size 
factor (FBS) and the “other” board factor (FOTH) are 
essentially control variables in our analysis. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the corporate 
performance measures, the board independence 
variables, and the control variables. The mean 
(median) return on assets and buy-and-hold stock 
return for our sample firms are 4.0 percent (3.9 
percent) and 15.5 percent (12.5 percent), respectively. 
Independent directors comprise approximately 71 
percent of the board for our sample firms; this is 
consistent with Gordon (2006).  On average, 21.4 
percent of our sample firms have the optimal board 
size of four to seven members; and 92.9 percent of 
our sample firms have the optimal number of board 
meetings of four to twelve per fiscal year. The CEO is 
not the chairman of the board for 35 percent of our 
sample firms; this is somewhat higher than the 23 
percent reported by Larcker et al. (2007) using 2002-
2003 data, indicative of more recent governance 
improvements. Also, 41 percent of the firms have a 
lead director; this is significantly higher than the 8 
percent reported by Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 
(2007). Stock options and restricted stock comprise 
approximately 43 percent of the typical CEO 
compensation package. Directors and officers own an 
average of 10 percent of their company’s stock. 
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4.2 Relation between ROA and Board 
Independence 
 
Table 2 reports the OLS estimation results using ROA 
as the firm performance measure for the post-SOX 
period. We employ three variants of ROA as the 
dependent variable in our regressions – ROA for the 
current year, ROA for the next year and the ROA 
average for the next two years. The control variables 
for the ROA regressions include total firm assets 
(LnASSET), the past/current year return on assets 
(LROA/ROA), and leverage (LEV). Firm operating 
performance should tend to persist over time; the 
coefficient on ROA should therefore be positive. 
Highly levered firms should exhibit strong (weak) 
operating performance during good (poor) economic 
times; therefore, LEV (i.e., the firm debt ratio) could 
be positively or negatively associated with future 
ROA.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents results using the 
individual governance variables as regressors. The 
variables PCTONBD, SEPCHR and DOHOLDINGS 
each exhibit a statistically significant positive relation, 
as predicted, with both next year’s ROA and the 
average ROA for the next two years. Boards with a 
greater percentage of independent directors and a 
chair who is not also the CEO should not be biased 
toward management; therefore, they are more 
effective monitors of management.  Boards whose 
members own a greater percentage of company stock 
are more likely to look out for the interests of 
shareholders (McConnell and Servaes, 1990) and 
thereby enhance firm performance. Also, REL has a 
significant negative relationship with next year’s 
ROA.
 
  
The additional variables, BDSIZE and 
NUMMTGS, also are significantly positively related 
to both next year’s ROA and the average ROA for the 
next two years. Firms with an optimal board size have 
better operating performance; this is consistent with 
Yermack (1996). Companies whose boards have an 
optimal number of meetings each fiscal year also have 
stronger operating performance; this is consistent with 
Vafeas (1999). Interestingly, COMPMIX has a 
statistically significant positive relationship with the 
average ROA for the next two years. Greater stock-
based compensation for the CEO enhances firm 
performance; this is consistent with the Hanlon, 
Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2003) finding. 
Panel B of Table 2 provides results when using 
the four governance factors as regressors.  As 
expected, the board leadership factor (FBL) has a 
significant positive relationship with the next two 
year’s average ROA. Firms with stronger board 
leadership (i.e., those with a CEO who is not 
chairman of the board and that have no lead director) 
also have stronger operating performance. There is a 
significant positive relationship between the board 
size factor (FBS) and both next year’s ROA and the 
average ROA for the next two years; firms which 
have an optimal board size are more effective 
monitors of management and thereby have stronger 
operating performance. The “other” board factor 
(FOTH) also exhibits a significant, positive relation 
with both future ROA metrics. Firms with an optimal 
board meeting frequency and stock-based CEO 
compensation have stronger operating performance. 
The control variable ROA is significantly positively 
related to future ROA while LEV is negatively related 
to future ROA.
 
As a robustness check, we also correct 
for firm level clustering of standard errors. 
Untabulated results indicate that the significance 
levels are similar to the results reported for the ROA 
regressions with controls for fixed industry and years 
effects. 
 
4.3 Relation between Equity Returns and 
Board Independence 
 
Firm equity returns are the dependent variables for the 
OLS estimation results for the post-SOX period 
presented in Table 3. We again employ three variants 
of the dependent variable – current year equity 
returns, next year equity returns, and the equity return 
average for the next two years. The control variables 
for the equity return regressions include LEV, the ratio 
of market value of equity to book value of equity 
(MB), firm size (LnMVE), and stock return volatility 
over the year (VOLAT). Firm leverage could be 
positively or negatively related to equity returns 
depending on the state of the economy. Firms with a 
lower market-to-book ratio of equity (i.e., value 
stocks) and smaller companies may have higher future 
equity returns (Fama and French, 1992). Firms with 
higher stock return volatility over the previous year 
may have higher equity returns given their higher risk 
level. However, we do not develop predictions for the 
control variables.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents results using the 
individual governance variables as regressors. As 
expected, PCTONBD has a significant, positive 
relation with both next year’s equity return and the 
average of the next two years’ equity returns; this is 
consistent with Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna. 
(2007). Boards with a greater percentage of 
independent directors are more effective monitors of 
management and thereby contribute to higher equity 
returns.  NUMMTGS and SEPCHR each exhibit, as 
predicted, significant positive relationships with both 
current equity returns and the average of the next two 
year’s equity returns. Boards which have an optimal 
number of meetings and whose CEO is not the chair 
enhance equity returns. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results for 
regressions employing the four governance factors as 
regressors.  The results indicate that, as predicted, the 
board independence factor (FBI) is significantly 
positively related to next year’s equity returns and the 
average of the next two years’ equity returns.  Also, 
the board leadership factor (FBL) has a significant 
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positive relationship with the equity return average for 
the next two years, and the “other” board factor 
(FOTH) is significantly positively related to current 
year equity returns. Firms with more independent 
boards, stronger board leadership, and stock-based 
compensation for the CEO have higher equity returns. 
The market-to-book and size control variables have 
significant negative relationships with future equity 
returns while the volatility control variable has a 
significant positive relationship with future equity 
returns. 
 
4.4 Relation between Tobin's Q and 
Board Independence 
 
Our third firm performance measure, Tobin’s Q, is the 
dependent variable for the OLS estimation results 
presented in Table 4. We employ three variants of the 
dependent variable – the current year's Tobin’s Q, 
next year’s Tobin’s Q, and two years’ ahead Tobin’s 
Q. The control variables for these regressions include 
firm total assets (LnASSET) and LEV. Since Tobin’s 
Q has total assets as the denominator, we include 
LnASSET as a control variable. Firm leverage could 
be positively or negatively related to Tobin’s Q 
depending on the state of the economy.  
Panel A presents regression results employing 
the individual governance variables as regressors. The 
variables SEPCHR, DOHOLDINGS, BDSIZE and 
COMPMIX are each significantly positively related to 
the three Tobin’s Q variants. Firms which have an 
optimal board size, a CEO who is not the chairman of 
the board, equity-based compensation, and a high 
level of board stock ownership exhibit stronger 
performance. In addition, REL has, as predicted, a 
significant negative relationship with each Tobin’s Q 
measure. 
Regression results using the four governance 
factors as regressors are provided in Panel B of Table 
4. The board leadership factor (FBL), the board size 
factor (FBS), and the “other” board factor (FOTH) 
each exhibit, as hypothesized, statistically significant 
positive relationships with the three Tobin’s Q 
measures.  Boards that have no lead director, a 
chairman who is not the CEO, an optimal board size, 
an optimal number of meetings, and equity-based 
compensation for the CEO exhibit higher Tobin’s Q. 
Both of the control variables, LEV and SIZE, are 
significantly negatively related to Tobin’s Q. 
 
4.5 Additional Analysis 
 
We summarize the results of several additional tests 
in this section.  First, we employ a pooled regression 
approach to relate our individual governance variables 
to the performance measures in both the pre-SOX 
period (i.e., 1998-2001) and the post-SOX period. 
This enables us to examine whether SOX has 
strengthened the link between board independence 
and firm performance.  Our pooled regression results 
demonstrate not only that the relationship between the 
percentage of independent directors on the board and 
firm performance (i.e., Tobin’s Q) is significantly 
negative in the pre-SOX period, but also that this 
relationship is significantly more positive (using all 
three firm performance metrics) in the post-SOX 
period. This is compelling evidence that SOX has 
strengthened the positive link between board 
independence and firm performance. 
Second, we test whether there might be an 
endogenous relationship between the board structure 
and firm performance. We use the approach followed 
by Larcker et al. (2007) as a way to provide some 
insight into the impact of endogeneity on our main 
results. Similar to Larcker et al. (2007), we assume 
that two of the primary variables that determine 
governance structure are firm size (measured as the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity) and 
industrial classification (measured by Fama and 
French (1997) industry factors). Each governance 
variable is regressed on firm size and industry and the 
OLS residuals for each of the eight governance 
constructs are retained. Then, we repeat our tests of 
future firm performance reported in Panel A of Tables 
2-4 using residuals for each of the eight governance 
constructs as explanatory variables. The untabulated 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Tables 2-4, thus alleviating the concern that the 
results in Tables 2-4 are driven by endogeneity.  
Third, we examine whether our results are 
driven by family (owner-manager) firms. We do so by 
re-estimating the models after deleting observations 
with DOHOLDINGS greater than 50% (i.e., owner-
manager firms) and DOHOLDINGS greater than 25% 
(high managerial ownership firms). Our inferences are 
not altered, indicating that our findings are unlikely to 
be driven by owner-manager firms or high managerial 
ownership firms. 
Finally, we examine whether our results hold 
after controlling for capital expenditures, an alternate 
proxy for future growth. We re-estimate the models in 
Panel B of Tables 2-4 after including net capital 
expenditures (capital expenditures less depreciation) 
as an additional regressor.  The untabulated results are 
consistent with the results in Panel B of Tables 2-4, 
indicating that those results are robust to controlling 
for future growth prospects. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We examine the relationship between firm 
performance and board independence in the post-SOX 
period of 2002-2005. Our study has several 
advantages over previous research in this area. First, 
we consider several firm performance metrics – return 
on assets, buy-and-hold equity returns, and Tobin’s Q. 
Second, we utilize principal components analysis to 
group our board independence variables into two 
factors. By doing so, we are able to capture the extent 
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to which boards are truly independent and reflect 
strong leadership.  
We argue that the adoption of SOX has resulted 
in independent outside directors being more effective 
monitors of management for several reasons. 
Independent outside directors are now being held 
more accountable. For example, such directors at both 
Enron and WorldCom were found liable for their 
actions in multi-million dollar lawsuits. This 
increased liability should compel such directors to 
perform their duties more effectively. In addition, 
outside directors must now meet the more stringent 
requirements of both the NYSE and NASDAQ to be 
considered “independent”. Such directors will not be 
independent in name only. Also, directors now hold 
fewer directorships and the fraction of directors who 
are retired has increased (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 
2007); this implies that directors now have more time 
to perform their duties and should, therefore, be more 
effective monitors of management (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006). 
While previous research yields inconclusive 
results, our study clearly demonstrates that firms with 
more independent boards have stronger performance 
in the post-SOX period. Boards which have more 
independent directors have fewer potential conflicts of 
interest with management; such boards, therefore, are 
more effective monitors of management leading to 
stronger company financial performance.  
 
References 
 
1. Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C. (1996), “Firm 
performance and mechanisms to control agency 
problems between managers and shareholders,” 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 
31 No. 3, pp. 377-397. 
2. Baysinger B. and Butler H. (1985), “Corporate 
governance and the board of directors: performance 
effects of changes in board composition,” Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 1,  pp. 101-
124. 
3. Bhagat, S. and Black, B. (2002), “The non-correlation 
between board independence and long-term firm 
performance,” Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 27 
No. 2,  pp. 231-273. 
4. Brown, L. and Caylor, M. (2006), “Corporate 
governance and firm valuation,” Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, Vol. 25,  pp. 409-434. 
5. Byrd, J. and Hickman, K. (1992), “Do outside directors 
monitor managers?” Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 32, pp.195-221. 
6. Chhaochharia, V. and Grinstein, Y. (2007), “Corporate 
governance and firm value: the impact of the 2002 
governance rules,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, pp. 
1789-1825. 
7. Dey, A. (2005), “Corporate governance and financial 
reporting credibility,” Working paper, University of 
Chicago. 
8. Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983), “Separation of 
ownership and control,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 301-326. 
9. Fama, E. and French, K. (1992), “The cross-section of 
expected stock returns,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 47, 
No. 2,  pp. 427-465. 
10. Fama, E. and French, K. (1997), “Industry costs of 
equity,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.  43, pp. 
153-194. 
11. Fich, E. and Shivdasani, A. (2006), “Are busy boards 
effective monitors?” Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, No. 
2, pp. 689-724. 
12. Goldman, E. and Slezak, S. (2006), “An equilibrium 
model of incentive contracts in the presence of 
information manipulation,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 603-626. 
13. Gordon, J. (2007), “The rise of independent directors 
in the United States, 1950-2005: Of shareholder value 
and stock market prices,” Columbia Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 323. 
14. Hanlon, M., Rajgopal, S. and Shevlin, T. (2003), “Are 
executive stock options associated with future 
earnings?”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
Vol. 36 No. 1-3, pp.3-44. 
15. Hermalin, B. and Weisbach, M. (2003), “Boards of 
directors as an endogenously determined institution: A 
survey of the economic literature,” FRBNY Economic 
Policy Review, Vol. 9 No.1, pp. 7-26. 
16. Jensen, M., (1993), “The modern industrial revolution, 
exit, and the failure of internal control systems,” The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 831-880. 
17. John, T. and John, K. (1993), “Top management 
compensation and capital structure,” The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 949-974. 
18. Klausner, M., Black, B. and Cheffins, B. (2005), 
“Outside directors’ liability: Have WorldCom and 
Enron changed the rules?” Stanford Lawyer, pp. 36-39. 
19. Klein, A. (2002), “Audit committee, board of director 
characteristics, and earnings management,” Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33 No. 3,  pp. 375-
400. 
20. Larcker, D., Richardson, S., and Tuna, I. (2007), 
“Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, and 
organizational performance,” The Accounting Review, 
Vol. 82 No. 4, pp. 963-1008. 
21. Le S., Walters B., Kroll M. (2006), “The moderating 
effects of external monitors on the relationship 
between R&D spending and firm performance,” 
Journal of Business Research, Vol. 59, pp. 278-287. 
22. Lefort, F., Urzua, F. (2008), “Board independence, 
firm performance and ownership concentration: 
evidence from Chile,” Journal of Business Research, 
Vol. 61, pp. 615-622. 
23. Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J. (1992), “A modest proposal 
for improved corporate governance,” Business Lawyer, 
Vol. 48 No. 1, pp. 59-77. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, Fall 2013 
 
73 
24. McConnell, J. and Servaes, H. (1990), “Additional 
evidence on equity ownership and corporate value,” 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 595-612. 
25. Milgram S. (1974), Obedience to Authority, Harper 
and Row, New York, N.Y. 
26. Molz R. (1988), “Managerial domination of boards of 
directors and financial performance,” Journal of 
Business Research, Vol. 16, pp.235-249. 
27. Morck R. (2004), “Behavioral finance in corporate 
governance – independent directors and non-executive 
chairs,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research 
Discussion Paper Number 2037.  
28. Roell, A. (2008), “Executive pay and shareholder 
litigation,” Review of Finance, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 141-
184. 
29. Rosenstein, S. and Wyatt, J. (1990), “Outside directors, 
board independence, and shareholder wealth,” Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 175-192. 
30. Vafeas, N. (1999), “Board meeting frequency and firm 
performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.  
53, pp. 113-142. 
31. Vance S. (1978), “Corporate governance: assessing 
corporate performance by boardroom attributes,” 
Journal of Business Research, Vol. 6, pp.203-220. 
32. Walters, B., Kroll M., Wright, P. (2007), “CEO tenure, 
boards of directors, and acquisition performance,” 
Journal of Business Research, Vol. 60, pp. 331-338. 
33. Warfield, T., Wild J., and Wild K. (1995), “Managerial 
ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of 
earnings,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 
20 No.1, pp. 61-91 
34. Weisbach, M. (1988), “Outside directors and CEO 
turnover,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, 
pp. 431-460. 
35. Xie, B., Davidson, W., DaDalt, P. (2003), “Earnings 
management and corporate governance: The role of the 
board and the audit committee,” Journal of Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 295-316. 
36. Yermack, D. (1996), “Higher market valuation of 
companies with a small board of directors,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 185-211. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, Fall 2013 
 
74 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ROA 3008 0.0397 0.0820 0.0137 0.0385 0.0738 
RETURN 2854 0.1550 0.4075 -0.0656 0.1246 0.3269 
TOBIN’S Q 3008 1.8209 1.0809 1.1563 1.4762 2.0412 
BDSIZE 3008 0.2144 0.4105 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NUMMTGS 3008 0.9292 0.2566 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
PCTONBD 3008 71.0167 14.0920 61.5000 72.7135 81.8180 
REL 3008 0.1393 0.3463 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SEPCHR 3008 0.3531 0.4780 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
LEADDIR 3008 0.4146 0.4927 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
COMPMIX 3008 0.4272 0.2795 0.2005 0.4580 0.6460 
DOHOLDINGS 3008 10.0803 13.6687 2.6000 5.2800 11.2000 
FBI 3008 41.0673 16.5780 33.0246 44.9050 53.1364 
FBL 3008 -0.0066 0.5467 -0.6820 0.0000 0.4410 
FBS 3008 0.2144 0.4105 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FOTH 3008 1.0167 0.2598 0.9336 1.0802 1.1688 
LEV 3008 0.1873 0.1567 0.0430 0.1677 0.2933 
LnASSET 3008 7.6964 1.3941 6.0727 6.7167 7.5746 
LnMVE 2854 7.8976 1.6837 6.6328 7.7578 8.9959 
VOLAT 2854 0.0925 0.0534 0.0570 0.0790 0.1120 
 
1. Variable Definitions: 
 
ROA=  return on assets; 
RETURN= annual buy-and-hold equity return; 
TOBIN’S Q = Tobin’s Q computed as (total assets + market value of equity- book value of equity -   
deferred tax) all divided by total assets ; 
BDSIZE= indicator variable which equals ‘1’ for boards which are comprised of an optimal board size of 
four to seven members and ‘0’ otherwise ;    
NUMMTGS= indicator variable which equals ‘1’ if a company has between four and twelve board meetings 
per year and ‘0’ otherwise ; 
PCTONBD= percentage of independent directors on the board; 
REL= indicator variable for relatives on board ; equals “1” if the CEO has a relative on the board of directors 
and “0” otherwise; 
SEPCHR= indicator variable which equals “1” if the CEO is not the chairman of the board and “0” 
otherwise; 
LEADDIR= indicator variable which equals “1” if the company has a lead director and “0” otherwise; 
COMPMIX= Compensation mix; 
DOHOLDINGS= percentage stock holdings of directors and officers; 
FBI =   board independence factor (0.686*PCTONBD – 0.749*DOHOLDINGS – 0.718*REL); 
FBL =   board leadership factor (0.782*SEPCHR - 0.682*LEADDIR); 
FBS =   board size factor (0.901*BDSIZE); 
FOTH =  other board factor (0.896*NUMMTGS + 0.431*COMPMIX); 
LEV=  firm debt ratio (i.e., total debt/total assets);  
LnASSET= natural log of firm’s total assets; 
LnMVE= natural log of firm’s market value of equity; and 
VOLAT= stock return volatility based on standard deviation of 12 months stock returns for the current 
year. 
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Table 2. Relationship between Future Operating Performance and Governance Variables and Governance 
Factors 
 
Panel A: Individual Governance Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted Current ROA  Next year ROA  Next two years ROA 
 
Sign 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept ? 0.0453 3.83*** -0.0058 -0.53 -0.0125 -1.07 
PCTONBD + 0.0001 0.87 0.0001 1.43* 0.0001 1.30* 
REL - -0.0022 -0.57 -0.0061 -1.76** -0.0036 -0.97 
DOHOLDINGS + 0.0001 0.64 0.0002 2.02** 0.0002 2.33*** 
SEPCHR + -0.0012 -0.45 0.0031 1.30* 0.0064 2.47*** 
LEADDIR - -0.0009 -0.36 0.0004 0.19 -0.0019 -0.74 
BDSIZE + -0.0031 -0.98 0.0056 1.92** 0.0074 2.37*** 
NUMMTGS + -0.0021 -0.45 0.0127 3.03*** 0.013 3.02*** 
COMPMIX ? 0.0007 0.15 0.0042 1.04 0.0105 2.45** 
LnASSET - -0.0014 -1.56* 0.0000 0.00 0.0007 0.86 
LEV ? -0.0511 -6.11*** -0.0196 -2.54** -0.0197 -2.35** 
LROA + 0.5046 40.17***     
ROA +   0.6125 45.20*** 0.5179 36.42*** 
Year controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
3008 3008 2182 
F-Value 
 
44.61 53.17 35.73 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
41.04% 45.44 43.32% 
 
1. Variable Definitions: 
 
LnASSET= natural log of firm’s total assets; 
LROA=  return on assets for the past year; 
ROA=  return on assets;  
LEV=  firm debt ratio (i.e., total debt/total assets); and 
.All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
2. *** significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level. Significance levels are 
based on one-tailed tests when the coefficient sign is predicted and on two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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Panel B: Governance Factors 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted Current ROA Next year ROA Next two years ROA 
 
Sign 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept ? 0.0490 5.38*** 0.0076 0.91 0.0012 0.14 
FBI + 0.00004 0.45 0.00001 0.11 -0.00003 -0.46 
FBL + -0.0004 -0.19 0.0015 0.73 0.0055 2.46*** 
FBS + -0.0028 -0.87 0.0059 2.03** 0.0077 2.48*** 
FOTH + -0.0014 -0.32 0.0133 3.20*** 0.0172 3.84*** 
LnASSET - -0.0014 -1.63* -0.02 -2.61*** 0.0006 0.76 
LEV ? -0.0518 -6.24*** -0.0003 -0.36 -0.0203 -2.44** 
LROA + 0.5051 40.29***     
ROA +   0.6129 *** 45.25 0.5174 *** 36.43 
Year 
controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
3008 3008 2182 
F-Value 
 
48.67 57.72 38.76 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
41.09% 45.36 43.24% 
 
1. Variable Definitions: 
 
FBI =  board independence factor (0.686*PCTONBD – 0.749*DOHOLDINGS – 0.718*REL); 
FBL =   board leadership factor (0.782*SEPCHR - 0.682*LEADDIR); 
FBS =   board size factor (0.901*BDSIZE); 
FOTH =  other board factor (0.896*NUMMTGS + 0.431*COMPMIX); 
LnASSET= natural log of firm’s total assets; 
LROA=  return on assets for the past year; 
ROA=  return on assets; and 
LEV=  firm debt ratio (i.e., total debt/total assets); and 
 
All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
2. *** significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level. Significance levels are 
based on one-tailed tests when the coefficient sign is predicted and on two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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Table 3. Relationship between Future Equity Returns and Governance Variables and Governance Factors 
 
Panel A: Individual Governance Variables 
Variable 
 
Predicted Current Return Next year Return Next two years Return 
 
Sign 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept ? 0.3239 5.39*** 0.0966 1.62 0.1420 1.19 
PCTONBD + -0.0003 -0.73 0.0009 2.12** 0.0019 2.20** 
REL - -0.0208 -1.17 0.0105 0.60 0.0190 0.55 
DOHOLDINGS + -0.0003 -0.53 -0.0004 -0.7 -0.0010 -1.03 
SEPCHR + 0.0161 1.31* 0.0140 1.17 0.0435 1.81** 
LEADDIR - 0.0041 0.34 0.0018 0.15 -0.0042 -0.17 
BDSIZE + -0.0135 -0.89 0.0086 0.58 0.0369 1.30* 
NUMMTGS + 0.0573 2.64*** 0.0179 0.85 0.0756 1.76** 
COMPMIX ? -0.0366 -1.70* -0.0123 -0.59 -0.0375 -0.91 
LEV ? -0.0486 -1.24 0.0650 1.71* 0.1868 2.43** 
LMB ? 0.0004 0.22     
MB ?   -0.0089 -3.31*** -0.0137 -2.54** 
LLnMVE ? -0.024 -4.91***     
LnMVE ?   -0.0084 -1.73* -0.0206 -2.12** 
LVOLAT ? -0.0567 -0.48     
VOLAT ?   0.7230 5.29*** 0.9427 3.67*** 
Industry 
controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
2854 2854 2096 
F-Value 
 
23.53 12.18 12.60 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
28.30% 16.43% 21.34% 
 
1. Variable Definitions: 
 
LEV=  firm debt ratio (i.e., total debt/total assets); 
LMB= market value of equity to book value of equity at the beginning of the year; 
LLnMVE= natural log of firm’s market value of equity at the beginning of the year; 
LVOLAT= stock return volatility based on standard deviation of past 12 months stock returns; 
MB= market value of equity to book value of equity; 
LnMVE= natural log of firm’s market value of equity; and 
VOLAT= stock return volatility based on standard deviation of current 12 months stock returns); and all 
other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
2. *** significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level. Significance levels are 
based on one-tailed tests when the coefficient sign is predicted and on two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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Panel B: Governance Factors 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted Current Return Next year Return Next two years Return 
 
Sign 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept ? 0.3330 7.06*** 0.149 3.163*** 0.2631 2.81*** 
FBI + -0.00003 -0.09 0.0008 2.12** 0.0018 2.43*** 
FBL + 0.0084 0.79 0.0088 0.86 0.0336 1.63* 
FBS + -0.0151 -1.01 0.0064 0.44 0.0307 1.06 
FOTH + 0.0347 1.60* 0.0104 0.50 0.0481 1.14 
LEV ? -0.0482 -1.24 0.0615 1.63 0.1789 2.35** 
LMB ? 0.0004 0.27     
MB ?   -0.0088 -3.30*** -0.0136 -2.53** 
LLnMVE ? -0.0268 -5.67***     
LnMVE ?   -0.0097 -2.07** -0.0251 -2.68 *** 
LVOLAT ? -0.0718 -0.61     
VOLAT ?   0.7062 5.20*** 0.8886 3.49*** 
Industry 
controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
2854 2854 2096 
F-Value 
 
25.32 13.19 13.62 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
28.17% 16.47% 21.32% 
 
1. Variable Definitions: 
 
FBI =   board independence factor (0.686*PCTONBD – 0.749*DOHOLDINGS – 0.718*REL); 
FBL =   board leadership factor (0.782*SEPCHR - 0.682*LEADDIR); 
FBS =   board size factor (0.901*BDSIZE); 
FOTH =  other board factor (0.896*NUMMTGS + 0.431*COMPMIX); 
LEV=  firm debt ratio (i.e., total debt/total assets); 
LMB= market value of equity to book value of equity at the beginning of the year; 
LLnMVE= natural log of firm’s market value of equity at the beginning of the year; 
LVOLAT= stock return volatility based on standard deviation of past 12 months stock returns; 
MB= market value of equity to book value of equity; 
LnMVE= natural log of firm’s market value of equity; and 
VOLAT= stock return volatility based on standard deviation of current 12 months stock returns  
and all other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
2. *** significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level. Significance levels are 
based on one-tailed tests when the coefficient sign is predicted and on two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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Table 4. Relationship between Future Tobin’s Q and Governance Variables and Governance Factors 
 
Panel A: Individual Governance Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted Current Tobin’s Q Next year Tobin’s Q 
Two years ahead  
Tobin’s Q 
 
Sign 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept ? 2.5887 13.96*** 2.3936 14.86*** 2.3550 12.10*** 
PCTONBD + -0.0002 -0.16 0.0004 0.33 0.0011 0.71 
REL - -0.2501 -4.11*** -0.2028 -3.94*** -0.1566 -2.44*** 
DOHOLDINGS + 0.0050 3.21*** 0.0048 3.52*** 0.0027 1.69** 
SEPCHR + 0.0517 1.28* 0.0818 2.32** 0.0623 1.44* 
LEADDIR - -0.0630 -1.53* -0.0404 -1.14 -0.0404 -0.92 
BDSIZE + 0.0753 1.54* 0.1124 2.59*** 0.1147 2.21** 
NUMMTGS + 0.0641 0.87 0.0793 1.27 0.0244 0.31 
COMPMIX ? 0.2839 4.13*** 0.2847 4.74*** 0.2264 3.15*** 
LEV ? -1.4278 -11.04*** -1.0536 -9.26*** -1.0464 -7.61 
LnASSET ? -0.0799 -5.55*** -0.1032 -8.58*** -0.0791 -5.28*** 
Year controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
3008 3008 1992 
F-Value 
 
18.45 21.51 11.06 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
23.08% 24.28% 19.18% 
 
1. Variable Definitions: 
 
LnASSET= firm total assets; and 
LEV=  firm debt ratio (i.e., total debt/total assets); and 
All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
2. *** significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level. Significance levels are 
based on one-tailed tests when the coefficient sign is predicted and on two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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Panel B: Governance Factors 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted Current Tobin’s Q Next year Tobin’s Q Two years ahead Tobin’s Q 
 
Sign 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Intercept ? 2.562 17.77*** 2.448 19.66*** 2.357 15.54*** 
FBI + -0.001 -0.90 -0.001 -0.80 0.001 0.43 
FBL + 0.06 1.93** 0.075 2.46*** 0.065 1.75** 
FBS + 0.105 2.15** 0.133 3.06*** 0.137 2.66*** 
FOTH + 0.196 2.70*** 0.205 3.30*** 0.136 1.79** 
LEV ? -1.424 -11.02*** -1.042 -9.17*** -1.044 -7.62*** 
LnASSET ? -0.077 -5.38*** -0.101 -8.52*** -0.075 -5.08*** 
Year controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
3008 3008 1992 
F-Value 
 
19.21 22.44 11.67 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
22.27% 23.47% 18.73% 
 
1. Variable Definitions: 
 
FBI =   board independence factor (0.686*PCTONBD – 0.749*DOHOLDINGS – 0.718*REL); 
FBL =   board leadership factor (0.782*SEPCHR - 0.682*LEADDIR); 
FBS =   board size factor (0.901*BDSIZE); 
FOTH =  other board factor (0.896*NUMMTGS + 0.431*COMPMIX); 
LnASSET= firm total assets; and 
LEV=  firm debt ratio (i.e., total debt/total assets); and 
All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
2. *** significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level. Significance levels are 
based on one-tailed tests when the coefficient sign is predicted and on two-tailed tests otherwise. 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, Fall 2013 
 
81 
FAMILY BUSINESS, DIRECTOR COMPENSATION AND BOARD 
EFFICACY: THE CASE OF TAIWAN 
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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of outside directors on firm performance during legal transitions 
and examines how the roles of family business and director compensation influence board efficacy.  By 
using Taiwanese listed companies as our sample, the empirical results show that outside directors who 
are appointed by legal mandate have less positive impacts on firm performance than outside directors 
appointed voluntarily. Family business weakens the positive impact of outside director on firm 
performance. The evidence further suggests that director compensation contributes to firm 
performance, particularly when outside directors are voluntarily appointed.  The findings provide 
western managers with an understanding of how the typical Chinese family business affects board 
independence.  We also demonstrate and incorporate the cultural and the ownership characteristics 
into the analysis to present a country-specific pattern that should be informative for foreign investors 
who are concerned about the quality of corporate governance in East Asia. 
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Introduction 
 
Much attention has been directed toward corporate 
governance reforms on the part of both theorists 
and practitioners, particularly following major 
corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom in 
the United States.  Although a number of studies 
have investigated why such business empires 
collapses, consistent explanations are lacking.  
Some scholars (e.g., Dewing and Russell, 2004) 
suggest that the scandals occurred partly because of 
the lack of corporate disciplines and partly because 
of the insufficiency of market prescriptions.  Other 
scholars (e.g. Clement, 2006) explore the American 
corporate scandals from the business ethics 
perspective.  Being aware of the leakages of 
institutional regulations, many countries have 
subsequently started to initiate or reinforce their 
corporate governance systems to prevent such kinds 
of scandals from happening again.  
The initiatives behind the corporate 
governance reforms often stem from responses to 
various imperatives, such as corporate raids, capital 
market globalization, and intentions to enhance 
investor confidence (Rhee and Lee, 2008).  For 
example, Taiwan, as an emerging country in East 
Asia, seeks to upgrade her weak legal systems (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997) to an extent which complies with 
international corporate governance standards.  
Therefore, the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) has 
taken steps to improve the quality of corporate 
governance.  One of the primary policies that the 
TSE has initiated is to request initial public offering 
(IPO) companies from 2002 onwards to introduce 
at least two independent outside directors 
(henceforth referred to as outside directors) to their 
boards before they are permitted to be listed. 
However, it remains an open question whether 
outside directors appointed by legal mandate are 
effective in enhancing corporate values.  Although 
there have been many studies that investigate the 
relationships between the presence of outside 
directors and firm performance, a paucity of 
literature detracts from investigating the efficacy of 
outside directors based on the condition of legal 
mandate.  Many scholars suggest that there is a 
connection between directors and firm performance 
(e.g., Luan and Tang, 2007; Kumar and Zattoni, 
2013; Peng 2004; Peng, Buck and Fliatotchev, 
2003). Peng (2004) finds that outside directors do 
have a positive effect on firm performance 
measured in terms of sales growth, while they have 
insignificant impact as measured by the return on 
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equity.  Similarly, Luan and Tang (2007) further 
confirm the positive impact of independent 
directors on firm performance.  But, to date, little 
attention has been directed to enhancing our 
understanding of the differences of efficacy of 
outside directors who are appointed by 
voluntariness of companies themselves or by legal 
mandate. 
Given that, this study aims to investigate 
whether Taiwan’s corporate governance reforms on 
board independence have a positive influence on 
firm performance arising from legal requirements to 
appoint outside directors.  Since family business is 
a dominant form of business organization and has 
highly concentrated ownership structure in Taiwan 
(Luo and Chung, 2005), understanding the 
influence of Chinese family business on the board 
of directors is paramount.  Thus, this study will also 
explore how family business influences board 
efficacy and the effects of director compensation on 
firm performance in light of different motivations 
firms appoint board of directors.  
The empirical results suggest that outside 
directors appointed voluntarily will have a positive 
effect on firm performance, while outside directors 
introduced to the boards by legal mandate will have 
relatively weak impact on firm performance.  We 
also find that family business characteristics 
hindering the impact of outside director on firm 
performance.  Although many studies suggest that 
director compensation is positively related to firm 
performance (Brick, Palmon and Wald, 2006), the 
results extend our knowledge by depicting that 
director compensation has relatively weak effects in 
circumstances where outside directors are 
appointed by legal mandate. 
 
Corporate governance development in 
Taiwan 
 
The consensus for improving corporate governance 
is rapidly prevalent in Taiwan through both ways 
from corporate self-discipline and from official 
policy enforcement.  For the past two decades, 
Taiwan has ever been criticized for her lack of 
comprehensive legal system to increase financial 
transparency and to reduce the analyst bias (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999).  Pubic 
opinions thus urge the government to initiate legal 
reforms to protect investors’ wealth.  Furthermore, 
ownership structure is also an important factor that 
worsens the corporate governance quality.  Yeh et 
al. (2001) identified 70% of Taiwanese listed 
companies are controlled by families or their 
owners. This feature has led to the prevalent 
phenomenon that the owner family is usually also 
serving as the CEO, and the selection of directors is 
probably decided by their personal relationships 
with the owners rather than in accordance with their 
expertise, which cause severe business ethics 
issues. 
Business groups, a dominant form of business 
organization in Taiwan business system, are 
paramount to Taiwan’s economic growth.  They 
contribute about 54 percents to Taiwan’s GDP 
(Chu, 2004).  Thus, such form of organization 
cannot be ignored when addressing the nature of 
corporate governance system in Taiwan.  Member 
firms in business groups are commonly linked 
through equity shareholdings (La Porta et al., 
1999), and the group at the center often exercises 
strategic control over the affiliates through 
interlocking directorates of family members.  These 
cross-directorate relationships may provide a 
channel through which the group can expropriate 
minority shareholders’ interests.  For example, the 
group at the center may benefit from arbitrage 
among affiliates through “tunneling,” which has 
been described as transferring resources from one 
affiliate in which the controlling family has few 
cash flow rights to other affiliates in which it has 
considerable cash flow rights (Bertrand, Mehta, and 
Mullainatha, 2002).  Such agency issues have been 
existed for many years in Taiwan and become the 
driving force behind improving the effectiveness of 
corporate boards. 
Given the escalating emphasis on the 
effectiveness of corporate boards, many studies find 
that the boards of directors may become 
dysfunctional when exercising their duties.  For 
example, Jensen (1993) claims that boards of 
directors are limited to fulfill their responsibilities 
effectively because the board culture may 
discourage team conflicts that inhibit directors from 
speaking up in the board meetings.  This argument 
may be applicable to Taiwanese family business 
system in which group harmony is emphasized 
because of the coherent kinships or friendships.  
Such ineffectiveness of board directors has caused 
many financial and managerial scandals in Taiwan 
(Lee and Yeh, 2004), and the exploitation will not 
be lessened unless the corporate governance 
mechanism can be upgraded.  
In order to tackle the increasing agency 
problems and respond to the escalating 
competitions following Taiwan’s entrance to the 
World Trade Organization, it is even more urgent 
for Taiwan to initiate corporate governance reforms 
to catch up with international corporate governance 
standards and face the challenges presented by the 
global markets.  In this sense, the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC) in Taiwan has 
attempted to implement institutional reforms by 
introducing recommendations: (i) to protect 
shareholders’ rights and interests; (ii) to strengthen 
the powers of the board of directors; (iii) to enable 
supervisors to fully exercise their roles; (iv) to 
respect stakeholders’ rights and interests; and (v) to 
enhance information transparency.  Based on these 
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recommendations, the TSE amended the listing 
rules to formally request that at least two outside 
directors should be appointed onto the boards when 
companies seek to be listed on the stock exchange 
from 2002 and should keep maintaining at least two 
outside directors on the board.  Hence, Taiwan 
presents an appropriate research setting to 
understand the efficacy of corporate governance 
reforms during legal transitions. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Voluntary vs. Mandatory Directors 
 
According to the “Corporate Governance Best-
Practice Principles for TSE/GTSM Listed 
Companies” issued by the TSE, any companies 
seeking to be listed on the stock exchange are 
mandated to appoint at least two outside directors 
onto their boards.  Although these new listing rules 
become effective in 2002, there are companies 
which are listed before 2002 and not restricted by 
new listing rules but remain voluntarily appointing 
outside directors onto their boards.  In the absence 
of legal mandate, such voluntary actions imply that 
these companies have the intentions to reform their 
board structures and thus to improve their corporate 
governance since they are not requested by the law 
to do that.  Under this circumstance, outside 
directors appointed voluntarily can exert their 
duties without inappropriate interventions from the 
CEO or large shareholders since the primitive 
objectivity of their appointments is to help the firm 
enhance firm performance.  Therefore, this study 
argues that companies that voluntarily appoint 
outside directors to their boards might have more of 
an intention than other firms to improve the 
corporate governance quality, and outside directors 
are able to independently review and monitor 
management’s operations and promote firm 
performance (Luan and Tang, 2007). 
   By contrast, companies listed on the stock 
exchange after 2002 had to follow the new listing 
rules which request IPO firms to introduce at least 
two outside directors to the boards. Following the 
new listing rules, companies employ outside 
directors who are qualified nominally based on the 
criteria issued by the TSE.  However, how much 
the outside directors are independent and how much 
they are able to exercise their obligations is a 
question.  In the real world, their presence on the 
boards may be just for meeting the bottom-line 
standard of corporate governance and thereby 
comply with the legal requirements to make the 
companies successfully listed.  The selection of 
outside directors in such instances cannot avoid the 
influences of guanxi in the Chinese cultural 
contexts (Fan, 2002).  Outside directors, thus, are 
nominally qualified to be independent on the boards 
but they are indeed having personal connections 
with their nominators directly or indirectly.  
Whether they have the expertise for monitoring or 
have ties for organizational boundary spanning 
(Luan and Tang, 2007; Peng, 2004) are not the 
points in the priority that the companies concern 
about.  For this reason, outside directors might be 
reluctant to take a stance that goes contrary to 
management and even fail to bridge the companies 
to accessing the external resources.  To sum up, this 
study argues that outside directors who are 
appointed by legal mandate will have a less positive 
impact on firm performance than those who are 
appointed voluntarily. 
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of outside 
directors appointed on the boards by legal mandate 
has a less impact on firm performance than that of 
outside directors appointed voluntarily.  
 
Family Business  
 
Family business is a dominant form of business 
organizations in Taiwan (Chen, Yen, Fu and Chang, 
2007; Luo and Chung, 2005, Wu, 2006; Yeh et al., 
2001).  These studies point out that the firms in 
Taiwan are usually controlled directly or indirectly 
by their founding families.  Traditionally, the 
founder, who is also the owner, builds the 
enterprise and expands the scope of the business in 
his own way.  While the power of the family was 
transited to the subsequent generations or the 
outsiders, the founding families still can hold the 
majority of shares and large proportion of board 
seats (Yeh, 2005; Yeh et al., 2001) to direct the 
companies’ operations.  
The distinctive features of Chinese family 
business can be broadly categorized by ownership 
structure and information asymmetry.  Filatotchev 
et al. (2005) suggest that family ownership structure 
generates effects pro and con on firm operations.  
Generally, family business can reduce agency costs 
between owners and managers and thus enhance 
firm performance.  However, family business also 
is criticized for their exploitation of the wealth of 
minority shareholders (La Porta et al, 1999) and for 
their weak financial transparency (Gul and Leung, 
2004).  To maximize family wealth, family 
businesses may keep all information in family (Luo 
and Chung, 2005).  Outsiders are difficult to know 
the whole real operations even on the seat of the 
board.  Considering the power of family business, 
we suggest that the positive impact of outside 
directors on firm performance will be mitigated. 
With these regards, we argue that outside 
directors appointed will improve the quality of 
corporate governance and further to enhance firm 
performance.  Unlike the separation of ownership 
and management in widely-held companies, family 
business is a distinct form of business organization, 
and in Chinese society, business is part of the 
family’s private assets or property is widely 
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accepted (Hamilton, 1998) so that managerial 
positions are occupied by family members who 
have close kinships with the controlling family. 
Compared with widely-held companies, family 
involvements are able to reduce agency costs 
(Zahra, 2003).  This is to say, the conflict between 
the manager and the family members is not severe 
because of the alignments of interests between 
owners and managers (Filatotchev et al., 2005).  
That explains why outside directors in the family 
business are less important than the widely-held 
companies since the primary purpose of outside 
directors is to monitor whether the business 
decisions of the manager are aligned with the 
interest of the shareholders.  However, as the 
manager of family business is the same as the 
owner who has common interest, thus, even if the 
outside director is employed by the family, the 
influence to the business efficiency is not as 
prominent as that of the outside directors of the 
widely-held companies. 
Concerning the second future of Chinese 
family business, many scholars suggest that all 
information keeping in the family is more salient in 
the Chinese family business ( Luo and Chung, 
2005; Pye, 1985).  The founding family builds up 
the business and forms the inner circle to control 
and manage the business (Hamilton, 1998).  In an 
earlier work, Pye (1985: 70) states that “The 
Chinese were taught to recognize a vivid distinction 
between family members, who could be relied 
upon, and non-family people, who are not to be 
trusted except in qualified ways.”  In the previous 
studies, Luo and Chung (2005) argue that social 
relationships in Chinese society are structured in 
concentric circles, with family members in the 
innermost circle and strangers in the outer circle.  
The remarks indicate family connections are the 
closest relationships in the organization that 
outsiders are not easy to participate in the decision 
formation of such core circle.  Similarly in Korea, 
Chang (2003) argues that family may use insider 
information to increase their shares in successful 
business group affiliates through exploiting wealth 
of outsiders.  Thus, family erects a wall to separate 
outsiders from their cores.  Non-family member or 
outsiders lack affinity and blood relationships that 
make them hardly obtain insider information and 
exercise their duties successfully.  Outside 
directors, as they are outsiders, may not able to 
obtain critical information from family business to 
make effective suggestions or monitoring on the 
boards.  Hence, the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of outside 
directors appointed by a family business has a less 
impact on firm performance than that of outside 
directors appointed by a non-family business. 
 
 
Director Compensation 
 
Director compensation reflects the value added to 
companies by directors’ decisions.  Unattractive 
compensation may not be able to motivate directors 
to maximize shareholder value (Felo, 2001; 
McClain, 2012).  Drawing on optimal contracting 
theory (e.g., Gaver and Gaver, 1995), compensation 
policy is set up in accordance with the values which 
the directors can create.  In a recent study, Young 
and Tsai (2008) argue that compensation can 
motivate nonfamily CEO to utilize their social 
capital in executing corporate operations.  In a 
similar vein, Linn and Park (2005) suggest that 
outside directors must be rewarded accordingly if 
they view their efforts costly, otherwise they will 
not take the job.  The compensation also influences 
whether the directors can commit to exercise their 
duties.  Although compensation packages are 
designed differently among companies, it is a 
general consensus that providing appropriate 
incentives can encourage directors to act in the 
interests of shareholders (Linn and Park, 2005).   
Based on the importance of the compensation 
incentives discussed above, the next question is 
whether the impact of director compensation on 
firm performance is influenced by the two forms of 
outside directors.  Previous research argues that 
board compensation is positively associated with 
firm performance (e.g., Crespí-Cladera and Gispert, 
2003), we also suggest that compensation has 
greater incentive effects when outside directors are 
appointed voluntarily.  This can be interpreted that 
companies voluntarily appointing outside directors 
onto their boards explicitly show their intentions to 
enhance firm performance by improving their 
corporate governance mechanism.  Since firms 
intend to enhance their performance by appointing 
outside directors, the voluntary outside directors 
can exercise their duties independently with 
relatively low level of intervention.  Building on the 
above work, we can conclude that the better 
performance the firm achieves, the higher level of 
compensation the directors receive.  The level of 
compensation induces them to maximize their 
efforts by supervising and providing suggestions to 
enhance firm performance. 
The mandatory outside directors are appointed 
by legal requirements.  In most instances, given that 
this type of outside director is compulsorily 
nominated, companies tend to introduce those who 
nominally meet the qualifications that are required 
of an outside director, but they may not 
wholeheartedly expect the outside directors to 
vigilantly monitor the firm while on the board.  
Hence, board efficacy will decline because, for 
conforming to legal requirements, the CEO tends to 
nominate new directors who are indebted for their 
appointments, which undermines board 
independence (Ryan and Wiggins III, 2004).  
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Additionally, Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) state 
that well-compensated directors have a lower 
inclination to “rock the boat.”  Thus, mandatory 
outside directors will be conservative in providing 
constructive criticism to the board.  In this sense, 
although they are referred to as “independent” 
outside directors, their nominations might be 
initiated by legal requirements to help IPO firms be 
successfully listed.  The compensation incentive 
effects should be relatively weak for outside 
directors appointed by legal mandate. The 
following hypothesis is formulated:  
Hypothesis 3: The association between outside 
director compensation and firm performance will 
be less pronounced as outside directors are 
appointed by legal mandate. 
 
Methods 
 
Sample and Data 
 
The data used to test the hypotheses is drawn from 
2002 and 2003 annual reports of Taiwanese listed 
companies and the database maintained by the 
Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ).  The TEJ is the 
most prestigious database in academic research in 
Taiwan and is widely subscribed to by many 
international research agencies including 
Datastream and Reuters.  The data we used spans 
only two years, due to the lack of data on individual 
director compensation from 2004.  The new listing 
rule, requesting IPO firms appointing at least two 
outside directors on the board, became effective in 
2002. 
There are two types of outside directors in this 
study.  One is outside directors who are voluntarily 
appointed without any legal mandate.  The other 
type is outside directors whose companies were 
initially listed in 2002 or later since they were 
appointed after the new legal requirements took 
effect. In addition to identifying the types of the 
outside directors, the annual reports also provide 
information regarding the directors’ compensation.  
This paper has drawn on annual reports to obtain 
data including details of outside directors and 
director compensation.  The data for the remaining 
variables are obtained from the TEJ database.  After 
cross-checking the information regarding the 
selected variables from both the annual reports and 
the TEJ database, a total of 1,686 observations are 
included in the sample to test our hypotheses.  
Our sample includes 1,686 companies.  There 
are a total of 810 companies in 2002, including 666 
initially listed before 2002 and 134 initially listed in 
2002.  Similarly, 876 companies are included in 
2003, consisting of 664 companies initially listed 
before 2002, 121 companies initially listed in 2002 
and 101 companies initially listed in 2003.  The 
sample set shows that 21%of the sample companies 
are listed after 2002, which are requested by legal 
mandate to appoint at least two outside directors to 
the boards. 
 
Model Specification 
 
We use the following multiple regression to test our 
hypotheses. To be consistent with our hypotheses, 
we predict that the coefficient estimate of 
OUTDIR*LM is negative (H1), and the coefficient 
estimates of OUTDIR*FAMILY and COMPEN*LM 
are negative (H2 and H3). Definition of each 
variable is addressed in next section. 
 
Tobin’s Qit = β0 + β1 OUTDIRit + β2 LMit + 
β3OUTDIRit *LMit + β4 FAMILYit + β5 OUTDIRit 
*FAMILYit+ β6 COMPENit + β7 COMPENit *LMit + 
β8 DEVATIONit + β9 BOARDSIZE it + β10 CEODUA 
it + β11 SIZEit + β12 LEVit + β13 AGEit + Industry 
controli + Year controlt + εit  
 
Measures 
 
The dependent variable, Tobin’s Q, is used to 
measure firm performance (e.g., Yeh, 2005), 
measured by the replacement cost of the assets 
divided by the book value of the assets.  Due to the 
lack of replacement cost data, we gauge it as the 
market value of the assets divided by the book 
value of the assets (for a similar approach, see Lehn 
et al., 1990 and Yeh, 2005).  Outside director 
(OUTDIR) is measured by the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of board 
members.  The number of outside directors is 
calculated based on the total number of board 
members according to the qualifications that TSE 
required. Dummy variable (LM) is set, coded as 1, 
if firms are initially listed in and after 2002 since 
these firms are requested by legal requirements to 
appoint outside directors on the boards.  Family 
(FAMILY) is coded as 1 when the firm’s CEO is 
the founding family members and when family 
members hold over half the total board seats (e.g., 
Tsai, Hung, Kuo and Kuo, 2006), otherwise 0.   
Director compensation often consists of a package 
of bonus and cash (Cordeiro, Veliyath and Eramus, 
2000).  In Taiwan, the annual reports of listed 
companies are used to piece together all kinds of 
compensation into a total cash amount disclosed in 
the financial reports.  Consequently, outside 
director compensation (COMPEN) is measured as 
the average amount of total bonus and salaries 
received by each outside director divided by the 
firm’s total assets, in which the stock-based 
compensation is counted by multiplying the number 
of bonus shares by the stock price on the day when 
the annual shareholder meeting was held. 
To control for some potential confounding 
effects, several control variables are included.  Prior 
studies suggest that agency problems influences 
firm performance.  La Porta et al. (1999), 
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Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2002) and Yeh et al. 
(2001) point out the existence of agency problems 
arising from the divergence between the controlling 
and the minority owners.  Yeh et al. (2001) suggest 
that as the divergence between the controlling and 
the minority owners escalates, firm performance 
will become worse.  In this sense, we control for the 
divergence between the controlling and the 
minority owners and define DEVATION as the 
controlling rights minus the cash flow rights.  
Furthermore, board size and CEO duality also 
affect firm performance (e.g., Yermack, 1996).  We 
control for board size(BOARDSIZE), defined as the 
number of directors who have been appointed on 
the board, and CEO duality, measured as a dummy 
variable (CEODU) , coded as 1 when CEO is also 
the chairman, otherwise 0.  Firm size (SIZE) is 
measured as the logarithm of firm sales. Firm 
leverage (LEV) is measured as debt divided by 
sales.  Firm age (AGE) is measured as the number 
of years the firm had been in operation.  Firm 
performance will be influenced by a firm’s initial 
public offerings. After a firm goes public, its 
performance will decline (Kim, Kitsabunnarat and 
Nofsinger, 2004). Finally, industry membership and 
year are also controlled as dummy variables.
 
 Year 
control includes a set of dummy variables 
representing the fiscal year; Industry control 
includes a set of dummy variables representing the 
industry. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, including 
the means, standard deviations and Pearson 
correlation matrices of all the variables used.  The 
average of the number of outside directors divided 
by total number of board members is 0.06.  The 
mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.29. The mean of LM equals 
0.21, indicating that twenty one percent of the firms 
are requested by law to appoint outside directors on 
the boards.  Fifty eight percent of the sample firms 
is family businesses.  In order to examine the 
multicollinearity between the variables, the 
procedure proposed by Neter et al. (1985) was used 
to calculate the VIF (variance inflation factor) 
values and the results suggest that there was no 
problem due to multicollinearity with all the VIF 
values being less than 10.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
Significance level: *** indicates P<0.01; ** indicates P<0.05; * indicates P< 0.1 
 
Table 2 shows the results of analyses to test 
our hypotheses.  The results of Model 1 show the 
coefficient on OUTDIR (outside director) to be 
positive (0.745) and statistically significant (P 
value < 0.01) while the coefficient on OUTDIR × 
LM (outside director × legal mandate) is negative(-
0.615) and significant (P value < 0.01).  The 
empirical evidence suggests that outside directors 
have positive effects on firm performance but if 
outside directors are appointed by legal mandate, 
the performance effects will diminish.  Hypothesis 
1 is supported.  
In Model 2, we consider the family business 
effects.  The coefficient on OUTDIR × FAMILY 
(outside director × family business) is negative (-
0.548) and significant (P value < 0.05), indicating 
that the impact of outside directors on firm 
performance will be mitigated when outside 
directors are appointed by family business.  
Hypothesis 2 is supported.  In order to test 
Hypothesis 3, we conduct additional analysis by 
entering compensation data.  In Model 3, the results 
show that Hypothesis 3 is supported.  The 
coefficient on COMPEN (director compensation) is 
positive (7.687) and insignificant while the 
coefficient on COMPEN × LM (director 
compensation × legal mandate) is negative (-2.439) 
and significant (P value < 0.05).  The results 
indicate that director compensation has less 
incentive impacts on firm performance when 
outside directors are appointed by legal mandate. 
As for the control variables, LM, and SIZE 
show positive relationships with firm performance, 
indicating that legal mandate, large firm size and 
initial public offerings have positive impacts on 
firm performance.  In contrast, LEV and AGE show 
a negative relationship with firm performance, 
indicating that high debt ratio and being older firms 
have negative impacts on firm performance. 
 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Tobin’s Q 1.29 0.63           
2 OUTDIR 0.06 0.12 0.30***          
3 LM 0.21 0.41 0.37*** 0.50***         
4 FAMILY 0.58 0.49 -0.22*** -0.26*** -0.25***        
5 COMPEN 0.00 0.00 0.03* 0.07*** 0.05** -0.02       
6 DEVATION 0.04 0.08 0.06** -0.01 0.08*** 0.18*** -0.02      
7 BOARDSIZE 6.82 2.58 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03** -0.08** 0.02 0.16**     
8 CEODUA  0.37 0.48 0.04* 0.11*** 0.05** -0.04** 0.01 -0.17*** -0.19***    
9 SIZE 21.61 1.37 0.12*** -0.06*** -0.11*** 0.07*** 0.00 0.13*** 0.28*** -0.13***   
10 LEV 0.42 0.17 -0.24*** -0.05** -0.06** -0.05** 0.01 -0.12*** -0.00 -0.01 0.14***  
11 AGE 23.83 11.78 -0.32*** -0.22*** -0.37*** 0.31*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.23*** -0.14*** 0.15*** 0.07** 
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Table 2. Results of Multiple Regression Analyses 
 
Variable 
Tobin’s Q 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 
-0.219 
(0.259) 
-0.265 
(0.169) 
-0.265 
(0.170) 
OUTDIR 
0.745 
(0.000)*** 
1.099 
(0.000)*** 
1.081 
(0.000)*** 
LM 
0.381 
(0.000)*** 
0.364 
(0.000)*** 
0.362 
(0.000)*** 
OUTDIR × LM 
-0.615 
(0.006)*** 
-0.562 
(0.012)** 
-0.556 
(0.014)** 
FAMILY  
0.130 
(0.000)*** 
0.131 
(0.000)*** 
OUTDIR × FAMILY  
-0.548 
(0.024)** 
-0.540 
(0.026)** 
    
COMPEN    
7.687 
(0.516) 
COMPEN × LM   
-2.439 
(0.049)** 
DEVATION 
-0.189 
(0.176) 
-0.326 
(0.022)** 
-0.325 
(0.022)** 
BOARDSIZE 
-0.007 
(0.136) 
-0.004 
(0.426) 
-0.004 
(0.417) 
CEODUA 
-0.014 
(0.551) 
-0.014 
(0.570) 
-0.014 
(0.562) 
SIZE 
0.093 
(0.000)*** 
0.091 
(0.000)*** 
0.091 
(0.000)*** 
LEV 
-0.773 
(0.000)*** 
-0.742 
(0.000)*** 
-0.741 
(0.000)*** 
AGE 
-0.011 
(0.000)*** 
-0.011 
(0.000)*** 
-0.011 
(0.000)*** 
Industry control Not reported Not reported Not reported 
Year control Not reported Not reported Not reported 
N 1686 1686 1686 
F 34.236 33.015 31.046 
Adjusted R
2 
30.2% 32.6% 35.1% 
    
Tobin’s Q the market value of equity plus the book value of the debt divided by the book value of the 
assets 
OUTDIR the number of outside directors divided by the total number of board members 
LM 1 if the firms are initially listed in and after 2002, otherwise 0. 
FAMILY 1if the firm’s CEO is the founding family members and when family members hold over half 
the total board seats 
COMPEN average amount of total bonus and salaries received by each outside director divided by the 
firm’s total assets 
DEVATION the controlling rights minus the cash flow rights 
BOARDSIZE the number of directors on the board 
CEODUA 1if CEO is also the chairman, otherwise 0. 
SIZE logarithm of total sales 
LEV debt divided by asset. 
AGE the number of years the firm has been in operation 
 
1. The number in parentheses is p value. Significance level: *** indicates P<0.01; ** indicates P<0.05;  
* indicates P< 0.1.  
2. All the VIF values are less 10 and the results suggest no problem of multicollinearity。 
 
To further investigate the robustness of our 
empirical results, we conduct sensitivity analyses to 
consider the IPOs effects (initial public offering) on 
firm performance.  We set a dummy variable IPOs 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, Fall 2013 
 
88 
equal to one if the firm is an IPO firm in a given 
year, otherwise 0. Untabulated results show that the 
results are similar to those reported in our main 
analyses, reported in Table 2.  Thus, the results are 
not attributable to the IPOs effects.  The sensitivity 
test is also conducted with alternative time 
specification for director compensation data can 
only be obtained for two years.  Without 
considering the director compensation data, we 
extend the sample time window from two years 
(2002 to 2003) to five years (2002 to 2006).   
Hence, a new set of 5,608 observations is 
developed and the hypothesis 1 and 2 are re-tested.  
The results, shown in Table 3, are similar to those 
reported in our main analyses, reported in Table 2.  
 
Discussions 
 
This paper aims to answer the research questions: 
(1) do outside directors appointed by voluntariness 
or by legal mandate generate different impacts on 
firm performance; (2) how do family businesses 
moderate the relationships between outside 
directors and firm performance; and (3) are the 
impacts of director compensation on firm 
performance influenced by the different 
motivations of firms.  In general, the empirical 
results support our hypotheses.  Prior studies have 
suggested that outside directors on the board would 
have significant effects on the firm performance 
(e.g., Luan and Tang, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).  This study further extends the current 
research progress by simultaneously considering 
the impacts of family business and director 
compensation during legal transitions.  The results 
suggest that outside directors contribute unequally 
to firm performance when we classified outside 
directors into two types in accordance with their 
appointments by corporate voluntariness or by legal 
mandate. 
The findings clearly suggest that outside 
directors voluntarily appointed by companies have 
greater positive contributions to firm performance, 
while those appointed for the sake of complying 
with legal requirements have a relatively slighter 
effect on firm performance.  The findings indicate 
that even though the government has done a lot to 
promote corporate governance, corporate 
governance is still a very new concept and is in a 
preliminary development stage in many companies.  
Indeed, to many senior managers, the launch of 
corporate governance means increased restriction 
and monitoring.  Therefore, if there are any 
mandatory regulations on corporate governance, 
companies may comply to meet the legal 
requirements, but outside directors, in this 
condition, will probably be symbolic figures rather 
than taking an actual monitoring role.  In other 
words, a company appointing outside directors by 
legal mandate indicates that the appointments are 
not totally by corporate voluntariness so that the 
efficacy of outside directors may be limited or even 
detrimental to firm performance.  
The findings also suggest that family 
businesses negatively moderate the relationship 
between outside director and firm performance.  
Family businesses are the dominant business 
system in Taiwan, and ownership is highly 
concentrated in the founding family (Luo and 
Chung, 2005; La Porta et al., 1999).  Such 
concentrated ownership enables the founding 
family to occupy the majority of board seats.  The 
core leader of the founding family usually assigns 
the family members to the key managerial 
positions.  These family-related managers have 
blood relationship with the founding family (Luo 
and Chung, 2005).  Even though outside directors 
are recruited to the board of a family business, the 
decisions of the family business are made mostly by 
family members, which outside directors find it 
difficult to monitor and become involved with, 
because they are the outsiders and not included in 
the inner circle of the family.  Hence, the findings 
may be interpreted that outside directors in a family 
business are appointed largely for social legitimacy 
and to comply with the institutional needs 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Family businesses 
appointing outside directors can enhance their 
corporate image, showing the public and the 
investors a signal that they begin to dilute their 
familism by introducing outside directors on the 
boards (Rhee and Lee, 2008).  
The findings show that the impacts of 
directors’ compensation on firm performance are 
moderated by the different types of outside 
directors.  Outside directors are rewarded for their 
efforts in terms of serving the board.  However, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the incentive 
effects of compensation are more significant for 
voluntary outside directors.  Companies which 
voluntarily appoint outside directors indicate the 
intention to improve the quality of corporate 
governance and probably want the best directors 
serving on their boards.  Inadequate compensation 
is unlikely to attract and retain outstanding directors 
to fulfill the objectives of such companies.  Young 
and Tsai (2008) suggest that compensation can 
induce nonfamily CEOs to utilize their social 
capital while family CEOs’ social capital is not 
incentive-relevant because of their alignments of 
owner-managers ownership.  Our results suggest 
that director compensation can encourage voluntary 
outside directors to promote corporate values, 
indicating higher compensation can attract better 
directors and also motivate the directors to improve 
firm performance.  
Mandatory outside directors are appointed by 
legal mandate. The results suggest that the incentive 
effects of compensation are not as pronounced as 
with voluntary outside directors.  Since the main 
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purpose of appointing outside directors is to meet 
legal requirements, the incentive effects are thus 
eroded. Similar to the findings of Brick, Palmon 
and Wald (2006), excess compensation is 
symptomatic of cronyism, where directors fail to 
protect the wealth of shareholders.  Our results 
imply that excess compensation weakens directors’ 
monitoring, which in turn undermines firm 
performance.  This may be interpreted that outside 
directors are usually nominated by the CEO or the 
board chair, and they are sensitively aware of the 
fact that they owe their positions to the CEO or the 
board chair.  Thus, director compensation loses its 
function of serving as an inducement to encourage 
mandatory outside directors to improve firm 
performance. 
 
 
Table 3. Results of Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Variable 
Tobin’s Q 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 
0.208 
(0.140) 
0.133 
(0.349) 
OUTDIR 
0.161 
(0.068)* 
0.203 
(0.097)* 
LM 
0.249 
(0.000)*** 
0.239 
(0.000)*** 
OUTDIR × LM 
-0.535 
(0.000)*** 
-0.554 
(0.000)*** 
FAMILY  
0.105 
(0.000)*** 
OUTDIR × 
FAMILY 
 
-0.132 
(0.039)** 
   
DEVATION 
-0.232 
(0.032)** 
 
BOARDSIZE 
-0.012 
(0.001)*** 
 
CEODUA 
-0.035 
(0.060)* 
-0.035 
(0.055)* 
SIZE 
0.077 
(0.000)*** 
0.078 
(0.000)*** 
LEV 
-0.871 
(0.000)*** 
-0.850 
(0.000)*** 
AGE 
-0.008 
(0.000)*** 
-0.009 
(0.000)*** 
Industry control Not reported Not reported 
Year control Not reported Not reported 
N 5602 5602 
F 56.085 53.552 
Adjusted R
2 
22.3% 24.1% 
Tobin’s Q the market value of equity plus the book value of the debt divided by the book value of 
the assets 
OUTDIR the number of outside directors divided by the total number of board members 
LM 1 if the firms are initially listed in and after 2002, otherwise 0. 
FAMILY 1if the firm’s CEO is the founding family members and when family members hold 
over half the total board seats 
DEVATION the controlling rights minus the cash flow rights 
BOARDSIZE the number of directors on the board 
CEODUA 1 if CEO is also the chairman, otherwise 0. 
SIZE logarithm of total sales 
LEV debt divided by asset. 
AGE the number of years the firm has been in operation 
 
1. The number in parentheses is p value. Significance level: *** indicates P<0.01; ** indicates P<0.05;  
* indicates P< 0.1.  
2. All the VIF values are less 10 and the results suggest no problem of multicollinearity。 
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Implications for Theory and Practice 
 
Several implications both for theory and practice 
can be drawn from this study.  Prior research on the 
efficacy of outside directors does not distinguish 
the motivations by which outside directors are 
appointed (e.g. Luan and Tang, 2007).  This study 
goes beyond the existing literature by extending the 
study of the efficacy of board independence to the 
extent which considers the appointments of outside 
directors to the boards by corporate voluntariness or 
by legal mandate.  This is an important finding that 
supplements the conventional arguments which 
based on agency theory to interpret the failure of 
outside directors on the board.  The results indicate 
that companies appointing outside directors may 
not really intend to improve the quality of corporate 
governance but just to comply with the pressure of 
external institutional forces.  This is an implicit 
ethical phenomenon regarding how firms respond 
to legal requirements on corporate governance and 
our findings can offer a theoretical perspective to 
explain why outside directors fail to be effective by 
pointing out the firms’ unethical pretence to have 
outside directors only for institutional legitimacy.  
This study also made contributions to family 
research by shedding light on the impact of family 
control on the efficacy of outside directors during 
legal transitions in corporate governance reforms.  
The findings indicate that the controlling family 
presents a defensive attitude towards outsiders.  
Following the logic of Luo and Chung (2005), the 
controlling family holds inner information and 
tends to “keep it all in the family.”  In this sense, 
family control makes outside directors less 
contributable to firm performance.   
For practical implications, the findings of this 
study show that outside directors appointed by legal 
mandate cannot function well as they are expected 
to.  On reflection, corporate governance reforms on 
board independence should be further developed.  
Policy-makers may not neglect the potential 
problems that “masked” outside directors may 
nominally conform to legal requirements but their 
existence may cripple the effectiveness of the 
corporate board and consequently erode the firm’s 
value.  Western managers can also benefit from this 
study by learning how the typical Chinese family 
business affects board independence.  This paper 
considers the prevalent family features of Chinese 
businesses and finds that family factors counteract 
the effectiveness of outside directors.  We 
demonstrate and incorporate the cultural and the 
ownership characteristics into analysis to present a 
country-specific pattern that should be informative 
for foreign investors (Rhee and Lee, 2008) who are 
concerned about the quality of corporate 
governance in East Asia. 
 
 
References 
 
1. Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., and Mullainathan, S. 
(2002) Ferreting out Tunnelling: An Application to 
Indian Business Groups, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 117, 121-148. 
2. Brick, I.E., Palmon, O. and Wald, J.K. (2006) CEO 
Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm 
Performance: Evidence of Cronyism? Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 12, 403– 423. 
3. Chang, S.J. (2003) Ownership Structure, 
Expropriation, and Performance of Group-Affiliated 
Companies in Korea, Academy of Management 
Journal, 46(2), 238-253. 
4. Chen, C.L., Yen, G., Fu, C.J. and Chang, F.H. 
(2007)  Family Control, Auditor Reputation, and 
Audit Quality: Empirical Evidence from the TSE-
listed Firms (1999-2002), Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 5(3), 96-110. 
5. Chu, W., (2004) Are Group-Affiliated Firms Really 
More Profitable than Nonaffiliated?  Small Business 
Economics 22, 391-405. 
6. Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L. H. P. (2002) 
Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment 
effects of large shareholding, Journal of Finance, 
56(6): 2741-2771. 
7. Clement, R. W. (2006), Just How Unethical is 
American Business? Business Horizon, 49, 313-327. 
8. Cordeiro, J., Veliyath, R. and Eramus, E. (2000) An 
Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of 
Outside Director Compensation, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 8(3), 268-
279. 
9. Crespí-Cladera, R. and Gispert, C. (2003) Total 
Board Compensation, Governance and Performance 
of Spanish Listed Companies, LABOUR, 17(1) 103-
126. 
10. Dewing, I.P. and Russell, P.O. (2004) Regulation of 
UK Corporate Governance: Lessons from 
Accounting, Audit and Financial Services, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
12(1), 107-115. 
11. DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell W.W. (1983). The Iron 
Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 
American Sociological Review, 48, 147-160. 
12. Fan, Y. (2002) Questioning Guanxi: Definition, 
Classification and Implications, International 
Business Review, 11, 543-561. 
13. Felo, A.J. (2001) Ethics Programs, Board 
Involvement, and Potential Conflicts of Interest in 
Corporate Governance, Journal of Business Ethics, 
32: 205-218. 
14. Fliatotchev, I. Lien, Y.C. and Piesse, J. (2005) 
Corporate Governance, Performance in Publicly 
Listed, Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from 
Taiwan, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 22, 
257-283. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, Fall 2013 
 
91 
15. Gaver, J.J. and Gaver, K.M. (1995) Compensation 
Policy and the Investment Opportunity Set, 
Financial Management, 24, 19– 32. 
16. Gul, F. A. and Leung, S. (2004) Board Leadership, 
Outside Directors’ Expertise and Voluntary 
Corporate Disclosures, Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, 23, 351–379 
17. Hamilton, G. (1998). Culture and Organization in 
Taiwan’s Market Economy. In Robert W. Hefner 
(ed.) Market Cultures: Society and Morality in the 
New Asian Capitalisms. Westview, Press, 41-77. 
18. Jensen, M. (1993) The Modern Industrial 
Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems, Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880. 
19. Kim, K., Kitsabunnarat, P. and Nofsinger, J.R. 
(2004) Ownership and Operating Performance in an 
Emerging Market: Evidence from Thai IPO Firms, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(3), 355-381. 
20. Kumar, P. and Zattoni, A. (2013) Corporate 
governance, Board of directors, and Firm 
Performance, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 21(4), 311-313. 
21. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silances, F., Shleifer, A. and 
Vishny, R.W. (1997) Legal Determinants of 
External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-
1150. 
22. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 
(1999) Corporate Ownership Around the World, 
Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517. 
23. Lee, T.S. and Yeh, Y.H. (2004) Corporate 
Governance and Financial Distress: Evidence from 
Taiwan, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 12(3), 378-388. 
24. Lehn, K., Netter, J. and Poulsen, A. (1990) 
Consolidation Corporate Control: Dual Class 
Recapitalisations versus Leverage Buyout, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 27, 347-376. 
25. Linn, S.C. and Park, D. (2005) Outside Director 
Compensation Policy and the Investment 
Opportunity Set, Journal of Corporate Finance, 
11(4), 680-715. 
26. Luan, C.J. and Tang, M.J. (2007) Where is 
Independent Director Efficacy? Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 636-
643. 
27. Luo, X. and Chung, C.N. (2005) Keeping it All in 
the Family: The role of Particularistic Relationships 
in Business Group Performance during Institutional 
Transition, Administrative Science Quarterly, 50, 
404-439. 
28. McClain, G. (2012) Outside Director Equity 
Compensation and the Monitoring of Management, 
Journal of Applied Business Research, 28(6), 1315-
1330. 
29. Neter, J., Wasserman, W. and Kutner, M. (1985) 
Applied Linear Statistical Models (2nd ed.). 
Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
30. Peng, M.W. (2004) Outside Directors and Firm 
Performance During Institutional Transitions, 
Strategic Management Journal, 25, 453-471. 
31. Peng, M.W., Buck, T. and Fliatotchev, I. (2003) Do 
Outside Directors and New Managers Help Improve 
Firm Performance? An Exploratory Study in 
Russian Privatization, Journal of World Business, 
38, 348-360. 
32. Pye, L.W. (1985). Asia power and politics: the 
cultural dimensions of authority. Cambridge. Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
33. Rhee, M. and Lee, J. (2008) The Signals Outside 
Directors Send to Foreign Investors: Evidence from 
Korea, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 16(1), 41-51. 
34. Ryan, H.E. and Wiggins III, R.A. (2004) Who is in 
Whose Pocket? Director Compensation, Board 
Independence, and Barriers to Effective Monitoring, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 497-524. 
35. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997) A Survey of 
Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 52, 737-
783. 
36. Tsai, W.-H., Hung, J.-H., Kuo, Y.-C. and Kuo, 
L.(2006) CEO tenure in Taiwanese family and 
nonfamily firms: An agency theory perspective, 
Family Business Review, 19(1), 11-28. 
37. Wu, C.F. (2006) The Study of the Relations among 
Ethical Considerations, Family Management and 
Organizational Performance in Corporate 
Governance, Journal of Business Ethics, 68: 165-
179. 
38. Yeh, Y.H. (2005) Do Controlling Shareholders 
Enhance Corporate Value? Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 13(2), 313-325. 
39. Yeh, Y.H., Lee, T.S. and Woidtke, T. (2001) Family 
Control and Corporate Governance: Evidence from 
Taiwan, International Review of Finance, 2, 21-48. 
40. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation for 
firms with a small board of directors. Journal of 
Financial Economics 40: 185-211. 
41. Young, C. and Tsai, L. (2008) The Sensitivity of 
Compensation to Social Capital: Business Research, 
61, 363-374. 
42. Zahra, S.A. (2003) International Expansion of U.S. 
Manufacturing Family Businesses: the Effects of 
Ownership and Involvement, Journal of Business 
Venturing, 18, 495-512. 
 
 
 
  
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, Fall 2013 
 
92 
РАЗДЕЛ 3 
КОРПОРАТИВНОЕ 
УПРАВЛЕНИЕ 
В РАЗВИВАЮЩИХСЯ СТРАНАХ 
SECTION 3 
CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIGH VOLUME TRADES AND STOCK PRICE CHANGES IN 
BRAZIL 
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Abstract 
 
This work analyzes the relation between stock price changes and high volume trades in Brazil. Using a 
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1. Introduction 
 
In an efficient market, the value of an asset should 
reflect the exact present value of the expected cash 
flows created by this same asset with the information 
made available to all interested investors. When 
several small investors have access to the same 
information, price fluctuations should only occur with 
the disclosure of new information or with changes in 
the risk-return profile of the investors. 
One can suppose that in a given market there are 
a large number of small investors, but also some 
investors that stand out due to their size. In such 
situation, it is possible to conceive that large investors 
may experience some difficulty in executing high 
volume orders since they may not find enough 
counetrparties for them. These orders may change the 
balance of prices with immediate and permanent 
consequences. The immediate effect is due to the 
instantaneous lack of market liquidity. The permanent 
impact happens through the tipping of the asset’s 
demand curve, causing a real modification of its 
actual value. 
Although extensively studied and accepted, 
these effects were very seldom measured for intra-
daily operations due to the difficulty in obtaining data. 
With the increasing availability of data in electronic 
media, some studies have been done for developed 
countries (Chan and Lakonishok (1995), 
Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004), 
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Almgrem, Thum, Hauptmann and Li (2005) and 
Bikker, Spierdijk and Van der Sluis (2007)). 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
impact of high volume operations over stock prices in 
Brazil. This paper innovates by working with publicly 
available information, as opposed to most 
international publications, which are based on 
proprietary data provided by funds or institutional 
investors and made available only to the authors of 
such papers. Although there are many international 
studies on the subject, intra-daily impacts of high 
volume orders have not yet been studied in Brazil. 
Using a database containing intra-daily data, 10 high 
liquid stocks are analyzed from 2001 to 2006. 
The findings of this paper indicate a positive and 
statistically relevant relation between the impacts on 
stock prices and high volume operations. We show 
that there are temporary and permanent impacts on 
stock prices following high volume operations, and 
that these impacts are asymmetric for buys and sells. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next 
section contains an overview of the literature review 
and Section 3 shows the data and methodology used 
in this work; Section 4 presents the results and 
Section 5 discusses the main conclusions of this 
study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In the international literature one can find several 
studies analyzing, on an intra-daily basis, the impact 
of high volume operations on stock prices. Most of 
these works, it must be said, base their research on 
proprietary data provided by a given investor 
(investment funds, pension funds or other institutional 
investors). 
Chan and Lakonishok (1995), Chiyachantana, 
Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004), Almgrem, Thum, 
Hauptmann and Li (2005) and Bikker, Spierdijk and 
Van der Sluis (2007) identify a positive relation 
between the volume of a given operation and its 
impact on stock prices. They also indicate the 
existence of an asymmetry in these results when 
comparing purchase and sale operations. 
Even though most studies present similar 
findings, there is no consensus about the volume 
necessary for an operation to be considered a high 
volume one and able to cause some effect on stock 
prices. The first studies on the subject used as a 
parameter the proportion between the volume of the 
operation and the total volume negotiated on the same 
day. Almgrem, Thum, Hauptmann and Li (2005) have 
improved this method and use the ratio between the 
volume of the operation and a portion of the total 
daily volume negotiated in the same lapse of time in 
which the operation was executed.  
Bikker, Spierdijk and Van der Sluis (2007) use 
two different and independent variables: the ratio 
between the volume of a single operation and the total 
volume of available stocks; and the ratio between the 
volume of this same operation and the total volume 
negotiated on the same day. Keim and Madhavan 
(1997) and Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood 
(2004) show that the impact on stock prices is 
positively related to the complexity of the high 
volume operation, which is measured through the 
number of brokers involved and the number of days 
necessary for its execution. 
Some authors analyze the relation between 
operation size and impact on stock prices in different 
countries. Bikker, Spierdijk and Van der Sluis (2007) 
demonstrate weaker impacts and lower transaction 
costs in the United States when compared to Europe, 
Japan and Canada. The authors explain that this 
difference may be related to the higher liquidity of the 
U.S. stock market. 
Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) 
study the impact of high volume operations in 39 
countries and concude that they are more significant 
in emerging markets, which usually have worse 
corporate governance. The authors argue that good 
governance, a better enforcement of shareholders’ 
rights and the existance of regulations against insider 
trading reduce the impact of the operations. Such 
finding corroborates the findings of La Porta et al. 
(1998), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Domowitz et al. 
(2001), Jain (2001) and Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002), which indicate differences between 
transaction costs in many countries, which they relate 
to different kinds of governance. 
The impact on stock prices is often defined in 
literature as the sum of temporary and permanent 
impacts. Kraus and Stoll (1972) define temporary 
impacts as those caused by a lack of immediate 
liquidity (price concessions aiming at stimulating 
buyers or sellers to give liquidity to a stock), 
inventory effects (temporary effects due to stock 
inventory imbalance) or imperfect substitution (price 
concessions to stimulate sellers or buyers to absorb 
additional shares). 
The same authors define the permanent impact 
as a change in the way the market evaluates a given 
asset due to the information conveyed by the 
operation. In other words, a high volume buying 
operation may be an indication that a given stock is 
undervalued, leading to a reconsideration of its price 
by other market participants with a consequent 
permanent change in its price.  
Even though different authors agree on these 
theoretical concepts, they use slightly different 
technical definitions. Bikker, Spierdijk and Van der 
Sluis (2007) define the temporary impact as the return 
of the stock between the time of the operation and a 
given moment after the operation; and the permanent 
impact as the return between a given moment 
immediately before the operation and a given moment 
after this same operation. 
Other authors use different prices as benchmarks 
for similar definitions, arguing that, in many cases, 
prices immediately before or immediately after the 
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operation are already (or still) under its influence. 
This is why it is not unusual to find studies that 
consider the closing price of the previous day or the 
opening price of the day of the operation as proxies 
for the price before the operation, and the closing 
price of the day of the operation or the opening price 
of the next day for the purpose of measuring 
permanent impact. 
Chan and Lakonishok (1995) use as a measure 
of impact the difference between the price truly 
executed in the operation and the price of the asset at 
the opening of the first day of the operation. Keim and 
Madhavan (1997) and Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and 
Wood (2004) also consider the price truly executed 
during the trade.  
To differentiate temporary from permanent 
impacts one must also measure the prices immediately 
after the operation and a sufficiently long time 
afterwards. Almgrem, Thum, Hauptmann and Li 
(2005) use the price immediately after the operation 
to measure temporary effect and the price 30 minutes 
later to calculate its permanent impact. Other authors 
use different lapses of time to measure permanent 
impact, such as 15 or 30 minutes, or even hours. 
The analysis of the impact of high volume orders 
over prices must also consider that operations can be 
made in blocks. Barclay and Warner (1993), when 
studying the positioning of informed investors, 
conclude that when operating with small (up to 500 
shares) or medium (500 to 10,000 shares) orders, the 
buyer (or seller) does not influence the market enough 
to justify the payment of a premium. For big orders 
(more than 10,000 shares), on the contrary, the market 
starts to notice the buying (or selling) operation and 
realizes that the investor has acces to some 
information not known to the market. Hence, the 
authors argue that the operation will be fragmented in 
several smaller operations in order to go unnoticed 
through the market, avoiding the payment of a 
premium. 
The first studies on the subject (Kraus and Stoll 
(1972), Keim and Madhavan (1991) and Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993)) analyze the impact over prices of 
isolated trades and disregard the hypothesis of these 
operations being a part of a bigger “package”. Chan 
and Lakonishok (1995) recognize that to institutional 
investors even positions considered to be average may 
represent a significant fraction of the total volume of 
some stocks. Therefore, it is perfectly natural that this 
investor breaks this operation in several smaller ones. 
And even these smaller operations may be broken 
down in minimal ones through computational 
algorithms. It would hence be wrong and useless to 
consider a single operation as the basic trade unit and 
to study the effects of these small operations on stock 
prices, since the trade as a whole would in this case be 
overlooked. 
The authors then suggest the creation of a 
package of operations and observe price behavior 
around this package instead of around specific 
operations. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) find that the 
size of these packages has a significant influence on 
prices. The question then becomes how to define the 
package of trades. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) 
suggest the use of the investor’s history to determine 
what is or is not part of the trade. As a general rule, 
they say that all the orders of a given investor should 
be aggregated until he stays out of the market for a 
considerable lapse of time. 
Many authors indicate that there are significant 
differences on the impact caused by buying or selling 
operations (Kraus and Stoll (1972), Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993, 1995), Keim and Madhavan 
(1997) and Madhavan and Cheng (1997)). In general, 
purchase operations cause more impact than sales.  
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) and Saar (2001) 
argue that purchase operations convey more 
information than sale operations. Since institutional 
investors usually do not carry an investment portfolio 
that is balanced according to the portfolio of the 
market, the option of selling does not necessarily 
convey bad information; the need to sell may be due 
only to a liquidity issue of this particular investor. On 
the other hand, the decision of buying a certain stock 
among all the others available in the market is more 
likely to convey positive information concerning a 
specific company. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
 
We use a database containing information on all intra-
daily transactions occured in BM&FBovespa for 49 
chosen assets from 2001 to 2006. From these 49 
assets, the 10 with highest liquidity during this period 
are selected, since approximately 60% of the 
transactions and 80% of the volume operated are 
concentrated in the 10 most liquid companies. 
The 10 companies analyzed are: Bradesco 
(bank), Braskem (petrochemical), Cemig (utilities), 
CSN (steel), Eletrobras (utilities), Gerdau (steel), 
Petrobras (oil and gas), Telemar (telecomunication), 
Usiminas (steel) and Vale (mining). The assets are 
selected in a way that most significant and 
competitive sectors in Brazil are represented, 
containing the most liquid firms for each category. 
The database contains the following information: date 
and time of the operation (on a second per second 
time scale), operation volume, trade price and the 
identification of the selling and buying brokers 
involved. 
As previously mentioned, most of the previous 
studies were done “from the inside”, meaning that 
they were done by researchers on the base of data 
supplied by investment funds or brokers. Thus, 
researchers knew beforehand when trades took place, 
their direction and whose intiative they were. In our 
study we are not in possession of the identity of the 
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buyer or seller. Therefore, we make an approximation 
by using the broker as the buying or selling entity. 
We know that in doing so we include a “noise” 
in a single operation, since all orders launched 
through a given broker, even if coming from different 
investors, will be considered as parts of a single 
package. However, since our analysis focuses on very 
high volume operations, way beyond the normal 
behavior of any broker for a given period of time, this 
noise should be small when compared to the size of 
the operations considered. 
Another problem that arises is the possibility of 
a single investor spreading its orders through different 
brokers. Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) 
study 39 countries (among them Brazil) and 
demonstrate that in average investors use between 
1.10 and 1.31 brokers. They point out differences 
between trades executed in a single day (1.05 broker 
per investor) and in multiple days (2.02 brokers per 
investor). Since in the present work we analyze only 
orders executed in a single day, the supposition of the 
use of 1 broker per investor for the execution of the 
orders seems reasonable. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
Our methodology is based on Chriss and Almgrem 
(2003) and Almgrem, Thum, Hauptmann and Li 
(2005). It must be highlighted, however, that the 
present work differs from those done so far, since 
instead of using proprietary information we work with 
information that is publicly available. By doing so we 
add yet another difficulty to it, which is the 
identification of a high volume trade. 
As seen in the previous section, there is no 
consensus around the value to be considered in order 
to qualify an operation as high volume. Almgrem, 
Thum, Hauptmann and Li (2005) find an average 
(median) volume of 1.51% (0.62%) of the total 
volume negotiated daily, and use as minimum cutoff 
values for high volume operations 0.25% of the total 
daily volume and at least 1,000 shares traded. Chan 
and Lakonishok (1995) find averages (medians) of 
66% (11%) for buys and 61% (7%) for sales. Bikker, 
Spierdijk and Van der Sluis (2007) find an average 
volume for the operations of 4.3% of the total daily 
volume for buys and 3.4% for sales. 
Hence, there is no single standard to define high 
volume operations. However, the use of some sort of 
cutoff value is necessary. Since we cannot preciselly 
establish from which value operations become 
relevant, we adopt several cutoff values: 10%, 20%, 
30%, 40% and 50%. We use 2 proxies to measure the 
volume of the operation: the ratio between the volume 
of the operation and the total volume negotiated 
during the same period; and the ratio between the 
volume of the operation and the total volume 
negotiated during that day.  
The interval considered for the aggregation of 
the operations in packages is also an important factor 
on which there is no consensus in the literature. 
Bikker, Spierdijk and Van der Sluis (2007) show that 
operation packages usually last between 0.22h and 
6.75h. Almgrem, Thum, Hauptmann and Li (2005) 
find average time for operation packages of 2.73h. In 
the present work, since our database is intra-daily, we 
consider different intervals (1 minute, 5 minutes, 10 
minutes, 20 minutes and 30 minutes) to include an 
operation as part of a block. 
Another difference between our study and most 
previous researches is that besides the immediate 
impact, we also measure the permanent impact of 
operations. In this regard, we have to estimate a lapse 
of time subsequent to the operation after which it no 
longer causes liquidity changes. Almgrem, Thum, 
Hauptmann and Li (2005) used a lapse of 30 minutes 
to measure the permanent impact, and we adopt this 
interval in this paper as well. 
Most studies calculate the impact on stock 
returns adjusted for the market return. None of them, 
however, multiplies the market return by the stock 
beta, meaning that the authors simply calculate the 
return of the asset and subtract the return of the 
market. We use a simple modification of the model by 
the inclusion of the stock beta, as per equation 1 
below: 
 
Stock Impact = Stock Return - Beta x Market 
Return 
(1) 
 
Barclay and Warner (1993), Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993), Chan and Lakonishok (1995), 
Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) and 
Bikker, Spierdijk and Van der Sluis (2007) use only 
linear regressions to relate operation volume and price 
impact. Chriss and Almgrem (2003) and Almgrem, 
Thum, Hauptmann and Li (2005) alert, however, to 
the possibility of this relation being polynomial or 
exponential. The authors admit, nevertheless, that a 
very large amount of data would be necessary for a 
conclusion about the form of the equation to be 
reached. They assume, hence, that the polynomial 
form is the most likely one and use regressions to 
determine the parameters and coefficients. In our 
work, we test three functional formats: linear, 
polynomial and exponential. 
Before presenting the results, we make an 
overview of the different proceedings followed. The 
first step is aggregating the operations according to 
their timing and to the broker or brokers involved. 
With the data aggregated per broker, we search for 
relevant operations by using different cutoff values 
(10%, 20%, 30%, 40% e 50%) according to the total 
volume negotiated in the period of the operation and 
to the volume negotiated during the day. This filter is 
not enough, since we may have high volume 
operations that are “confronted” by other high volume 
operations at the other end. Hence, besides being 
relevant, the operation has to be big enough to 
overcome this contrary pressure. In other words, we 
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select, for instance, buys higher than 10% as long as 
at the other end there is no sale higher than 10%. 
Thus, we select only operations that we could clearly 
identify as a buy or a sale due to the dispersion of the 
operations at the other end through several brokers. 
Finally, we calculate the dependent variables: 
immediate impact (stock at the end of the operation 
minus the market return adjusted by beta) and 
permanent impact (stock return 30 minutes after the 
end of the operation minus the market return adjusted 
by beta). 
We use two independent variables: volume of 
the operation/total volume negotiated during the same 
period, and volume of the operation/total volume 
negotiated during the same day. It is worth 
highlighting that the main explanatory variable is not 
merely the total volume of the operation, but its net 
volume. For example, having a buy of 80% of the 
volume and a sale of 40% of the volume, one may use 
as independent variable either the total negotiated 
volume (80%) or the net result of the operation (80% 
- 40% = 40%). We test both variables and the results 
are significantly stronger when the net volume is 
adopted instead of the total volume. 
We estimate three equations to relate the 
dependent and independent variables: 
 
IV                                                                
III                                                                        
II                                                                   
3
2
21
1
21
VolumeImpact
eImpact
VolumeImpact
Volume
 
where Impact is the immediate and permanent 
stock return minus the market return adjusted by 
beta), Volume is the net volume of the operation 
(divided by the total volume negotiated during the 
same period and during the same day), 1, 2 and 3 
are estimated parameters. The coefficient that we are 
most interested in is 2, which shows the relation 
between stock impact and operation volume. 
 
4. Results 
 
Six dimensions are analyzed: the type of impact 
(immediate and permanent), the cutoff value used in 
the selection of the operations, the time scale 
considered for aggregating the operations, the type of 
operation (buy or sell), the volume to be considered 
for the calculation of the net result (volume negotiated 
during the period of the operation or during the day) 
and the equation specification (linear, exponential, 
polynomial). 
Due to the many dimensions analyzed, 36,000 
regressions are estimated, being 3,600 per asset and 
720 for each interval of each asset. From this total, 
49% show a significant relation at the 5% level 
between impact on stock prices and operation volume. 
Table 1 shows the percentage of significant 
coefficients that relate stock impact and operation 
volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV). One can notice that there 
are fewer significant values for bigger intervals. This 
seems consistent with the hypothesys according to 
which most of the impact is immediate. 
Table 1. Percentage of Significant Coefficients that Relate Stock Impact and Operation Volume 
 
This table shows the percentage of significant coefficients that relate stock impact and operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV). 
Linear, exponential and polynomial regressions are estimated and the dependent variable is the impact on stock prices at the 
end of the operation or 30 minutes after the end of the operation. The models are estimated using different aggregation 
intervals (1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 minutes), and includes purchase and sale operations.  
 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale Total 
1m 63% 85% 49% 73% 71% 63% 65% 56% 81% 82% 69% 
5m 57% 67% 39% 57% 58% 52% 56% 63% 64% 47% 56% 
10m 45% 65% 38% 52% 59% 50% 49% 46% 52% 37% 49% 
20m 25% 45% 32% 40% 53% 41% 37% 49% 34% 27% 38% 
30m 31% 27% 26% 39% 43% 41% 28% 29% 28% 24% 32% 
Total 44% 58% 37% 52% 57% 50% 47% 48% 52% 43% 49% 
 
It is worth pointing out that the percentage of 
significant coefficients presented in Table 1 refers to 
all the estimated regressions and dimensions. Given 
that the number of analysis is enormous and due to 
lack of space we opt for presenting only the most 
relevant results here. However, all the results are 
available upon request. 
We start modeling immediate stock impact 
through linear regressions. We use the cutoffs of 10%, 
20%, 30%, 40% and 50% to define high volume 
operations. These cutoffs are applied to both the 
volume negotiated during the period of the operation 
and to the volume negotiated during the day. Table 2 
shows the coefficients that relate stock impact and 
operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV). 
Most methods present a large number of 
significant coefficients, indicating that there is a 
relation between volume of the operation and impact 
on stock prices. The coefficients and their significance 
vary a lot according to the cutoff level, aggregation 
interval and company. However, we can note that the 
results are more significant for shorter intervals, 
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which is in fact expected to happen. Therefore, for 
short intervals we are able to observe an almost 
immediate effect caused by the operation volume on 
stock prices. The 20% cutoff presents the largest 
number of significant coefficients. 
 
Table 2. Impact on Stock Prices and Operation Volume for Different Cutoff Values 
 
This table shows the coefficients that relate stock impact and operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV). Linear regressions are 
estimated and the dependent variable is the impact on stock prices at the end of the operation. The models are estimated using 
different aggregation intervals (1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 minutes). Panels A to E show the results for the following cutoff values, 
respectively: 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%. These cutoffs are applied to both the volume negotiated during the period of 
the operation and to the volume negotiated during the day. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: 10% Cutoff 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
1m 4.23** 7.37*** 4.05* 4.85*** 3.77*** 2.84*** 1.68*** 1.75*** 5.78*** 2.25*** 
5m 5.29 2.67 5.69 4.94** 5.38*** 2.00 3.21*** 2.36*** 5.77*** 2.52** 
10m 12.65 2.92 3.67 0.53 7.32*** 6.56** 2.63 3.66** 8.52* 2.29 
20m 4.37 0.86 13.23 10.68* 8.79** 14.62*** 2.27 3.54 5.51 -1.43 
30m 15.70 17.00* 6.61 3.78 10.48** 7.09 0.96 -5.23 6.33 -1.18 
Panel B: 20% Cutoff 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
 1m  1.44** 4.09*** 2.53*** 1.80*** 1.89*** 2.15*** 0.78*** 0.57*** 2.94*** 1.34*** 
 5m  2.29*** 1.93** 2.74*** 3.18*** 2.08*** 3.05*** 0.90*** 0.82*** 1.66** 0.21 
 10m 1.90** 2.90*** 2.13** 1.70* 2.94*** 2.69*** 0.72** 1.58*** 1.08 1.76*** 
 20m 2.02*** 4.16*** 2.12 2.30** 0.84 2.06** 1.66** 1.84** 2.09** 0.37 
 30m 3.78*** 3.36 1.92 1.80 2.77** 3.09 0.93 1.67 1.85 0.40 
Panel C: 30% Cutoff 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
 1m  1.33*** 2.31*** 1.48*** 1.64*** 1.57*** 1.26*** 0.51*** 0.40*** 1.33*** 0.68* 
 5m  1.00 0.99** 1.10** 1.69*** 1.03*** 1.24*** 0.61*** 0.56*** 1.40*** 0.71* 
 10m 2.13 1.61 1.58** 1.49** 0.85 1.55*** 0.69** 0.57** 1.51*** 0.14 
 20m 2.51 1.71 0.03 1.48 1.83** 2.07** 0.84 0.93* 1.36 0.09 
 30m -0.90 1.64 -0.35 0.80 2.47** 1.83 0.95 0.13 1.25 0.61 
Panel D: 40% Cutoff 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
 1m  0.69*** 0.98*** 0.80*** 0.91*** 0.85*** 0.72*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.79*** 0.44*** 
 5m  0.19 1.31*** 0.83*** 2.02*** 0.68*** 0.79*** 0.50*** 0.69*** 1.28*** 0.28 
 10m -0.54 1.37*** 0.68 1.54*** 1.04*** 1.40*** 0.49* 0.59** 1.60*** 0.30 
 20m -1.29 1.18 0.79 0.82 1.24* 1.40 1.22** 1.20** 0.59 0.87 
 30m -2.73 0.60 0.10 2.11 1.30 2.82** 0.08 1.30 0.95 -0.24 
Panel E: 50% Cutoff 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
 1m  0.48** 1.12*** 0.65*** 0.72*** 0.75*** 0.51*** 0.31*** 0.47*** 0.66*** 0.46*** 
 5m  0.63 0.80*** 0.77*** 1.26*** 0.41* 0.36 0.38*** 0.65*** 0.77*** (0.03) 
 10m 0.51 1.21** 0.32 0.59 0.91** 0.69 0.59** 0.16 1.32*** 0.19 
 20m 4.59 1.39 1.34* 1.46 1.53** 0.55 -0.23 -0.32 1.38 -0.47 
 30m -4.96 0.64 1.41 -0.11 0.63 1.33 -1.11 2.48** 2.12 0.43 
 
As seen in Section 2, some authors use as 
independent variable the percentage of total volume 
during the lapse of time in which the operation is 
executed, while others use the percentage in relation 
to the volume negotiated during the day. Table 3 
shows the results for both alternatives using a cutoff 
of 20% to define high volume operations.
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Table 3. Impact on Stock Prices and Different Measures of Operation Volume 
 
This table shows the coefficients that relate stock impact and operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV). Linear regressions are 
estimated and the dependent variable is the impact on stock prices at the end of the operation. The models are estimated using 
different aggregation intervals (1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 minutes) and a cutoff value of 20%. Panels A and B show the results for 
different measures of operation volume: percentage of the volume negotiated during the day and percentage of the volume 
negotiated during the lapse of time in which the operation is executed. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Percentage of the Volume Negotiated During the Day 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
1m 1.55*** 4.53*** 3.43*** 2.17*** 2.48*** 2.58*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 3.04*** 1.72*** 
5m 2.48*** 4.20*** 3.10*** 2.94*** 3.12*** 2.58*** 1.10*** 0.92*** 3.04*** 1.54*** 
10m 2.55*** 5.10*** 3.81*** 2.65*** 3.62*** 2.85*** 0.86*** 1.31*** 2.86*** 2.40*** 
20m 2.88*** 5.99*** 4.62*** 3.06*** 3.78*** 4.28*** 2.08*** 1.94*** 2.87*** 3.17*** 
30m 4.63*** 6.43*** 4.49*** 3.00*** 3.76*** 5.04*** 1.32*** 1.63*** 4.53*** 3.23*** 
Panel B: Percentage of the Volume Negotiated During the Lapse of Time in which the Operation is Executed 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
1m  27.98*** 41.82*** 43.93*** 50.61*** 39.47*** 52.01*** 24.90*** 19.89*** 76.21*** 49.03*** 
5m  16.17*** 45.48*** 33.74*** 36.41*** 46.02*** 45.60*** 28.28*** 13.15*** 70.69*** 30.75*** 
10m 10.03** 43.60*** 36.29*** 39.43*** 34.75*** 42.71*** 25.69*** 12.52*** 64.40*** 26.45*** 
20m 6.87** 36.14*** 33.67*** 34.47*** 34.95*** 41.25*** 19.04*** 22.54*** 57.23*** 13.82*** 
30m 4.21** 42.86*** 39.58*** 24.08*** 37.05*** 51.92*** 30.54*** 10.45*** 48.52*** 21.12*** 
 
All coefficients that relate stock impact and 
operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV) are significant at 
1% or 5% levels. Therefore we can conclude that both 
alternatives to measure operation volume have a 
significant relationship with stock impact. The 
difference between both independent variables is 
minimal, indicating a slightly superior performance 
for the percentage volume negotiated during the day, 
which presents all coefficients significant at 1%. 
When the cutoff is modified (not only 20%), the 
percentage of the daily volume continue to present 
more significant coefficients than the percentage of 
the volume during the lapse of time in which the 
operation took place. 
Table 4 brings a comparison between linear, 
exponential and polynomial models with a cutoff of 
20% and using the percentage of the daily volume as 
independent variable. All coefficients that relate stock 
impact and operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV) are 
significant at 1%. As can be seen, the results are 
similar for all models. When the analysis is repeated 
varying other dimensions, the linear model presents a 
slightly superior performance, with more significant 
coefficients than the other models. 
 
Table 4. Linear, Exponential and Polynomial Relations between the Impact on Stock Prices and Operation 
Volume 
 
This table shows the coefficients that relate stock impact and operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV). Linear, exponential and 
polynomial regressions are estimated and the dependent variable is the impact on stock prices at the end of the operation. The 
models are estimated using different aggregation intervals (1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 minutes), a cutoff value of 20% and operation 
volume is measured by the percentage in relation to the total volume negotiated during the day. Panels A, B and C show the 
results of the linear, exponential and polynomial models, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Linear Model 
Stock /  
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
1m 1.55*** 4.53*** 3.43*** 2.17*** 2.48*** 2.58*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 3.04*** 1.72*** 
5m 2.48*** 4.20*** 3.10*** 2.94*** 3.12*** 2.58*** 1.10*** 0.92*** 3.04*** 1.54*** 
10m 2.55*** 5.10*** 3.81*** 2.65*** 3.62*** 2.85*** 0.86*** 1.31*** 2.86*** 2.40*** 
20m 2.88*** 5.99*** 4.62*** 3.06*** 3.78*** 4.28*** 2.08*** 1.94*** 2.87*** 3.17*** 
30m 4.63*** 6.43*** 4.49*** 3.00*** 3.76*** 5.04*** 1.32*** 1.63*** 4.53*** 3.23*** 
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Panel B: Exponential Model 
Stock /  
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
1m 1.41*** 0.63*** 1.33*** 1.77*** 0.98*** 1.40*** 0.46*** 2.76*** 0.28*** 0.53*** 
5m 1.76*** 0.98*** 7.62*** 5.06*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 1.77*** 7.01*** 1.46*** 2.93*** 
10m 1.79*** 1.24*** 3.54*** 1.66*** 3.62*** 2.75*** 4.49*** 2.41*** 2.81*** 2.13*** 
20m 7.99*** 5.21*** 13.62*** 4.60*** 6.85*** 4.77*** 1.26*** 2.84*** 5.13*** 7.50*** 
30m 1.94*** 2.86*** 1.94*** 6.20*** 0.49*** 3.08*** 3.62*** 5.53*** 3.12*** 2.66*** 
Panel C: Polynomial Model 
Stock /  
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
1m 1.47*** 1.44*** 1.96*** 1.33*** 1.33*** 1.46*** 0.76*** 1.65*** 0.64*** 0.73*** 
5m 2.77*** 1.41*** 3.81*** 2.83*** 1.29*** 1.10*** 1.15*** 2.84*** 1.11*** 1.74*** 
10m 7.43*** 1.88*** 3.07*** 1.64*** 2.78*** 1.95*** 1.52*** 2.29*** 1.60*** 1.87*** 
20m 8.30*** 4.09*** 5.81*** 2.81*** 3.67*** 3.45*** 2.06*** 2.04*** 1.98*** 5.71*** 
30m 43.40*** 3.00*** 2.51*** 4.32*** 1.27*** 2.59*** 1.62*** 4.08*** 2.40*** 3.03*** 
 
We perform two additional analyses: buys vs. 
sales and impact on stock prices 30 minutes after the 
end of the trade. First we compare the results for buy 
and for sale operations to check if there is asymmetry 
between them. Table 5 presents the results for the 
linear models with a 20% cutoff and using the 
percentage of the daily volume as independent 
variable. 
 
Table 5. Impact on Stock Prices and Operation Volume for Buying and Selling Orders 
 
This table shows the coefficients that relate stock impact and operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV). Linear regressions are 
estimated and the dependent variable is the impact on stock prices at the end of the operation. The models are estimated using 
different aggregation intervals (1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 minutes), a cutoff value of 20% and operation volume is measured by the 
percentage in relation to the total volume negotiated during the day. Panels A and B show the results of the model for 
purchase and sale operations, respectively. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Purchase 
Stock /  
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale Average 
1m 2.01*** 6.08*** 4.39*** 1.76*** 2.09*** 2.10*** 0.64*** 1.21*** 3.67*** 2.35*** 2.63*** 
5m 3.26*** 5.25*** 3.91*** 3.13*** 3.32*** 2.52*** 0.96*** 0.70*** 4.09*** 1.73*** 2.89*** 
10m 3.41*** 6.38*** 4.72*** 2.70*** 4.32*** 3.17*** 0.68*** 1.63*** 3.01*** 3.31*** 3.33*** 
20m 4.15*** 8.13*** 6.89*** 2.37*** 3.62*** 6.77*** 2.68*** 2.06*** 1.43*** 4.66*** 4.27*** 
30m 6.85*** 10.17*** 6.49*** 2.57*** 3.27*** 6.85*** 0.73*** 1.07*** 4.87*** 3.71*** 4.66*** 
Panel B: Sale 
Stock /  
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale Average 
1m 1.07*** 2.92*** 2.43*** 2.60*** 2.89*** 3.08*** 1.21*** 0.64*** 2.38*** 1.06*** 2.09*** 
5m 1.67*** 3.11*** 2.26*** 2.74*** 2.91*** 2.64*** 1.25*** 1.15*** 1.95*** 1.34*** 2.10*** 
10m 1.65*** 3.77*** 2.86*** 2.60*** 2.89*** 2.52*** 1.05*** 0.98*** 2.70*** 1.45*** 2.35*** 
20m 1.56*** 3.76*** 2.26*** 3.78*** 3.95*** 1.69*** 1.46*** 1.82*** 4.37*** 1.62*** 2.73*** 
30m 2.32*** 2.54*** 2.41*** 3.45*** 4.27*** 3.16*** 1.93*** 2.21*** 4.18*** 2.73*** 2.92*** 
 
All coefficients that relate stock impact and 
operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV) are significant at 
1% for both buys and sales. Consistent with existing 
literature, there is a difference between the impact 
caused by purcahse and sale operations. The values 
for the purchase coefficients are significantly higher 
than those of the sale operations. 
Finally, instead of analyzing only the immediate 
stock impact after the operation, we also investigate 
the impact 30 minutes after the end of its execution. 
Based on previous studies, our expectation is to find 
weaker results if compared to those of the immediate 
impact. Table 6 presents the results for immediate and 
permanent stock impacts. 
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Table 6. Immediate and Permanent Impact on Stock Prices and Impact 30 Minutes After the End of the 
Operation and Operation Volume 
 
This table shows the coefficients that relate stock impact and operation volume ( 2 in Eqs II to IV). Linear regressions are 
estimated and the dependent variable is the impact on stock prices at the end of the operation and 30 minutes after the end of 
the operation. The models are estimated using different aggregation intervals (1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 minutes), a cutoff value of 
20% and operation volume is measured by the percentage in relation to the total volume negotiated during the day. Panels A 
and B show the results for the immediate and permanent impacts, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Pannel A: Impact Imediately after the End of the Operation 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
1m 1.55*** 4.53*** 3.43*** 2.17*** 2.48*** 2.58*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 3.04*** 1.72*** 
5m 2.48*** 4.20*** 3.10*** 2.94*** 3.12*** 2.58*** 1.10*** 0.92*** 3.04*** 1.54*** 
10m 2.55*** 5.10*** 3.81*** 2.65*** 3.62*** 2.85*** 0.86*** 1.31*** 2.86*** 2.40*** 
20m 2.88*** 5.99*** 4.62*** 3.06*** 3.78*** 4.28*** 2.08*** 1.94*** 2.87*** 3.17*** 
30m 4.63*** 6.43*** 4.49*** 3.00*** 3.76*** 5.04*** 1.32*** 1.63*** 4.53*** 3.23*** 
Pannel B: Impact 30 Minutes after the End of the Operation 
Stock / 
Interval 
Bradesco Braskem Cemig CSN Eletrobras Gerdau Petrobras Telemar Usiminas Vale 
1m 0.93 5.47*** 3.76*** 1.75** 3.80*** 2.62*** 0.73*** 0.16 2.04*** 1.66*** 
5m 1.76* 3.17*** 3.57*** 3.60*** 2.54*** 2.58*** 1.00*** 0.89*** 2.27*** 1.90*** 
10m 0.53 6.72*** 2.89*** 2.35*** 3.70*** 1.62*** 0.93*** 1.32*** 1.35*** 2.23*** 
20m 5.15*** 6.62*** 5.05*** 3.05*** 4.25*** 3.93*** 2.54*** 2.13*** 3.62*** 3.92*** 
30m 5.08** 7.59*** 4.40*** 2.46** 3.28*** 4.92*** 1.33** 1.63*** 4.73*** 3.12*** 
 
By observing the number of significant 
coefficients it is possible to notice that the 
significance of the results for permanent impact is 
slightly lower than that of the immediate impact. 
However, the permanent impact continues to be 
significant in most cases. This result led us to also test 
the the permanent impact in longer periods (60 and 
120 minutes after the execution of the operation). The 
results (not reported here) indicate that the 
significance falls substantially, practicaly eliminating 
the existence of significant coefficients. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There are numerous studies in international literature 
that analyze, on an intra-daily basis, the impact on 
stock prices decurring from high volume operations. 
In general, these are researches based on proprietary 
data provided by some investors and reveal in their 
findings the existence of a positive relation between 
the size of the operation and its impact on stock 
prices. 
This paper analyzes the impact on stock prices 
of high volume operations executed in Brazil. It is 
groundbreaking work in the sense that it is based on 
publicly available data, with intra-daily information 
on 10 high liquidity stocks, from 2001 to 2006. In this 
regard, this paper differs from most studies found in 
the international literature.  
Confirming previous observations, we have 
found that there are significant changes in stock prices 
after a high volume operation, be it a purcahse or a 
sale. Our results confirm the existence of temporary 
and partially permanent effects and of an asymmetry 
in the impacts caused by purchases and sales.  
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A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE SENSITIVITY OF A BANK’S 
BALANCE SHEET TO CHANGE WHEN OPTIMIZING FOR 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER BASEL 
 
F Cronje*, J.H. van Rooyen** 
 
Abstract 
 
The management of a modern bank is a complex task that is becoming increasingly more so due to the 
inherent complexities of its business and of an ever changing modern financial environment. Recent 
turmoil in the global financial environment necessitated new regulation, some of which may have a 
material impact on the structure and management of a bank. The establishment of higher minimum 
capital buffers for banks to counter the possibility of failing will have a material influence on 
profitability. Apart from making investment in banks shares less attractive, the regulation may turn 
out to be bad for global economic growth. In view of the above, the objective of this research was to 
single out and demonstrate the effect of the minimum capital requirements on the profitability, 
composition and size of a bank balance sheet. The Simplex algorithm was used to set up a goal 
programming problem formulation in Excel. Different capital minima was entered in the model and 
then optimised to observe the effect on the bank balance sheet size, composition and profitability. The 
research clearly demonstrated that at a capital reserve requirements of 5%, the resulting balance sheet 
is 190% of the original balance sheet size and at the 25% capital reserve requirement the new balance 
sheet is merely 57% of the original size. Increasing the reserve requirement from say 5% to 9,5% gives 
rise to approximately 40% change in balance sheet size, all other things being constant. As the capital 
reserve requirement is increased from 5% of RWA to 14%, the profit falls from over R60 billion to just 
over R10 billion. It is clear from the research that banks are very sensitive to the new regulation. It also 
underlines how difficult it may be for banks to maintain profitability. The changes needed to maintain 
the profitability, may not be possible/feasible in the South African financial environment. The time is 
possibly right now for banks to start improving efficiency and developing new innovative low risk high 
return services and product lines. 
 
Keywords: Capital; Reserves; Optimisation; Objective function; Liquidity 
 
* Stellenbosch University, Department of Business Management, Private Bag X1, Matieland, 7602, South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction and problem formulation 
 
The management of a modern bank is a complex 
task that is becoming increasingly more so due to 
the inherent complexities of its business and of an 
ever changing modern financial environment. This 
has recently again been underlined by the Sub-
Prime crisis. The primary reasons why banks failed, 
was due to excessive risk taking which came in 
many different forms, for an example, undue credit 
granting to risky clients, excessive gearing, undue 
derivative risks and add to this the collective 
actions of many global banks. Due to the 
interrelated nature of global financial markets, 
banks were all affected in some way or another.  
The primary risk that banks take is credit risk. 
It can easily be argued that the American banks set 
aside the very fundamental investment and business 
principles of being rewarded for taking high risk. 
Of course, human behaviour had a lot to do with the 
magnitude of the crisis. That is, for high risk, a high 
return is sought or that was what we were led to 
believe. The fundamental problem with the sub-
prime loans was that these loans should, from a 
risk/return perspective, never have been granted in 
the first place. Put differently, credit granting 
standards deteriorated. The fundamental problem of 
these loans was that the borrower put very little or 
no equity into the loan agreement due to very 
limited private wealth. Due to this, excessively high 
loan to asset ratios (even 1) were needed to be able 
to grant these loans. This situation meant that banks 
were not rewarded for the risk they took. The 
problem is really that the lender (a bank) can, in 
case of default, fall back on a property that is 
already 100 per cent financed. Furthermore, the 
lender can also not add an interest premium to the 
loan rate to cater for the high risk as this will make 
repayments even more difficult for the borrower 
which may already be cash strapped. It is by now 
clear that this was, from a bank management 
perspective, an undesirable situation. 
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Apart from the fact that undue credit was 
granted by many US banks, many other risks were 
also amplified after the crisis. Most important of 
these was liquidity risk. The credit problems led to 
large losses by highly levered banks which were 
exacerbated by loan defaults. This led to funding 
problems. Market liquidity deteriorated due to 
levered banks trying to lower leverage. In an 
attempt to lower counterparty exposure, banks 
started selling assets, hoarding cash and improving 
or tried improving their risk management 
processes/positions. All this gave rise to interbank 
funding problems with TED spreads widening. 
TED is the acronym derived from the T-bill and 
Eurodollar futures ticker which is ED. The TED 
spread is the difference between the interest rates 
on interbank loans and on short-term U.S. 
government debt ("T-bills"). The TED is an 
indication of the perceived credit risk in the general 
economy. An increase in the TED goes hand in 
hand with an economic downturn and lowering 
liquidity in the market. 
Banks experienced funding liquidity problems 
which quickly spread, affecting highly levered 
hedge funds also creating funding risk for them 
where banks refuse to lend. The market illiquidity, 
the prospect of further liquidity risk and possible 
bank failures, scared investors. Prices dropped, 
especially those of illiquid assets with high 
margins. The crisis also spread across all asset 
classes and markets globally even affecting 
Covered Interest Rate Parity and the possibility for 
arbitrage. 
Recent events in the global financial 
environment underlined just how vulnerable banks 
can be and just how easily they can fail - and they 
are certainly not too big to fail. The Basel III 
Accord, among others, proposes that banks increase 
the size and quality of their capital buffers to absorb 
losses. Apart from this, liquidity positions and 
management must also improve substantially in the 
years to come. Although increasing the capital 
buffers may seem to be the way for the future, it 
may, in the long run, not be the case. If the capital 
buffer is increased, banks will have to increase risk 
to increase the ROE. It won’t be long before banks 
again start taking on more risk or will seek other 
innovative ways of bypassing regulatory 
requirements so as to deliver the ROE that owners 
want and in doing so, increase risk as these two 
things go hand in hand.  
 
Objectives of the research 
 
Since so many financial magnitudes affect the 
balance sheet of a bank simultaneously, knowing 
how the balance sheet should look in future is 
difficult to determine. The bank balance sheet is 
affected in a unique way by market factors. The 
degree of interaction between the asset and liability 
sides of the balance sheet is quite profound, more 
so than in case of any other businesses. However, 
we are fortunately not left entirely in the dark about 
the structure of the balance sheet. Many modern 
tools exist which may help us model and achieve 
some reasonable answer to the question of the 
structure of the balance sheet. 
The objective of this research is briefly as 
follows:  
 To develop a simple multi-objective, goal 
programming bank balance sheet model which will 
be used to demonstrate how the capital 
requirements will affect balance sheet size and 
profitability. The model will also demonstrate that 
the size of the capital buffer is not straight forward 
to determine.  
 Another sub-objective of this research is 
that the model developed here, will serve as a 
prototype for the development of a more complex 
bank balance sheet planning model in the 
foreseeable future. 
A discussion of aspects such as the 
effectiveness of some of the Basel measures is 
outside of the scope of this research. Financial 
aspects other than capital and profitability will not 
be covered in this research. 
 
Literature Review  
 
The recent financial crisis demonstrated just how 
interrelated and vulnerable financial markets can 
become. The collective actions and risks to which 
banks were exposed, underlined the weakness of 
the Basel II accord. This led to the third Basel 
Capital Accord (Basel III) which represents one of 
the biggest changes to banking regulations that the 
financial world has seen (Barfield, 2011:1). With 
the main aim of creating a resilient banking sector 
(BIS, 2010:1), this accord has been and is being 
implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision as a direct response to the recent 
financial crisis of 2007 (King & Tarbert, 2011:1). 
According to Barfield (2011:10), banks entered into 
the financial crisis with insufficient capital, high 
leverage ratios, and financial assets carrying too 
high a level of risk. This led to a large number of 
bank bailouts and failures and resulted in the 
current unstable state of the banking sector. The 
Basel Committee plans to achieve its stated aims of 
resilience and financial stability (Barfiel, 2011:9) 
by strengthening regulations and raising 
requirements on capital and liquidity (BIS, 
2011:1)(see Figure 1 below).  
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Figure 1. A breakdown of the Basel III requirements 
 
  
 
Source: KPMG (2010:9) 
 
The Basel Committee anticipates that new 
regulations will lead to a safer banking sector in the 
future, with banks holding elevated levels of capital 
and lower levels of risk (De La Mora, Matten & 
Barfield, 2010:2). The Basel III regulations on 
capital could, however, have a negative impact for 
shareholders, consumers and bank profitability, and 
it may have a destabilising effect on the financial 
system (De La Mora, Matten & Barfield, 2010:2). 
The issue of bank capital management is not 
new to the banking sector. Since the initiation of the 
First Basel Accord in 1988, the Basel Committee 
has had the same objective of achieving a sound 
and stable international financial system (Jackson et 
al, 1999:1) and has used the same major technique 
of regulating bank capital to do so. The First Basel 
Accord was unsuccessful, and as a result, the 
second accord (Basel II) was implemented 26 years 
later (King & Tarbert, 2011:1-2). The Basel 
Committee, however, also failed in this attempt 
(Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 2010:5) due to the 
fact that the recent financial crisis severely affected 
the economy and left the banking sector unstable, 
despite the Basel II regulations being in place. 
From this, the Basel Committee has concluded that 
past regulations have been insufficient and that an 
even higher minimum capital requirement should 
be implemented. Although Basel III aims to 
improve on the earlier accords, their previous 
failures raised some doubt regarding the Basel 
Committee’s approach and the effectiveness of 
continually raising capital requirements. The 
advantages of Basel III seem simple: holding a 
larger capital buffer will result in a banking sector 
that can easily absorb losses and remain stable in a 
period of financial distress (King & Tarbert, 
2011:3). Banking regulation is, however, complex 
and the costs involved with adhering to capital 
requirements frequently outweigh the seemingly 
obvious advantages. Under Basel III, banks will 
need to optimise their capital and carefully plan 
their actions in order to facilitate the crucial 
restructuring of the banking system and the 
resetting of their business models necessary to 
adjust to the revised capital regulations. This will 
inevitably have cost and time implications, 
resulting in the necessity for banks to start this 
process earlier rather than later (De la Mora, Matten 
& Barfield, 2010:5). This immediate reaction is 
needed even though Basel III will only be fully 
implemented by 2019 (Chan, Masters and Hingel, 
2010:1), with the requirements being gradually 
increased and enforced. According to the Basel 
Committee, the reason for this staggered 
implementation is to allow for economic recovery 
(King & Tarbert, 2011:11) and also to give banks 
enough time to adjust to the regulations at the 
lowest possible cost (Kowalik, 2011:5). Although 
this seems beneficial, the main problem may 
concern the actual requirements, not merely the 
timeframe of implementation.  
There is a substantial amount of information 
supporting, as well as criticising, capital 
requirements with numerous conflicting views. The 
Basel Committee has recently conducted a 
Quantitative Impact Study to assess the effects of 
the new regulations. This study has suggested that 
Basel III will have minimal negative effects (Lyons 
& Casey, 2011:29) but this represents only one side 
of the capital requirement argument. This research 
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discusses the (optimal) level of capital and 
determines the impact of the necessary bank 
reform, providing a critical view on Basel III. These 
regulations will affect a large number of banks on a 
global scale and it will, therefore, be beneficial for 
banks and governments, as well as investors, to be 
conscious of the impact thereof. 
  
Banks and capital requirements under 
Basel III  
 
A bank is a financial establishment that is based 
largely on leverage, with banks borrowing from the 
market and lending to borrowers (King and Tarbert, 
2011:1). According to Kowalik (2011:1), banks 
fund their investments by using deposits, other debt 
and equity capital. Often not enough equity capital 
is held, because this represents money that cannot 
be invested to earn a return and is, thus, costly for 
banks (Paletta, 2010). Capital is an important and 
critical concept of banking and it can be defined as 
the portion of the bank’s assets that is not 
contractually bound to make repayments (Elliot, 
2010:3). The conventional role of capital is to 
ensure that banks can survive unexpected losses 
and that these losses can be absorbed internally 
without affecting the economy as a whole. This is, 
however, not the sole purpose of capital as excess 
reserves also play a fundamental role in the credit 
rating assigned to banks and the confidence of 
investors in the financial institution (Kjeldson, 
2004). Higher credit ratings are assigned to banks 
with stronger capital positions and this leads to 
lower financing costs charged on interbank loans, 
as well as lower interest rates on bonds issued by 
the bank. Capital reserves also enable a bank to 
enter into large exposures without having to raise 
additional capital and maintain the reputation of the 
institution (Kjeldson, 2004). An aspect that should 
also be considered is a particular bank’s appetite for 
risk and its policy towards risk taking. The risk 
culture in a bank has a lot to do with how it will 
deal with risk and how it maximises profit. 
Regulations on bank capital aim to ensure that 
the excess reserves held by banks are sufficient to 
absorb losses and that these additional funds add 
value to the institution. According to the Basel 
Committee, it is crucial for banks to back their risks 
with a high quality and quantity of capital and this 
has resulted in the need for establishing the Basel 
Accord (BIS, 2010:2). Regulation is defined as a 
“set of rules and standards that govern financial 
institutions” (Barfield, 2011:5) and this is exactly 
what Basel III aims to do.  
The key elements of the Basel III framework 
include:  
 
Type of capital Percentage of RWA 
Minimum capital (Tier 1) 4,5% 
Capital conservation buffer 2,5% 
Counter cyclical buffer 2,5% 
 
Firstly, the new regulations require banks to 
hold a minimum level of capital, consisting entirely 
of Tier 1 capital, equivalent to 4.5% of risk 
weighted assets (BIS, 2010:12)(see Figure 2 
below). Tier 1 capital is the highest quality, 
support-providing capital (Lyons & Casey, 2011:1) 
and consists of common equity and retained 
earnings (Shearman & Sterling.2011:4). Risk 
weighted assets (RWAs) involve the assignment of 
an inclusion percentage to assets based on their 
perceived level of risk (Kowalik.2011:2), with 
riskless assets carrying a weight of 0% (King & 
Tarbert, 2011:1).  
 
Figure 2. A breakdown of the total capital requirements compared under the Basel III and Basel II regulations 
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The fundamental definition of capital will be 
strengthened and applied uniformly on a global 
scale under Basel III (King & Tarbert, 2011:3). The 
main aim of this is to ensure consistency and 
transparency amongst all internationally active 
banks.  
The Basel Committee has identified additional 
regulations, which will be implemented over and 
above the minimum capital requirements, to close 
the loopholes evident in Basel II (The Economist, 
2011:2). These additional requirements are 
comprised of a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% 
of RWAs and a countercyclical capital buffer of up 
to 2.5%, depending on the state of the economy 
(Shearman & Sterling, 2011:3). A leverage ratio of 
at least 3% will also be introduced under Basel III 
(King & Tarbert, 2011:6).  
Setting the capital requirement at an 
appropriate level is a difficult task. If the capital 
requirements are too high, banks will become 
unprofitable. This will lead to an increased cost of 
borrowing, which will, in turn, slow down 
economic growth (The Economist, 2011:1). On the 
other hand, capital requirements set too low will 
lead to banks being vulnerable and susceptible to 
failure (The Economist, 2011:1). Many, vastly 
different opinions on the appropriate levels of 
capital exist. Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano 
(2011:40) believe that the capital requirement 
should be set at 20% of RWAs, almost triple the 
level suggested in Basel III. The banking industry, 
on the contrary, believes that the Basel III 
requirements, which have already almost tripled, 
are too high, with more modest changes being 
appropriate (Elliot, 2010:9).  
The measurement of the required level of 
capital, in relation to RWAs, has also been 
identified as problematic. Firstly, the practice of 
assigning a risk weighting to assets has been widely 
criticised, with certain arguments suggesting the 
elimination of this approach altogether (King & 
Tarbert, 2011:3). Basel III allows sophisticated 
banks to use internal risk models to determine 
various risk weightings and in doing so, ultimately 
determine the capital levels held (Elliot, 2011:8). 
The main problem with this approach is that 
weightings are often based on limited historical 
data and are determined in the bank’s own interest 
(Elliot, 2011:8). These risk models are also often 
not stress-tested, resulting in insufficient capital in a 
financial crisis (The Economist, 2011:1) and a 
largely flawed system. Secondly, RWAs focus on 
individual assets and are, therefore, portfolio 
invariant. This is seen as a disadvantage because 
the importance of diversification is not reflected 
and the concentration of a portfolio in one asset is 
not penalised (Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 
2010:4). Basel III does not address the fundamental 
problems found regarding the use of RWAs as has 
become evident in the previous accords (Blundell-
Wignall & Atkinson, 2010:10).  
The return on equity (ROE) is a measure of a 
bank’s profitability in relation to shareholders’ 
equity. This is a fundamental measure for 
shareholders as it indicates the quality of the shares 
and reveals how well a bank is utilising its funds to 
generate returns (Business: The Ultimate Resource, 
2009). Banks should aim to keep their ROE as high 
as possible, but this proves to be difficult with the 
increase in equity required by the Basel III 
regulations. According to Barfield (2011:14), a 
falling ROE can negatively change the perception 
investors have of banks, and shareholders often fear 
that a bank is struggling when common equity is 
offered to the public (Kowalik, 2011:3). Issuing 
more equity also results in the dilution of shares 
values, which will not appeal to investors as their 
earnings per share will decrease. These factors 
make it difficult for banks to generate common 
equity and increase their Tier 1 capital, at a time 
when it is specifically required by regulations. 
Banks will be forced to take less desirable actions 
in order to meet requirements, while aiming to 
continue satisfying shareholders and minimising 
costs. Instead of issuing more capital, banks will be 
inclined to decrease the supply and increase the cost 
of loans to meet the Basel III standards (Kowalik, 
2011:3) (Elliot, 2010:11). This will likely have a 
negative impact on economic growth and recovery. 
Alternatively, banks can also attempt to 
maintain their ROE by raising profits, forming one 
of the main arguments against Basel III. Banks 
cannot earn a higher return through the use of risk 
free assets. These assets may have a 0% weighting 
with regard to RWAs (Kowalik, 2011:2) and, 
therefore, require no capital, but these assets also 
generate a low return. With the need to increase 
profitability, banks will move their funds to riskier 
parts of the economy (The Economist, 2011:1), 
being forced to hold higher levels of capital, but 
also being exposed to the possibility of earning 
higher returns. This, once again, causes problems 
for the stability of the banking sector and 
counteracts the safety created through the increase 
in capital, defeating the objectives of the Basel 
Accord as it relates to capital.  
There is little dispute that the increased capital 
requirements will increase the cost of borrowing 
and in doing so, slow economic growth. There is, 
however, disagreement regarding the magnitude of 
the harm that Basel III will cause (The Economist, 
2011:4). According to The Economist (2011), the 
Institute of International Finance estimates a 
decrease in economic growth of up to 0.9% per 
percentage point of capital held, while the New 
York Federal Reserve estimates a decrease of 
0.09% and The Basel Committee expects even less 
than this.  
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The slow economic growth expected under 
Basel III, can be attributed largely to the increased 
cost of borrowing, the decrease in loans offered, 
and the resultant plunge in the money supply (The 
Economist, 2011:4). Adjusting to capital ratios is 
costly for banks, and according to Kowalik 
(2011:5), banks prefer to raise their capital ratios by 
decreasing lending instead of increasing equity 
capital. This, however, could cause a credit crunch 
and will undoubtedly decrease economic growth 
(Kowalik, 2011:5) due to the lack of money in the 
financial system. The economy is presently in the 
process of recovering from the recent financial 
crisis and a slow economic growth is, therefore, 
undesirable in the current state of the financial 
sector. According to Professor Tim Congdon, the 
main reason for the decrease in the money supply 
and the failure to recover from the financial crisis to 
date, is that “regulators...are pressing banks to raise 
capital asset ratios and to shrink their risk assets” 
(Evans-Pritchard, 2010).  
It is important to realise that banks take time 
to adjust to capital ratios (Kowalik, 2011:5) and as 
a result, the Basel Committee has designed a 
timeframe in which the regulations on capital are 
implemented gradually (Lyons & Casey, 2011:1). 
Regardless of this, however, these regulations will 
be costly to banks and only really make sense in 
times of credit expansion and monetary growth 
(Brown, 2010). As the economy is currently in a 
trough, these ideal conditions do not exist and the 
new Basel Accord could ultimately harm the 
economy and limit growth, making this an 
important topic for discussion in the management 
of bank capital under Basel III.  
 
Additional requirements under Basel III  
 
The first and second Basel Accords focused solely 
on micro-prudential factors, but Basel III has 
implemented a range of additional requirements in 
order to attain a broader range of macro-prudential 
goals (King & Tarbert, 2011:3). Over and above the 
minimum capital requirements discussed, 
conservation and countercyclical buffers,   a 
leverage ratio, will be introduced (Lyons & Casey, 
2011:25). According to Ojo (2011:15), the 
conservation and countercyclical buffers have the 
main aim of protecting the banking system from a 
build-up of risk, which can be directly linked to 
excessive credit growth. These buffers essentially 
raise the capital requirements to an even higher 
level, and in doing so, exacerbate the possible 
harmful effects of Basel III on the banking system 
and the economy. The leverage ratio is 
supplementary to the basic Basel III requirements 
and acts to provide a last resort, or 'backstop' of 
support to the risk weighted capital requirements 
(Lyons & Casey, 2011:24).  
Additional requirements have been introduced 
under Basel III with the aim of achieving a resilient 
banking sector and a macro-prudential focus (King 
& Tarbert, 2011:3). The conservation and 
countercyclical buffers increase the amount of 
capital banks are required to hold in an economic 
boom, resulting in capital reserves that can be used 
to absorb losses in an economic downturn 
(Kowalik, 2011:1). A leverage ratio has also been 
introduced to account for all on- and- off balance 
sheet leverage in an attempt to prevent the de-
leveraging of banks in a financial crisis (Lyons & 
Casey, 2011:26). Although these additional 
requirements seem beneficial, they each have their 
own drawbacks in practice and essentially double 
the minimum capital requirement proposed. These 
buffers could have advantages, but it was necessary 
to determine if the costs outweigh the gains.  
It was and is still evident that a large degree of 
uncertainty exists regarding the new capital 
requirements under Basel III. The Basel III 
framework proposes some fairly drastic changes 
and the reason that this research was undertaken 
was to form a clear, critical picture of the new 
regulations and their effects on the balance sheet 
only. 
 
Strategic Balance Sheet and Risk 
Management 
 
In the banking context, balance sheet management 
may briefly be defined as follows: 
Balance sheet management entails considering 
conflicting and competing objectives such as 
maximization of income/profit as opposed to 
minimizing financial risks associated with 
alternative portfolios (Tayi & Leonard : 1988). 
Although this definition is dated, it still applies 
today. However, the complexity of financial 
markets have drastically increased, markets in 
different countries are more integrated/linked 
together thereby influencing each other more than 
ever and all markets are more volatile. Financial 
products traded and offered to clients also had to 
become more complex due to the more complex 
management problems. 
Looking at the liability side of the balance 
sheet, it is clear that the primary business activity of 
a bank entails receiving money (deposits) from the 
general public (retail market) which are loanable 
funds. Deposit activities are often intricately linked 
to economic activity (e.g. interest rates, propensity 
to save), product ranges offered, services offered 
and competition between banks. 
Another important item on the liability side of 
the balance sheet is the capital and reserves (Tier 1 
Capital). Capital refers to the capital raised from 
issued shares. Reserves represent the accumulative 
profit carried forward from one year to the next. 
The relative size of the capital and reserves is seen 
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as very important to safeguard the bank against 
failure (as seen during the financial crisis) and is, at 
the same time, very controversial due to its effect 
on profitability. Increasing the issued share capital, 
of course, reduces the ROE. Increasing the capital 
buffer with the reserves component is dependent on 
the bank’s ability to generate profits through its 
core business. Apart from the capital requirements, 
the new regulatory risk weighted assets, maturity 
matching and liquidity requirements limit the 
ability of banks to take on risk and increase the 
ROE/ROA. To complicate thing even more, the 
economic environments have undergone change, 
leading to the reduced ability of clients (whether 
corporate of private) to save.  
The following important item on the liability 
side of the balance sheet is borrowed funds which is 
often used as a long-term source of funds. It is also 
used to leverage the return on the shareholder’s 
funds, if the bank succeeds in earning more with the 
borrowed funds than what it pays for it. 
On the asset side of the balance sheet the 
primary source of income is from loans and 
advances which may make up anything between 70 
and 80 percent or even more of the total balance 
sheet. The loans and advances are quite diverse. 
These include secured loans such as housing loans, 
unsecured loans such as credit card loans, loans to 
corporates and personal loans. Other assets are 
funds locked up in cash, traded instruments (e.g. 
bonds, derivatives) and other investments. 
When a bank attempts to manage its balance 
sheet on a strategic level, that is, over an extended 
planning period of say 36 to 60 months, it needs to 
look at the source(s) of funds, how much can it get 
hold of and how those funds will be allocated to the 
different asset classes that will generate its income. 
Over this planning period, the bank should also 
consider how it would want to change its position 
in the market to gain competitive advantage and 
gain market share or reposition it so that it may 
substantially reduce risk or say introduce new 
profitable product lines. It therefore has to consider 
how to strategically allocate the funds to different 
asset classes on a risk and return basis. Funds may 
be allocated to these classes in accordance with 
various factors that are usually linked to the 
economic environment and the bank’s own internal 
constraints and management policies. In South 
Africa, the financial markets and the change that 
the markets can undergo, is limited due to the size 
of the market and the profile of the depositors. 
The interaction between the asset and liability 
sides of the balance sheet, in the case of a bank, is 
unique. The structure of both sides of the balance 
sheet has to be considered together. Of course, the 
starting point of the balance sheet planning is to 
decide what funds the bank may in future receive 
(wholesale or retail). However, it is not to say that 
the bank should let the balance sheet constantly 
increase in size or grow. It may even want to reduce 
the size of the balance sheet to be able to maintain 
the ROE, the capital requirements and liquidity 
requirements. In the next section the model will be 
formulated. This is then followed up by an  
illustration of the model outcomes and a brief 
discussion. 
 
Balance sheet planning model 
formulation 
 
As the models that may be formulated to determine 
the future balance sheet structure, may vary 
substantially in terms of complexity and focus, it 
stands to reason that the most important variables 
that will materially influence the future position and 
profitability of the bank, must be used within the 
framework of the requirements of Basel III. It is not 
possible to consider all possible variables as this 
would make the model exceedingly complex. Any 
additional benefits that will be gained with 
additional complexity may be very marginal. 
Increased complexity may also lead to increased 
model risk. 
The primary objective of an optimization 
model may, on the one hand, be to maximize the 
shareholder’s wealth. On the other hand, the bank 
should attempt to minimize risk within a given 
framework. If risk is minimized, the return on 
equity is affected negatively. The purpose of this 
research is to elucidate the questions about the 
capital buffer level only. 
The research instrument utilised in order to 
collect primary data in this investigation takes the 
form of a simple, single objective linear 
programming model developed in Microsoft Excel. 
A model is defined as a “representation of a [real 
world] system that is constructed to study some 
aspect of the system as a whole” (Blumberg, 
2011:36).  
The model utilised in this research operated by 
inputting a summarised bank balance sheet (of 
ABSA bank in particular) into Microsoft Excel and 
allowing this financial statement to be modified and 
projected in order to optimise the allocation of 
assets and liabilities and equity under various 
scenarios while maintaining the RWA and liquidity 
regulatory requirements. Symbols have the 
following meaning: 
 
A = Asset 
L = Liability 
RWi = Asset risk weight for Ai 
Ri = Per period interest rate for asset Ai or 
liability Li for period j 
m = number of liabilities and equity 
n = number of assets 
o = number of goals 
i = ith asset or liability 
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j = jth period j of the planning or forecasting 
period 
s = short-term 
m = medium-term 
l = long-term 
 
Objective function: 
 
A standard optimisation model would attempt 
to optimize the net interest income as follows: 
 
Z = Max  )()(
11
j
m
i
jj
n
i
j RxLRxA
 
 
However, a simple, goal programming model 
formulation requires that the model “optimizes” the 
balance sheet by minimizing the deviations (
jj dd ,  from the stated goals. The user sets a goal 
for net interest income. The model then is used to 
structure a future balance sheet that will be as close 
to the profit goal as possible. Therefore, for this 
research, the following objective function was 
minimized: 
The objective function is restated as follows: 
 
Z = Min )11(
1
j
o
i
j dd
 
 
Where d1 is the deviation variable applicable 
to goal 1 for period j. The plus sign “+” indicates an 
over achievement of goal 1 for period j. The 
negative sign indicates an under achievement of 
goal 1 for period j. 
Subject to all decision variables being 
nonnegative: 
 
A, L ≥ 0 
 
 
Table 1. Mathematical formulation for decision variables 
 
Line item in balance sheet (decision variables) 
Decision variable value determined by lower and or 
upper bound or equal to constraint 
Liabilities: Other than deposits and capital (not 
changed by LP model. Balances are kept static and 
equal to the opening balance sheet values.) 
 
Deposits from banks  L1j = opening balance 
Trading liabilities L2j = opening balance 
Derivative liabilities  L3j = opening balance 
Hedging liabilities L4j = opening balance 
Deposits: Short-term  No limitation: L5sj ≥ 0 
Deposits: Medium-term  No limitation: L5mj ≥ 0  
Deposits: Long-term  No limitation: L5lj ≥ 0  
Debt securities in issue L6j = opening balance 
Normal tax L7j = opening balance 
Liabilities under investment contracts  L8j = opening balance 
Policyholder liabilities under 
insurance contracts 
L9j = opening balance 
Borrowed funds  L10j = opening balance 
Other liabilities and sundry provisions L11j = opening balance 
Deferred tax liabilities L12j = opening balance 
Share premium - Preference shares L13j = opening balance 
Shareholder’s equity: Capital and accumulated reserves 
at end of period j 
n
i
jj AR
1
- 
m
i
jjLR
1
-  (L14(opening) x  (1 + per 
period ROE% for period j) = 0 
Minority interest L15j = opening balance 
Minority - Barclays L16j = opening balance 
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Assets: Loans and advances and other assets  
Cash, cash balances and balances with central banks L1j ≥ %  of 
m
i
Lj
1
 
Statutory liquid asset portfolio L2j ≥ %  of 
m
i
Lj
1
 
Loans and advances to banks A3j = opening balance 
Trading assets A4j = opening balance 
Derivative assets A5j = opening balance 
Total hedging assets A6j = opening balance 
Loans and advances to customers - short term No limitation: A7sj ≥ = 0 
Loans and advances to customers - medium term No limitation: A7mj ≥ = 0 
Loans and advances to customers - long term No limitation: A7lj ≥ = 0 
Reinsurance assets A8j = opening balance 
Other assets A9j = opening balance 
Investments A10j = opening balance 
Subsidiary shares A11j = opening balance 
Investments in associated undertakings and joint 
ventures 
A12j = opening balance 
Intangible assets A13j = opening balance 
Property and equipment A14j = opening balance 
Current tax assets A15j = opening balance 
Deferred tax assets A16j = opening balance 
 
Table 2. Mathematical formulation of other additional constraints 
 
Accounting constraint  
Total assets = total liabilities 
n
i
Aj
1
-
m
j
Lj
1
= 0 
Level of liabilities of planned balance sheet is 
equal to the level of the opening balance sheet 
m
i
openingL
1
)( =
m
i
jL
1
 
Regulatory constraints:   
Maintenance of capital buffer  
Capital asset ratio (CAR): Shareholder’s capital + 
retained earnings + forecast period growth must be ≥ 
prescribed % of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) 
(L14(opening) x  (1 + per period ROE% for period j)) ≥  
Minimum capital % x ( RWjxAj
n
i 1
) 
Maturity Mismatch  
Short-term loans must be a percentage of short-term 
liabilities 
AL5sj - % of L7sj = 0 
Medium-term loans must be a percentage of medium-
term liabilities 
AL5mj - % of L7mj = 0 
Long-term loans must be a percentage of long-term 
liabilities 
AL5lj - % of L7lj = 0 
 
It is important to note that the Deposits due to 
customers and Loans and advances to customers are 
left open to fluctuate. All these decision variables 
have lower bounds only, i.e. they are set ≥ 0. The 
size of the balance sheet is therefore dependant only 
on the level at which the model can satisfy the 
profit goal (minimise the deviations), satisfy the 
accounting and regulatory (capital buffer and 
liquidity) constraints. All balances other than loans 
and deposits are set equal to the opening balance 
sheet values. It is assumed that all other balances 
stay static, i.e. do not change over the entire 
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planning period of one year. Although this is 
unrealistic, it is done to observe the change in the 
compositing of the main interest earning liabilities 
and assets and ultimately the effect of certain 
changes in important variables on the balance sheet 
size, profit and balance sheet composition.  
The Basel capital implications are mainly 
implemented in this model. The Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio (LCR), Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is 
not considered. However, liquidity is considered 
only to a limited extent as indicated above. The 
final outcome and relationship between assets and 
liabilities should, however, be very similar to 
implementing LCR and NSFR. 
 
 
 
The data 
 
The final results of ABSA Bank Limited as at 31 
December 2012, was used in this research. A 
simplified balance sheet is used as illustrated 
below. The only adjustment made to the balance 
sheet was to split Loans and advances to customers 
and Deposits due to customers into short-, medium- 
and long-term line items. The sub-values are 
fictitious. However, the totals still balance with the 
original balance sheet. This was done to implement 
a maturity mismatch constraint as indicated in the 
previous section under problem formulation. Apart 
from the balances, the table also indicates the 
percentages of funds locked up in the different 
categories of the balance sheet.  
Table 3. The data 
 
  
Proportion Opening BS 2012/1/1 Interest rate 
Cash, cash balances and balances with central banks 
 
3.217% 24 847 409 691 4.00% 
Statutory liquid asset portfolio 
 
4.278% 33 042 731 034 5.00% 
Loans and advances to banks 
 
6.038% 46 634 312 485 5.00% 
Trading assets 
 
1.744% 13 471 867 777 7.00% 
Derivative assets 
 
8.468% 65 406 817 026 7.00% 
Total hedging assets 
 
0.406% 3 139 370 276 7.00% 
Loans and advances to customers S 4.165% 32 170 759 269 8.00% 
Loans and advances to customers M 25.893% 200 000 000 000 9.00% 
Loans and advances to customers L 38.839% 300 000 000 000 10.00% 
Reinsurance assets 
 
0.117% 902 782 419 0.00% 
Other assets 
 
2.187% 16 892 880 183 0.00% 
Investments 
 
3.513% 27 132 760 936 0.00% 
Subsidiary shares 
 
-0.195% -1 509 589 231 10.00% 
Investments in associated undertakings and joint ventures 
 
0.278% 2 144 009 946 0.00% 
Intangible assets 
 
0.124% 957 289 028 0.00% 
Property and equipment 
 
0.890% 6 874 905 352 0.00% 
Current tax assets 
 
0.008% 59 537 710 0.00% 
Deferred tax assets 
 
0.031% 243 055 853 0.00% 
Deposits from banks 
 
7.558% 54 928 315 291 3.00% 
Trading liabilities 
 
0.654% 4 751 267 937 4.00% 
Derivative liabilities 
 
9.355% 67 985 815 297 8.00% 
Hedging liabilities 
 
0.149% 1 079 764 107 8.00% 
Deposits due to customers - short term S 11.322% 82 281 091 291 3.00% 
Deposits due to customers - medium term M 13.760% 100 000 000 000 4.00% 
Deposits due to customers - long term L 27.521% 200 000 000 000 5.00% 
Debt securities in issue   22.828% 165 899 975 378 0.00% 
Normal tax   0.060% 434 157 291 0.00% 
Liabilities under investment contracts 
 
1.428% 10 376 919 854 0.00% 
Policyholder liabilities under insurance contracts 
 
0.423% 3 076 208 062 7.00% 
Borrowed funds 
 
1.692% 12 296 353 503 8.75% 
Other liabilities and sundry provisions 
 
1.807% 13 131 045 705 0.00% 
Deferred tax liabilities 
 
0.390% 2 834 841 649 0.00% 
Share premium - Preference shares 
 
0.639% 4 643 930 718 0.00% 
Minority interest 
 
0.143% 1 042 035 781 0.00% 
Minority  - Barclays 
 
0.270% 1 962 843 519 0.00% 
Capital and reserves attributable to equity holders: 
 
6.287% 45 686 334 368 0.00% 
Profit 
 
0.000% 0 0.00% 
Profit deviation (d1+) 
 
0.000% 0 0.00% 
Profit deviation (d1-) 
 
0.000% 0 0.00% 
TOTAL 
 
0 0   
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Empirical results 
 
The model was used to illustrate the relationship 
between the balance sheet size, the profit and risk 
taking by the bank for different levels of capital. A 
controversial question is, what should the level of 
capital be that a particular bank (or all banks 
generally) should hold as a buffer. Basel prescribes 
the minima as discussed above. The effect of 
changing this requirement is addressed in this 
research. However, the safe level of capital (for a 
particular bank) is really a function of many things 
such as the risk policy, current risk profile (Tier 1 
and 2 capital and reserves) and the future strategy 
of the bank within a certain market context. A 
lengthy discussion of these aspects, fall outside of 
the scope of this research. However, the point 
should be made that the level of risk that any bank 
wants to take on is dependent on its appetite for 
risk. What any bank therefore views as the optimal 
capital level is relative and dependant on its 
strategic goals. This optimal level of capital is not 
the same as the minimum prescribed by Basel. 
The first aspect that is modelled is the impact 
of change in the capital reserve requirement on the 
size of the balance sheet. Figure 2 below seems to 
indicate an exponential decrease in balance sheet 
size, with the size of the balance sheet falling 
rapidly at a capital requirement less that 11% and 
decreasing more gradually thereafter. At a capital 
reserve requirements of 5%, the resulting balance 
sheet is 190% of the original balance sheet size, and 
at the 25% capital reserve requirement the balance 
sheet is merely 57% of the original size. Increasing 
the reserve requirement from say 5% to 9,5% gives 
rise to approximately 40% change in balance sheet 
size, all other things being constant. 
In order to maintain the capital buffer 
requirement, the model adjusts the size of the 
balance sheet. The size adjustment is largely due to 
a decrease in the loans extended to customers on 
the asset side of the balance sheet and fewer 
deposits accepted on the equity and liability side of 
the balance sheet. In order to meet the capital buffer 
(through the RWA percentages) and different yields 
on short-, medium and long-term loans, the 
volumes of these items are adjusted by the model. 
From the data collected it is evident that banks will 
have to completely reduce medium and long term 
loans to R0 in order to meet the capital reserve 
requirements optimally. Figure 3 illustrates that 
short-term loans will also be decreased drastically 
as the reserve requirement increases. These 
decreases require significant and often costly 
restructuring within the banking system and could 
also have a significant impact on the economy if 
banks withdraw from this market. This is a strategic 
issue that banks will have to evaluate carefully. 
Since banks will not be able to adjust their 
balance sheets much due to market and internal 
constraints (even less so over the short term), they 
will have to find other ways to increase profit. 
Efficiency, among other things, will probably be 
one way to improve profit. Instead of focusing on 
extending the balance sheet and 
increasing/decreasing the total assets held, banks 
will have to reduce their assets and function more 
efficiently if they hope to meet the capital 
requirements while trying to stay liquid and 
maintaining an acceptable profitability level for the 
owners. Another way for banks to increase 
profitability is to move into new services which 
bear relatively low risk with a promise of a high 
payoff. An example would be extended electronic 
services due to improved technology. 
 
Figure 2. The percentage change in the size of the balance sheet in comparison to the original when a capital 
reserve is implemented (holding all else static) 
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Figure 3. The change in the value of short-term loans as an increased capital reserve requirement is implemented 
 
 
 
The next aspect considered is the effect of the 
capital buffer requirements on the risk weighted 
assets (see Figure 4 below). Table 2 clearly 
indicates how the loan balances, which easily make 
up 70 to 80 percent of the total assets, behave as the 
reserve requirement is increased. From Table 2 it is 
evident that the largest constituent of the RWA are 
short-term loans to customers. These assets have 
risk-weightings (for this research) ranging between 
50% and 100%. From this table it can, therefore, be 
concluded that banks will have to take on less loans 
as the capital requirements are increased, assuming 
that the capital buffer is not be increased in any 
other way than through profit for the year. If capital 
increases only by the current year’s profit, the 
reduced higher yielding loans volumes will have a 
negative impact on profit and ROE. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 5 below. If the bank wants 
to maintain the ROE at all cost, it will have to 
increase the size of the balance sheet (see Figure 2) 
in order to achieve this target, an option which may 
turn out to require unrealistic funding. Apart from 
annual reserve growth, the growth of the balance 
sheet can only be achieved by a high deposit 
growth rate or by increasing the borrowed funds. 
 
It may be concluded, tentatively, that, banks 
may want to invest in riskier assets (as they yield 
more) as a result of the Basel increased capital 
requirements due to pressure from shareholders to 
maintain profitability. Investing in riskier assets 
requires more capital which can only be acquired 
through new issue of shares, or reserves earned 
over time. Alternatively, the balance sheet size has 
to shrink if no reserves and or capital will be 
obtained. 
In this investigation, the RWA decreased as 
the capital reserve requirement increased. This was 
largely due to the shrinking balance sheet and the 
fact that the reserve value (increased only by the 
current year’s profit of 25%) was kept constant at 
R57 107 917 960. As in Figure 2, depicting the 
percentage change in the size of the balance sheet, 
the value of the RWA also falls exponentially with 
increasing requirements. If RWA is calculated as a 
percentage of total assets, however, there is a far 
more linear relationship between the RWA and the 
required capital. This can be seen in Figure 4 
below.
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Figure 4. The change in RWA and the capital reserve held by banks when increased capital reserve requirements 
are implemented 
 
 
 
Table 2. The constituents of the total RWA at various capital reserve requirements 
 
 
 
Profitability is an important aspect to consider. 
From figure 5 it is evident that the proposed Basel 
III capital requirements could have a fairly 
significant impact on the profit level realised in the 
financial sector. As the capital reserve requirement 
is increased from 5% of RWA to 14%, the profit 
falls from over R60 billion to just over R10 billion. 
At a capital reserve requirement of higher than 
14%, the profit level remains constant and a 
minimum floor level of profit is essentially created. 
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The drastic decline in the profit invariably arises 
due to the decrease in the size of the balance sheet 
with increasing capital stringency. As the balance 
sheet shrinks, fewer assets are held and, therefore, 
fewer returns are earned for the bank. This decrease 
in returns may cause banks to invest in (assumedly) 
riskier assets in order to increase profitability.  
 
Figure 5. The impact of capital requirements on profit levels 
 
 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
It was explained that as the capital buffer 
requirements increase, more of the loans balances 
have to be set aside as capital. In order for the bank 
to do this, the balances of assets with high risk 
weightings have to be kept constant to adhere to the 
capital reserve requirement. The total RWA’s are 
limited by current capital and reserves, which can 
only increase due to the issuing of additional shares 
or due to profit realized and carried over to capital 
and reserves. In these results we see conflicting 
outcomes. To increase the profit and ROE, the bank 
has to invest in higher yielding assets which, of 
course, is more risky and carries higher risk 
weightings and in the end require more capital and 
reserves. If the banks want to maintain the ROE at 
all cost (given an increased CAR), it will have to 
increase the size of the balance sheet while 
investing in lower yielding, lower risk assets. If it 
wants to maintain the ROE but invest in higher risk 
higher yielding assets, it will have to decrease the 
balance sheet size. The first alternative may turn 
out to be unrealistic in the given market conditions. 
The second alternative may also take time to 
implement and may be met with resistance. 
The question that needs to be answered is: 
what minimum level of capital should banks 
maintain? Setting the minimum level of capital as a 
percentage of RWA’s seems to be too a simplistic 
approach. However, it seems from the observed 
results that the answer should depend on the risk 
that an individual bank is willing to take, its current 
risky position and also on what the market is 
capable of sustaining, which is very limited in the 
economy. It also seems as though the banks are 
caught up between a rock and a hard place. A bank 
can achieve basically anything as long as it is 
willing and able to change the input variables. It 
does seem that the most viable alternative is for 
banks to focus on being true bankers again and to 
start focusing on value added services and 
efficiency.  
Many more models can be developed to 
determine the “optimal” level of capital. However, 
in the end the answer really has to do with 
qualitative issues such as bank management in 
general. Basel III attempts to, among other aspects, 
set the general level of capital that all banks must 
maintain now and in future. Is it not really treating 
the symptoms rather than the problems? The 
attitude of managers when it comes to taking risk is 
forgotten – think of the highly geared banks that 
failed after the financial crisis. Should bank 
managers not also be held accountable for the way 
that they deal with funds that belong to other 
people? Should they not also be prevented from 
practicing as bankers/bank managers if they are 
found guilty of unethical practices (including taking 
undue risk)? Should Basel not also prescribe 
volumes of investment in certain asset classes or 
limit risk taking in the first instance? Should certain 
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product lines such as housing loans not rather be 
granted by a specialised organization such as SA 
Home Loans where long term funding can more 
easily be matched with long term lending? 
A lot has been implied above. But, let us not 
forget how inefficient and unproductive banks can 
sometimes be. Improving the current business 
model may go a long way towards increasing or at 
least maintaining ROE in spite of the Basel III 
requirements. On the other hand, should 
shareholder not accept that banks will in future, 
possibly, have to achieve lower returns? 
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